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19980115 048

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-035

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Deputy Minister of Agriculture Replaced
92P20193A

[Editorial Report] Sofia TRUD and ZEMYA in Bulgarian on 26 February publish front-page reports on the replacement of Georgi Tanev, deputy minister of agriculture, by Vladislav Kostov. Under the headline "The Lawyer-Minister Gets Rid of the Only Specialist on His Team," TRUD reporter Anatoliy Iliev writes that Professor Tanev was released on the basis of Article 328, Item 9 of the Labor Code for being "effectively incapable of fulfilling his duties." According to Iliev, Tanev attracted the attention of Minister of Agriculture Stanislav Dimitrov with an unfortunate interview in which "our agricultural administration was characterized as a circus and its leadership accused of incompetence." In the ZEMYA article, Rayna Stoyanova adds the following biographic information about Tanev's successor: "The new deputy minister, a little over 50, is an agronomist by training, served until recently as a representative for Bulgarplodekspor in Prague, and is a specialist on the canning industry."

New National Security Commission Head Interviewed

*AU1703141392 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 12 Mar 92 p 1, 3*

[Interview with Nikolay Slatinski, newly elected chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on National Security, by Valeri Vasev; place and date not given: "Let Us Introduce New Principles and Restore Parliamentary Control"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[Vasev] You are already familiar with the first versions of the bills drafted on the problems of national security. Do they contain any promising concepts?

[Slatinski] The idea has been launched to adopt a general bill under the working title "On Defense and Armed Forces." This bill should contain the basic views of the Ministry of Defense leadership and the General Staff. Nevertheless, we can discuss the question in more detail only after it has been submitted to the National Security Committee.

[Vasev] Whom are you going to rely on within the commission? Which competent institutions or persons do you intend to consult, considering the specific nature of the subject?

[Slatinski] I already pointed out how we intend to compensate for some shortcomings in our competence. We rely on the lofty sense of duty that all deputies of our faction have in common and on the sense of responsibility of certain members from the opposition. As chairman of the National Security Commission, however, I fully realize that any subject whatsoever can be politicized, but the problems of national security absolutely require mutual agreement.

[Vasev] You mean consensus.

[Slatinski] I would not hesitate to use the word, but this is not the most important thing today. What counts is that we should realize the major priorities, that we should rely on experts' opinions, that we should adopt sensible decisions and pass the kinds of bills that are in conformity with the new world situation. We should rely on the existing realities by taking into consideration Bulgaria's difficult economic situation, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the new way of thinking in all spheres related to geopolitical factors. Such are the parameters that determine our national security. They should be the basic principles of our future legislation. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that, despite the prevailing public opinion, we are still quite far removed from a consensus.

[Vasev] Mr. Dimitur Yonchev was elected your deputy at the commission. Is this not an indication that relations between the two factions are changing?

[Slatinski] The hostile reaction [of the opposition] to all actions of our ministers for the sake of political profit is also felt in the National Security Commission. For this reason, precisely, I am glad that our parliamentary group showed wisdom in voting for Mr. Yonchev. This is a way of showing that we are ready to cooperate with our opponents for the sake of national security. We are convinced that the principles laid down in our program require an effort to find a common language with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Parliamentary Group. The vote for Mr. Yonchev was a symbolic gesture of joining hands, of appealing to the opposition that national security interests should prevail. [passage omitted]

[Vasev] I cannot help asking you a question connected with the bills on decommunization that were already submitted to parliament. Mr. Stoyanov's draft plans to ban former political officers and party secretaries at the level of primary party organizations and upwards from public life. Do you have any comment on this question?

[Slatinski] When I assumed the leadership of the National Security Commission, I observed that the bill in question was not submitted to our commission. I will insist that it should be discussed at the National Security Commission. We will base our views on the need to preserve the Army's fighting capacity and on the need to find a solution in the spirit of the law that should, nevertheless, avoid any damage to the Armed Forces.

[Vasev] Could you briefly describe, in one sentence, your own intentions?

[Slatinski] It is my wish that new principles should be introduced and parliamentary control restored.

New Security Service Chief Views Role of Service
*AU2003090692 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
 16 Mar 92 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel Chavdar Petkov, director of the National Security Service, by Ventsislav Lakov; place and date not given: "Disreputable Political Intentions Give Rise to Attempts To Compromise"]

[Text] [Lakov] How does one explain the attempt to discredit Minister Stoyan Ganev and Ahmed Dogan?

[Petkov] In this case, operational information was used incompetently. We receive information from all channels, including through the use of special devices. We have to use them because we need to uncover hidden processes. They may be criminal acts, but it is possible that they do not qualify as such in the Penal Code.

[Lakov] How does one arrange the use of special devices?

[Petkov] We act according to a strict system of permits. Usually we have a public prosecutor's order, but, to receive this, we have to analyze the primary information we receive. During the process of this primary check, we ascertain the reliability of the source. This type of primary information is secret and operational. It remains confidential so that we have an opportunity to work normally and objectively. This is exactly the type of information that was leaked in the case of Stoyan Ganev and Ahmed Dogan.

I stress that such information has no value in a court of law and can be unreliable.

Unfortunately, because of the imperfections in parts of the Constitution that are directly applicable to us, additional legislation is needed on the use of special devices to prevent violations of human rights. As you can see, the publication of the primary information gave rise to tension in society.

[Lakov] However, publication actually happened....

[Petkov] I do not want to make any comments on this matter. This is not because I am afraid to speak about the matter but because the procedure laid down by the National Security Council must be adhered to in the case in question.

[Lakov] Information about a new kompromat [intentional discrediting of public figures], aimed at discrediting Stoyan Ganev and Ventsislav Dimitrov, appeared in the press....

[Petkov] I also learned about this from the papers. The question of the illegal removal of documentation from the former security services is a very serious one, but it is a reality. We are not indifferent to this matter and are taking specific measures. I could speak about them, but then we would have yet another kompromat on our hands.

[Lakov] Let me put the question like this. How many people have been sacked from the State Security and National Service for Protection of the Constitution [NSZK]? They could use that information.

[Petkov] The answer to this question is officially a state secret. The officer staff of the State Security numbered 1,500, and the NSZK establishment stood at 539 persons. The National Security Service now has 409 posts, but not all of these are filled. The legislative basis for work with secret documents is foolproof, but people work with these documents and can misuse them if they so decide. We cannot check on everybody.

[Lakov] How can the National Security Service be controlled?

[Petkov] At the moment we need parliamentary control.

This will also be of use to the National Security Commission because there is no other organ that coordinates the actions of the various special services. There is no one to investigate the information requirements of the chief government departments in Bulgaria. Control must be exercised in such a way as not to jeopardize the sources with which the service works. It can be implemented at the final point of output from the system. In this way, it will be possible to assess whether we are working within the limits of our powers and whether the information received from us is correct and of any value. It is possible to have a form of control that extends to the very center of our service in specific cases, but then the results ought not to be made public.

[Lakov] I understand that your work requires you to work under conditions of restricted publicity. Would you comment on the publication of specific information on the files of members of parliament, on secret projects with major state participation, and on espionage activities? Surely such cases are rather numerous?

[Petkov] They can all be explained by dishonest political intentions. Not one of these publications can solve Bulgaria's main problems....

[Lakov] Who is responsible?

[Petkov] The people responsible are those who are illegally in possession of such documents and make them public. Our service must guard secrets and detect the people who are using such materials.

[Lakov] A lot of time has passed since the first article was published in FAKS. Did you discover who was behind it?

[Petkov] Let us leave this question unanswered. We do not want any untruths, half-truths, or complete fabrications to appear in the press. People need peace and quiet; we are dealing with our own problems, but the most important thing—a sense of responsibility to the state—remains in the background.

Yordanov on Country's Entry to Council of Europe
AU1703144692 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
11 Mar 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Aleksandur Yordanov, chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission and of the Parliamentary Group of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Ventsislav Lakov; place and date not given: "Decommunization Is a Process and Will Be Accomplished Through a Number of Laws"]

[Text] [Lakov] Last week and on 10 March you had meetings with representatives from the Council of Europe, who have to prepare a report on our admittance to this institution. What are your impressions from the talks?

[Yordanov] The European Parliament has already had contacts with our National Assembly for two years. A great deal of work was done on collecting information about the democratic process in the country. Messrs. Martinez, Columberg, and Rathbone are well acquainted with Bulgaria's problems and have extensively gone into the nature of the change being carried out. The talks with the three parliament members, who are representatives of three different ideological trends in Europe—socialist, Christian democrat, and conservative—touched on a wide range of questions. Matters to do with human rights and the rights of minority groups were given priority. The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] put forward its stance, which was fully shared and welcomed by the three members of parliament. The stance gives the best guarantees that the country will be admitted into the Council of Europe. We propound the thesis that civil rights and freedoms will always be respected in Bulgaria and that all ethnic groups will be able to defend their rights.

[Lakov] What was the range of the unresolved problems that exist between our parliament and the Council of Europe?

[Yordanov] As far as I know, the position of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] on the ethnic issue has been subjected to serious criticism. The three rapporteurs were not satisfied with the Socialists' views on the rights of the ethnic minorities, and, more specifically, the rights of the Turkish population. After three days of talks, it became clear that there was another area of contention to do with the decommunization law submitted by the SDS. We reached a common position that decommunization is a process that will be accomplished through the country's laws. In practice, each newly adopted law will aid decommunization. If the reform comes up against organized opposition such as an attempt to change the government by force or the creation of a parliamentary crisis by force or violent opposition to adopted bills, then it is logical that we could reach the point of a special decommunization law. This law will resolve specific, individual problems and not tar different categories of people with the same brush.

[Lakov] Does a contradiction exist between the president's statements, the decision of the SDS Coordinating Council, and the SDS Parliamentary Groups's assessment of this process?

[Yordanov] I was present when Dr. Zhelev made his statement, and I can assure you that he was not happy with the way his opinion was represented by certain mass media. The president's point is that decommunization is a process and that it will be accomplished through various laws. This view is fully in line with ours. It seems to me that, at the SDS Coordinating Council, its members exchanged their views. However, because of the coalition nature of the SDS, before this exchange of views can take place, the question was to have been discussed by the different parties and organizations. This did not happen. That is why, in my opinion, the SDS Coordinating Council's decision is rather hasty. I hasten to emphasize that, if a special law on decommunization is adopted in Bulgaria, it will be caused by the behavior of the BSP and its local economic *nomenklatura*. In this sense, I accept Dr. Zhelev's opinion that, if the Communists aid decommunization in the country, the changes will continue successfully. However, I doubt that the part of the BSP that still thinks in a Stalinist fashion will help. However, let us wait and see. The future will determine our actions.

[Lakov] What are your expectations from the report that the Council of Europe will receive?

[Yordanov] I believe that the rapporteurs departed with a clear understanding of the path our country has traversed toward democracy. They managed to convince themselves of the fact that, after the 13 October elections, we now have a genuinely democratic government and that genuine European attitudes are being established in the country. In my opinion, there are no obstacles in the way of Bulgaria's being admitted to the Council of Europe as early as its session in May.

Administrators Discuss Sowing, Turkish Language

AU2203202092 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 16 Mar 92
p 1

[TRUD staff report: "Let Those Who Do Not Sow in Spring Read the Penal Code"]

[Text] On 14 and 15 March in Borovets, the country's oblast administrators discussed the problems of municipal self-government. On 15 March, Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov took part in the meeting, the government's Press Center announced. Stanislav Dimitrov, minister of agriculture, and experts from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, also took part in the meeting.

The problems of the coming spring sowing occupied a central place in the talks on 15 March. The oblast administrators promised to cooperate by all means and seek legal responsibility from those who do not implement their obligations in this sphere or deliberately

hinder the normal conduct of the sowing. The participants shared the categorical opinion that the sanctions and penalties must be extraordinarily strict. However, we do not know whether normal economic measures guaranteeing our nutrition during the year have also been discussed. As is known, on 13 March the minister of agriculture requested 2.5 billion leva for ensuring the spring sowing. For the time being, the Bulgarian National Bank intends to offer a credit of only 1 billion leva.

The oblast administrators have promised the prime minister to strictly control the bookkeeping and the administrative services for the population. Issues related to the administrators' functions and obligations as organs of state management called upon to resolve problems with the land, restitution, and privatization, also have been discussed during the meeting.

The participants also discussed the issue of Turkish-language study in the schools. They have confirmed that every citizen has the right to study any foreign language he wants. However, on the other hand, it has been pointed out that the manner of study and the study program, envisaged by Decree No. 232 of the Council of Ministers, refer only to the mother language—that is, the language related to the ethnic origin of the people.

Bulgarian Socialist Party Statute Adopted

92BA0334A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Dec 91 p 5

[Statute of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP, adopted at the 39th BSP Congress, with amendments and supplements made at the 40th BSP Congress]

[Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is a political organization that works for a democratic, socially just, and humane society, on the basis of universal, national, and socialist values.

The BSP expresses and defends the interests of the working people and other strata that favor democracy and a social market economy. It is a mass parliamentary party. It defends the national interests and attains its objectives through democratic means, in accordance with the country's Constitution and laws.

The BSP is the party of democratic socialism. It makes its activities consistent with the achievements of contemporary science and the experience and traditions of the socialist movement. It shares the ideas of the Socialist International and the basic values of freedom, justice, and solidarity. It is part of the world's left.

I. Principles Governing the Party's Structure and Activities

Article 1. The BSP is a democratically united organization, with common programmatic objectives. It functions and develops on the basis of the principle of democratic unity.

Article 2. The party's structure is based on the territorial principle. A socialist has the right to choose the group of which he wishes to be a member, as follows:

1. In primary party organizations, according to place of residence or interest.
2. In township party councils.

Article 3. The BSP has freedom of ideological trends, platforms, movements, and associations within the framework of the party's programmatic objectives and statute. Its supporters are represented in the party's elected authorities.

Article 4. The party's relations and activities are based on the following:

1. Equality of rights and obligations of the socialists.
2. Comradeship, cohesion, mutual respect, and mutual aid.
3. Freedom to express views and to submit alternate proposals for discussion and resolution of problems.
4. Openness and glasnost in activities and responsibility for decisions, actions, and steps.
5. Autonomy of the party authorities and organizations in formulating and resolving problems of their structure, relations, and activities.

Article 5. The party organs are structured and function in accordance with the following requirements:

1. All leading bodies and positions subject to election, based on a majority vote (no fewer than one-half plus one of all votes cast), through direct or indirect, secret or open elections held in the respective organizations, with alternate options or by delegation of powers by part of the memberships.
2. Renewal, rejuvenation, and combination of the efforts of different generations of cadres.
3. Division of functions and authorities between permanent and temporary party bodies and the combination of horizontal and vertical ties among party councils and party organizations.
4. Control from below of the activities of all party bodies and periodical accountability by the leaderships to the socialists and to the party organizations.

Article 6. Resolutions in the party organizations and bodies are passed by general consensus or majority vote. They are mandatory for the respective bodies and party members who have adopted them. The resolutions on the election of leading authorities apply to all members.

Minorities have the right to defend their views and submit for discussion in the party press and for resolution in the party bodies their own alternate proposals, without obstructing the implementation of resolutions passed by the majority.

Article 7. The BSP is open to society. Its relations with political parties, trade unions, and other public organizations and movements are based on respect for the supremacy of the national interests and the rights of the individual, political cooperation and interaction, tolerance of political dialogue, and a constructive approach.

Article 8. The participation of the BSP in the state bodies is achieved through the activities of its members who have been elected to those bodies. They uphold the political line of the party as stipulated in its programmatic documents and statute.

Article 9. To implement its activities, the party owns property that belongs to the entire party, and to the township and the primary party organization.

II. Socialist Party Structure

Article 10. Party membership may be individual and collective.

Article 11. Any adult Bulgarian citizen can be a member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party if he accepts the party's programmatic documents and statute, is guided by them in his political activities, is a member of and participates in the work of any party organization or township party council, and pays his membership dues.

Membership in other political parties is incompatible with membership in the BSP.

Article 12. Party membership is voluntary.

The primary party organization and the township party council have the right to accept new members.

The resolution to accept a new member is adopted by a simple majority.

Article 13. Professional, youth, women's, cultural, and other associations, organizations, clubs, and movements that share the socialist values and ideals and support the party's policy and activities may be collective members of the BSP.

Collective membership is established with a protocol signed by the respective managements.

Article 14. Followers and sympathizers of the BSP may participate in the activities of the party organizations.

Article 15. A party member has the following rights:

1. To participate in the formulation and implementation of party policy and resolutions, and to freely express and uphold his own views, opinions, and considerations on all problems related to party activities.

2. To elect and be elected to the party bodies; to participate in nominating the party candidates for state power bodies.

3. To seek and obtain information from the party bodies on their own and on overall party activities and to express verbally or in writing his proposals aimed at improving their activities.

4. To discuss the work and behavior of the party members, bodies, and organizations, and to participate in the supervision of their activities.

5. To be protected by the party should he be threatened, persecuted, discredited, or slandered for political convictions and actions of his that do not violate the country's laws and the party's objectives and principles.

6. To be present whenever his party status and activities are discussed; to resign from the party of his own free will.

Article 16. A party member assumes the following obligations:

1. To participate in and support the party in electoral campaigns and other political actions and to contribute to the development of parliamentary democracy.

2. To work for the strengthening of party unity, to enhance its influence in society and develop its ties to the people.

3. By his personal behavior, to strengthen humanism in society and to contribute to achieving public support for the party's policy.

Article 17. The party status (restriction, expulsion) of a party member who has violated programmatic documents, the statute, legality, or public morality standards is discussed and resolved by the primary party organization or township party council of which he is a member.

If, within a period of three months, such bodies fail to express their views on the status of such socialists, the matter is considered and resolved by the township or the All-Party Control Commission.

Termination of membership is based on the personal wish of the party member.

Individuals who have left the party may request to rejoin it after a period of one year; in the case of an expellee, the wait is two years.

Article 18. Complaints and objections submitted by party members are considered and resolved by the respective control commissions within three months of their receipt; the results are reported to the primary party organization or the township party council.

III. The Party's Organizational Structure

The organizational structural units of the BSP are the following:

Primary party organizations, township party organizations, and all-party bodies.

Party clubs, federations, and regional and rayon coordinating councils are set up to develop horizontal relations.

During electoral campaigns, temporary party structures are organized.

Primary Party Organizations

Article 19. Primary party organizations are created at places of residence and according to the interests of the membership, on the initiative of the socialists or the township party councils, and must consist of no fewer than three party members. Such organizations may also be created by party members who live, work, or are engaged in studies abroad, unless this violates the laws of the respective countries.

The primary party organizations must register with the respective township party councils.

Article 20. The primary party organizations determine their own structures. They may set up groups by residential district, street, or housing area, on the basis of interests, and on the basis of civic initiatives.

Article 21. The party meeting, which is convened by the executive bureau or on the initiative of one-quarter of the socialists, but no less frequently than once every three months, is the leading authority of the primary party organization. The party meeting handles all issues of the party organization and makes decisions on them; it nominates candidates for party bodies working in the state authorities and local self-governments and discusses their platforms.

Article 22. The primary party organization holds an annual accountability and election meeting. The organization and implementation of its current activities are accomplished through the election of an executive bureau consisting of a secretary, a deputy secretary, a treasurer, and members.

Article 23. The primary party organization actively participates in the formulation of party policy and its implementation on the respective territory; it works for strengthening the party's influence and ties to the population; it expresses and defends the interests of its members, adherents, and sympathizers; it supports and develops relations with the other local political forces, public organizations, movements, and associations; it organizes and conducts the electoral campaign of the party within the electoral section; it engages in individual work with like-minded people, sympathizers, and voters; and it resolves matters of party membership and problems related to party property.

Article 24. One or several primary party organizations may create a party club. Such clubs are centers for ideological-political and mass cultural activities; ties to socialists, sympathizers, and voters; and places for holding meetings and debates and for the dissemination

and utilization of party printed matter and other activities. They are managed by club councils, which plan and organize their activities.

The party clubs are supported by funds of the primary party organizations, donations, aid, and their own revenue.

Article 25. The primary party organizations based on interest (professional, creative, and other) and consisting of one or several township party organizations aimed at coordinating their activities may unite into federations.

Township Party Organizations

Article 26. The township party organization rallies all primary party organizations and party members (individual and collective) within the township.

Article 27. The township conference (General Assembly) is the supreme authority of the township party. The rates of representation to the conference are determined by the township party council. The delegates retain their mandates until the next accountability and election conference and, if necessary, hold meetings.

The conference (the General Assembly):

1. Discusses the reports of the township party council, of the group of socialist council members, and of the control commission.
2. Formulates the basic directions in the work of the township party organization and considers other issues related to party activities.
3. Ratifies the platform of the township party organization for electoral campaigns.
4. Elects a township party council and a control commission or appoints no more than 50 percent of the members of the council through delegated representatives of the primary party organizations.
5. Elects a chairman, deputy chairmen, and secretaries of the township council or grants this right to the township party council.
6. Elects the chairman of the township control commission or grants this right to the commission.

The conference is convened by the township party council or on the initiative of one-quarter of the members of the township organization.

Article 28. The township party council guides and coordinates the activities of the primary party organizations in the implementation of general tasks; organizes and directs the party's electoral campaign in the township; assists the primary party organizations; helps the activities of clubs and federations; keeps the members' records; represents the township party organization in its dealings with the state and local self-government authorities and the managements of other parties, movements, and associations; resolves issues on the founding of or

participation in juridical autonomous economic enterprises on township territory; and exercises ownership rights and handles problems related to township party property.

Article 29. The township party council determines its own structure and table of organization and the budget of the township party organization. If necessary, it may appoint an additional bureau in charge of the organization and conduct of current issues, and sets up voluntary commissions and groups of experts and lecturers, and so forth, to handle matters related to party activities.

Article 30. The township party council supervises the observance of the programmatic documents and the statute; it holds those who violate them liable, and discusses and resolves issues dealing with complaints, objections, and internal party disputes. It supervises the bookkeeping and financial activities and management of party property within the township. It elects a chairman and a deputy chairman, and settles matters related to its personnel and its budget.

Article 31. The township party council may set up a permanent party club. Its areas of activity are determined by the township party council, and its daily work is managed by a club council. The management of the club cooperates with all club councils of the party in the township and assists them in their activities.

The party club is supported by the township party council and through aid, donations, public initiatives, its own activities, and other legal sources.

Article 32. Clubs for socializing and debates attended by socialists supporting different ideological trends, platforms, movements, and associations, within the party, and clubs for civic initiatives may be created on township territory.

Article 33. In Sofia, a city council of the BSP and a city control commission are elected, in addition.

Local Party Coordinating Councils

Article 34. In the big cities, by decision of the township party council, rayon coordinating councils for work with the primary party organizations may be set up.

Article 35. In accordance with the administrative and territorial division of the country, regional coordinating councils are, if needed, set up to coordinate and assist the township party councils and organizations in their activities.

The councils' structure is as follows: the chairmen of the township party councils, the members of the Supreme Council and the All-Party Control Commission, the national representatives of the BSP for the respective areas, and the chairmen of the groups of socialist council members.

Article 36. The party organs and organizations may establish permanent or temporary structures that organize the party's electoral work in the respective electoral districts.

All-Party Bodies

Article 37. The all-party bodies of the BSP are the following: the Congress, the All-Party Conference, the Supreme Council, and the All-Party Control Commission.

Article 38. The Congress, which is convened no less frequently than once every two years, is the supreme body of the BSP.

Article 39. The Supreme Council convenes the regular Congress; the Extraordinary Congress is convened by the Supreme Council or on the initiative of no less than one-quarter of the total number of party members.

Debates on and motions on the agenda must be made public at least two months in advance of a regular congress, and one month of an extraordinary congress.

The proportional representation for the Congress is determined by the Supreme Council. Nominations of delegates are submitted by the primary party organizations and elected at their meetings or at township conferences (general meetings).

Article 40. The Congress:

1. Adopts, amends, and supplements programmatic documents and the party statute and adopts the party symbols.
2. Discusses the reports of the Supreme Council, the parliamentary group, and the All-Party Control Commission, and passes resolutions on them.
3. Formulates the party's political line and the trends of its electoral and parliamentary activities.
4. Adopts the party's electoral platform.
5. Elects the Supreme Council, the All-Party Control Commission, and the Supreme Council chairman.

Article 41. The All-Party Control Commission is convened once every year unless there is a party congress. It consists of the delegated representatives of the township party organization and the members of the Supreme Council, the All-Party Control Commission, and the party's parliamentary group.

The Conference:

1. Discusses the political situation and adopts a program for action.
2. Adopts the party's electoral platform.
3. If necessary, renovates the membership of the all-party bodies but by no more than one-third of their total membership.

Article 42. The Supreme Council:

1. Guides the work of the party in the period between congresses and conferences.
2. Elects the Executive Bureau, which consists of a chairman and the deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council and members; appoints the editors in chief of the central party publications.
- The chairman of the parliamentary group of the BSP is an ex-officio member of the Executive Bureau.
3. Forms permanent and temporary expert commissions and working groups on basic problems of party policy and activities.
4. Helps the regional and township party councils in the implementation of party policy.
5. Formulates the party's electoral platform, resolves problems of its electoral alliances and governmental coalitions, and approves candidates for national representatives from the BSP.
6. Jointly with the parliamentary group of the BSP, formulates the strategy and tactics of its parliamentary activities.
7. Represents the party in its relations with the state and other parties, organizations, movements, and associations.
8. Ratifies the structure, table of organization, and budget of the Supreme Council; resolves party property and financial and economic issues; makes decisions on organizing companies and appoints their managers.
9. Guides the party's international activities.

Article 43. The Executive Bureau of the VS [Supreme Council] of the BSP represents the party in its relations with state authorities and other organizations; implements the party's specific political line; takes initiatives for its implementation; performs representative and coordination functions; resolves current issues of party life; resolves property, financial, and economic problems of the party; and summons the Supreme Council to sessions and reports to it.

Article 44. The All-Party Control Commission supervises the observance of programmatic documents and the statute by the party members and holds violators accountable; considers and resolves problems related to complaints, objections, and internal party disputes; checks the bookkeeping activities of the party bodies and organizations; exercises internal financial control over fiscal revenue and expenditures, party property, and party economic activities; controls the effectiveness of the coparticipation of the party in various economic entities involving the use of party funds and property; provides methodical aid to the township control commissions; and elects a bureau, a chairman, and deputy

chairmen, and adopts the budget and the table of organization of the Commission.

Article 45. The Supreme Council organizes the Central Party Club for purposes of mass political, electoral, cultural, and other activities.

IV. Parliamentary Activities and Attitude Toward State Authorities, Political Forces, Organizations, and Movements**Electoral and Parliamentary Activities**

Article 46. The party implements its policy in the National Assembly, the government, the township councils, and mayoralties through its members elected to those bodies and through other democratic forms of influence allowed by the law.

Article 47. The nomination of party candidates for national representatives, council members, and mayors takes place at meetings of primary party organizations, with the extensive participation of nonparty people, supporters, and sympathizers.

The township party councils and the Supreme Council organize the public discussion of the nominated candidacies. The national party tickets for national representatives and for candidates for president and vice president must be approved by the Supreme Party Council, whereas the tickets for township council members and mayors are approved by the township party councils.

Article 48. The party members who are national representatives constitute a parliamentary group; the council members are part of the group of socialist council members. They work for the implementation of the party's political line and electoral platform in parliament and in local bodies.

The legislative and other initiatives of the national representatives and the socialist council members are discussed by the groups that formulate and support a common viewpoint.

Article 49. The parliamentary group and the Supreme Council, the group of township council members, and the township party councils formulate a common position at joint sessions on important matters to be discussed by the National Assembly, the government, and the township councils.

Article 50. The socialist national representatives participate in the sessions of the Supreme Council in advisory capacities.

The socialist township council members participate in the sessions of the township party councils in advisory capacities.

Article 51. The members of the Executive Committee of the Supreme Council, the chairman and deputy chairmen of the All-Party Control Commission, the editor in chief of the central party organ, and the socialist

ministers also have the right to participate in the meetings of the parliamentary party group.

The chairmen, deputy chairmen, and secretaries of township party councils and the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the township control commissions have the right to participate in the sessions of the groups of socialist township council members.

Article 52. The socialist national representatives, council members, and mayors periodically inform the respective party councils and organizations of their activities.

Article 53. The socialist parliamentary group, council members, and mayors are supplied by the party councils and the party scientific and research units with the information and advisory assistance they require for the implementation of their functions.

Article 54. The party parliamentary group and the groups of socialist council members conduct their activities on the basis of a set of rules.

The BSP and Other Political Parties

Article 55. The BSP maintains relations of equality with the other political parties in the formulation of common views on specific sociopolitical problems, promoting joint agreements and alliances for unity of action and joint civic initiatives.

Article 56. The Supreme Party Council and the local party leaderships form alliances and coalitions for the election of the most suitable candidates for president, vice president, national representatives, council members, and mayors.

Article 57. In accordance with party policy, the parliamentary group of the BSP and the socialist council members encourage cooperation with groups of other political parties for the resolution of other tasks and problems.

The Party and Public Organizations and Movements

Article 58. The BSP interacts with the trade union organizations mainly through its members, adherents, and sympathizers who defend the interests of working people, and respects the autonomy of the trade unions.

Article 59. The BSP maintains ties to socialist-oriented youth and student organizations, associations, and other left-wing and democratic youth movements. It supports and assists their independent activities.

Article 60. The BSP supports the activities of women's, cooperative, ecological, and other movements and initiatives that set for themselves humane, democratic, and patriotic objectives.

V. Party Means of Mass Information and Scientific Units

Article 61. The BSP has its own means for mass information, which implement its programmatic objectives, its statute, and the resolutions of congresses and conferences.

Article 62. The party mass information media provide a rostrum for all socialist and ideological trends and platforms, as well as for democratic public forces and individuals, journalists, and private citizens. The parties' ideological trends may have their own printed publications.

Article 63. The all-party mass information media are founded or closed down by decision of the Congress or the All-Party Conference, while the local media are created by decision of the township conference.

Article 64. The party publications operate on a self-sustaining basis. If necessary and if possible, they are helped with party funds.

Article 65. The party bodies and organizations are in constant touch with the press, television, and radio in order to popularize their objectives, views, and initiatives among the public by providing it with the necessary information.

Article 66. The Supreme Council creates scientific and expert teams for purposes of public, sociological, and political studies, expert consultations, and cadre training.

VI. Fiscal Means and Party Property

Article 67. The party is financially self-supporting in carrying out its activities. It secures its funds from party membership dues; income from property and party economic activities allowed by the law; donations, all-party actions for the voluntary collection of funds, inheritances, and other legitimate sources; and state budget subsidies (in accordance with the Law on Political Parties).

Article 68. Membership dues are based on the net monthly incomes of party members (excluding taxes and material expenditures of individual producers). A party member may make quarterly, semiannual, or annual payments, after himself assessing the amount of his membership dues. However, the monthly amount must not be less than:

- 1 percent for working people.
- 0.5 percent for pensioners.
- One lev for the unemployed and students.

Article 69. Membership dues are collected by the primary party organizations, which keep 20 percent for their own use. Forty percent goes to the township party councils and 30 percent to the Supreme Council. Ten percent of the party funds is appropriated for mass

information purposes. The township party councils, as well, have the right to collect membership dues.

Article 70. The party councils, organizations, and clubs, using their own funds, organize economic activities as allowed by the law.

On a contractual basis, the Supreme Council may grant the party councils, organizations, and clubs property and the right to set up juridically independent economic projects and use the revenue from such activities.

Article 71. The primary party organizations and party bodies spend party funds exclusively for party needs and systematically inform the socialists regarding income and expenditures. By decision of the General Assembly, they may appropriate additional funds for electoral campaigns and other all-party needs.

Article 72. The party bodies and organizations are concerned with the maintenance, management, development, and expedient utilization of party property.

VII. Cadres and Party Associates

Article 73. In accordance with party policy, the Supreme Council and the township party councils are concerned with the party's cadre support and training and the specialization and development of their political workers and associates, making use of the party's intellectual potential.

Article 74. The elected party bodies are helped in their work by paid political and technical associates. Their number, organization, and tasks are defined by the respective elected authority. Their labor-legal relations are settled on the basis of a regulation approved by the Supreme Council in accordance with current labor legislation.

No less than one full-time position for a political associate must be provided for in the small township party organizations.

Article 75. The political associates work under the guidance of the elected body and report to it. No hierarchical subordination of political associates from different party organizations is allowed.

VIII. Party Symbols

Article 76. The party symbols are:

- a) A bright red flag with the inscription "BSP" in white letters.
- b) Emblem: a red rose with green leaves on a white background.
- c) A red five-pointed star, which is the historical symbol of the party's struggles and sacrifices.

Baksay Details Advantages of EC Agreements
*AU1303102292 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 10 Mar 92 pp 1, 3*

[Report signed (do): "The Customs Barriers Are Falling"]

[Text] "The temporary trade agreement between Czechoslovakia and the European Community is an endorsement of the Czechoslovak Government's—and especially the Federal Foreign Trade Ministry's [FMZO]—proexport policy," declared Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay at a press conference held in Prague yesterday.

A similar agreement with the European Free Trade Association, which should be signed on 20 March, comes into the same category. The temporary trade agreement with the EC came into effect on 1 March, although the association agreement is now going through the ratification process in the parliaments of all the participating countries and will come into effect on 1 January 1993. Of course, it will come into effect as long as there are no unforeseen (in no way, however, unforeseeable) developments such as the breakup of Czechoslovakia. If this were to happen, then, according to the first possible variant, the successor state to the CSFR would assume responsibility for the commitments agreed upon. The second variant—the establishment of two new states—would complicate the entire situation even more: "The validity of the trade agreement, and that of the whole Association Agreement, would be cast into doubt along with everything resulting from it," stated Minister Baksay.

The trade agreement, oriented during the course of the next 10 years toward the creation of free trade zones, immediately abolishes duty on 70 percent of Czechoslovak exports to EC countries, but only on 20-25 percent of Czechoslovakia's imports from the community. The remainder will be given free access to Czechoslovakia within nine years, while this advantage will be ascribed to Czechoslovak goods within five or six years. The direct financial gain resulting from these customs concessions is estimated at 5.5 billion korunas, but the FMZO is warning exporters to consider whether they can offer Czechoslovak goods much more cheaply. They could come up against anti-dumping measures. Naturally, the treaty does not abolish these measures, but brings them completely into line with GATT regulations.

The trade agreement divides industrial products into nonsensitive categories (exports to the EC market without duty) and sensitive categories. They are further divided into three subgroups according to their level of sensitivity and the duty on these products is gradually reduced by various amounts in chronological succession. For example, the most sensitive group has a fixed duty ceiling (a quota below which goods can be exported without duty), while duty is imposed on exports above this ceiling. These duties will be reduced by 15 percent

every year, so that within approximately seven years no duty will be imposed on these goods at all.

Likewise, CSFR imports are divided into sensitive and nonsensitive categories. Duty will also be reduced in phases for sensitive categories. For example, new cars (a specific category) will now be burdened with a duty representing only 80 percent of the current duty (instead of 19 percent, somewhat below 16 percent) then 60 percent, 40 percent, 20 percent, and, finally, no duty at all.

Mutual trade in items that can be categorized into supersensitive groups (steel, textiles, agricultural products) will be subject to a special procedure described in detail in the special protocols that comprise an inseparable element of the agreement. For example, in the case of steel, duties on Czechoslovak exports are immediately reduced to 80 percent and they will gradually be reduced to 60, 40, 20, and 10 percent until they reach zero. All quantitative limits are abolished with immediate effect. Duty on Czechoslovak coal exports will be abolished after one year. In the case of Czechoslovak textile exports, the duties imposed as of 1 March represent five-sevenths of the current duty and, during the coming years, they will successively be reduced by another one seventh until they reach zero. Agricultural trade is regulated by a completely separate regime—a rather complicated one—that is obviously the result of extremely difficult negotiations.

Of course, all the concessions apply exclusively to goods of Czechoslovak origin confirmed by the exporter in the accompanying documentation. As Hungary and Poland have also signed a similar agreement with the EC, a category involving the cumulation of the goods' origin is being introduced. This means that goods resulting from cooperation among these three countries will be viewed as goods of Czechoslovak—and ultimately of Hungarian and Polish—origin. The appropriate agreement involving the customs administrations of these three countries should be signed in Budapest this week, because customs administration will be entrusted with supervision in a manner corresponding to practices in the EC (in our country, the chambers of commerce and industry are, to date, entrusted with supervision). So-called direct conveyance is required for the import of goods originating in EC countries so that, for example, it is no longer advantageous for a Czechoslovak importer to import a German product from Austria.

In reply to a question from HOSPODARSKE NOVINY on how mutual trade involving the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland will be dealt with in connection with the Association Agreements, Minister Baksay said that the negotiations are complicated and he did not rule out the possibility that all three countries could reach an agreement on a free trade zone with the EC and, at the same time, not have such a zone for trade among themselves. One of the obstacles to this is the fact that average customs tariffs in the CSFR are less than 6 percent, while they are 10 percent in Hungary and even 13 percent in

Poland. Therefore, possible mutual agreements would have to have a strongly asymmetrical character in Czechoslovakia's favor.

KDH Most Successful in Slovak By-Elections

*AU1303201892 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
10 Mar 92 p 1*

[CSTK report: "Independent Candidates Most Successful of All"]

[Text] At its meeting yesterday, the Slovak Electoral Commission for Elections to Community Self-Administration Bodies discussed a report on the course and results of elections that were held on 7 March 1992 in 18 communities in 13 districts of the Slovak Republic and confirmed by its signature the correctness of the elections' course and results. A total of 50.13 percent of eligible voters participated in the elections. They elected 14 mayors of smaller communities, one city mayor, and six deputies to community representative bodies. The largest number of mayoral seats—seven, that is, 46.67 percent—were won by mayors who ran as independent candidates. The Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] won four mayoral seats (26.67 percent) and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia two mayoral seats (13.33 percent). Deputies to community representative bodies running for the KDH and as independent candidates won two seats, that is, 33.33 percent, each and deputies for the Party of the Democratic Left and for the Slovak Green Party won one seat, that is, 16.67 percent, each.

Democratic Party Committee Meets in Kosice

*AU1703150092 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech
16 Mar 92 p 1*

[Report signed (jr): "The Civic Democratic Party Plus the Democratic Party Equals Federation"]

[Text] Kosice—"The Democratic Party Executive Committee fundamentally rejects the proposal made by a group of Federal Assembly deputies to revoke the so-called Screenings Law. The Democratic Party is striving tirelessly to purge public life of the 'old structures,' and it considers the Screenings Law to be one of the means of purging our society," states the communique issued on Sunday [15 March] at the end of the Democratic Party of Slovakia Executive Committee's meeting in Kosice.

At the Democratic Party Executive Committee's closed introductory session on Saturday [14 March], its members—apart from praising the initiative of Ministers Jan Holcik (Slovak industry minister) and Vladimir Pavle (Slovak transportation and communications minister)—referred, in this connection, to the fact that some morally and professionally incompetent managers are continuing in their posts at the transportation department.

The basis for the Democratic Party's election program, as the Executive Committee agreed, will be the current

program amended to contain specialist sections and a new introduction. Democratic Party campaign managers from individual districts also met in Kosice to discuss this issue. All the regional campaign leaders—except for one (who will be appointed this week)—were elected at the meeting.

During the weekend, the Democratic Party Executive Committee also expressed its opinion about the draft coalition agreement between the Civic Democratic Party and the Democratic Party, and recommended that it be conclusively signed with minor changes. The signing of this agreement should mean the creation of the strongest federal election coalition.

Slovak KDH Holds Meeting, Outlines Principles

*AU1303200592 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK
in Slovak 9 Mar 92 pp 1, 4*

[Report by Anton Balaz: "The Slovak Christian Democratic Movement's Four Pillars"]

[Text] When the first part of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Council session—at which a resolution on the separation of the political platform led by Engineer Jan Klepac was adopted—came to an end on Saturday, representatives of the breakaway platform held a meeting in Bratislava. Seventy-three representatives from 24 districts in Slovakia took part in this first informal meeting to discuss what steps to take next. These steps should lead to the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement [SKDH] constituent assembly in Zvolen on 28 March 1992.

At the start of the open discussion on the new movement's program and aims, a discussion that lasted for several hours, Jan Klepac said they had just made a very important political decision and, despite all the difficulties that await them in the coming days and weeks, he considers this decision to be an act of liberation.

Being aware of the responsibility Christians bear for Slovakia's future fate, it was hard for them to accept that they could not implement the ideals with which they helped found the KDH in the current movement, because every single attempt they made to rectify the movement's policy or the coalition government's work was always outvoted. The atmosphere of incessant suspicion prevailing against them in the movement and the conviction that the KDH will be unable to fulfill its preelection promises eventually led to the decision to separate from the movement, to proclaim their own policy aims, and to adopt a proper name for the movement. "We did not adopt the adjective Slovak to be provocative, but because we want to highlight something that is neglected in the current KDH. We want to address ourselves to the majority in Slovakia," said Jan Klepac at the end of his improvised statement.

Following a discussion on the movement's program and future steps, the meeting's participants elected an SKDH Preparatory Committee. It will be headed by Jan Klepac

and will include Slovak Ministers J. Belcak, J. Krsek, V. Oberhauser, and I. Tirpák; Federal Assembly Deputy M. Kapusta; Slovak National Council [SNR] Deputy A. Andras; B. Kunc, an adviser to the SNR deputy chairman; Central Secretary J. Kuzma; Regional Secretaries P. Lupták, M. Culen, and F. Ondrejkov; O. Nagyová, chairwoman of the Christian Democratic Association of Slovak Women; J. Baca, a representative of Christian Democratic Youth; and J. Sramek, a representative of Slovaks living abroad.

At the end of the meeting the participants unanimously adopted the following Slovak Christian Democratic Movement statement:

"The Slovak Christian Democratic Movement was constituted today as a new political movement with its own program. We proceed from our conviction regarding the mission and significance of Christian Democracy in the renewal of our spiritual, social, and material life and we believe in the inspirational force of Christian ideals. Therefore, we consider it essential to formulate our own political program following up on the original program of a movement from which the current KDH has deviated.

"The SKDH bases its program on four pillars:

"—Christian. Aimed at spiritually renewing Slovakia and preserving its traditions.

"—National. Aimed at achieving Slovak sovereignty and its international recognition.

"—Democratic. Aimed at safeguarding equality and liberty for all citizens.

"—Social Democratic. Aimed at fulfilling Slovakia's complete economic development.

"Therefore, the SKDH wants to renew faith in Christian democracy and appeals to all Slovak citizens, current and former KDH members and supporters, and Slovak Christian democratic clubs and unions to demonstrate their faith in and support for it."

Need for Genuine Slovak Liberal Party Emphasized

92CH0358A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak
13 Feb 92 p 1

[Commentary by Ivan Hoffman: "Of Unity and Coalitions"]

[Text] My reaction to the founding of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] in Slovakia, was "at last." Something tells me that this party might become fashionable (as did coupon privatization), and that it is precisely Klaus who, unlike Slovak liberals, has a chance to succeed in turning back "real socialism" which in Slovakia not only has much staying power but tragically excellent perspectives, judging by whom the Slovaks are apparently planning to vote for.

In all honesty, I must admit that my belief that the ODS has a chance to succeed in Slovakia, is not widely shared. Political observers rather predict that the ODS will take votes away from the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [ODU-VPN] coalition and from the Democratic Party [DS], resulting in less than 5 percent each for these parties in the elections. These observers fear that this will mean a loss in parliamentary representation for the 15 percent of the Slovak citizens who are intelligent enough to grasp that rejection of reform equals isolation, misery, and dictatorship. The ODS is deemed unable to muster support of the mass media, as well as of regionally oriented voters, moreover, it is unlikely to attract strong and reliable personalities, but rather opportunist politicians who had failed elsewhere. Furthermore, these observers believe that even if the ODS should do relatively well in the elections, it will find no partners for a coalition. The liberals expect that in Slovakia Klaus will do more harm than good, both for Slovak democrats and for himself.

I am not quite so pessimistic. Klaus is highly popular in Slovakia, he issued more than 2 million coupon books here, and his wife is Slovak. We should also consider the fact that weak popular support for rightist parties (mainly ODU-VPN) does not mean that only a handful of Slovaks desire democracy, economic reform, and a common state. In addition to the voters the VPN had lost already two years ago, simply because it had to introduce unpopular economic measures, such as free prices and no state subsidies (raising unemployment), the VPN lost support because it had to remove from office its own premier. This raises the question of how it could support him in the first place for the post of interior minister and finally prime minister. Also unclear is why the VPN realized its error so belatedly. The mass media also deprived the VPN of adherents, because through their support of the opposition, they vented their own frustrations of having collaborated with the totalitarian regime until November 1989. Another reason why voters abandoned the VPN-ODU coalition is its mixed liberal-conservative orientation which Klaus calls "neither fish nor fowl." Nor did the coalition's recent congress show whether it would be a party with a firm structure which pragmatically implements its objectives—even a bit "over dead bodies"—or a party of liberals who are so certain of their long-term mission that they prefer momentary electoral setbacks to competing with other parties in deceiving the disoriented voters who are more easily fooled than convinced. Promising both pragmatism and idealism is quite impossible.

From what I have written so far, it would seem that the founding of the ODS in Slovakia provides a signal for a final division within the VPN. Those who believe that Slovakia can still be spared its suicidal self-determination and the so-called entry into Europe without the Czechs—a course wrought with many perilous twists—should become pragmatists and work 24 hours a day under the ODS banner. While it may not be entirely too late, it is certainly high time.

On the other hand, those who are thoughtful and realize that, historically speaking in contemporary Europe, a possible victory of hybrid movements (such as Meciar's in Slovakia) is a passing phenomenon, those who believe that a normal political scene will eventually emerge in Slovakia, one with no place for exotic "leaders of the nation,"

should—regardless of the coming elections—devote themselves to building a liberal party for democrats, without which no political spectrum is complete and which no society can do without. I have in mind a party which (at least for the first 20 years) would favor principles of civility and common sense over electoral preferences.

'Danger' Seen in U.S. Economic Domination
92CH0356A Budapest HITEL in Hungarian 19 Feb 92
p 2

[Article by Zoltan Biro: "Is There a Way Between West and East?"]

[Text] The question of whether there is a way between West and East is once again of great importance to us, because it is also the question of Hungary's (and Central Europe's) always relative independence. In the final outcome, from a historical perspective it is the question of our survival. If from our point of view the change of political systems merely means that we have climbed from the leg of Uncle Joe's boot onto Uncle Sam's knee and are bouncing ecstatically there to his great delight, then—even though we have succeeded in raising ourselves knee-high—we might add that this time we are truly being taken for a ride. For the real danger is that now, just when we have finally rid ourselves of direct military domination from the East, we are about to slide immediately into less direct, but no less dangerous, economic and monetary domination from the West. In the long run, of course, that could mean the state's—and in a certain sense also society's—subordination to the West, not only in the case of Hungary, but of the other countries of Central Europe as well.

Responding to their healthy and natural historical reflexes, all those who cannot reconcile themselves easily to such historical conditions, but who clearly understand their country's geopolitical situation, are seeking a way that would lead toward the development of their independent existence as a nation, society, and state, yet would still be feasible under the given circumstances in world politics. One might smile at such aspirations and dismiss superciliously any idea of a third way, a Hungarian way, a specific way of our own. The supercilious, however, would then have to admit that they perceive Hungary's future not as national independence within the framework of an extensive system of East-West and North-South relations, nor as a confederation of small Central European countries that ensures the national independence of its members, but on the fringes of a superpower or multinational power, as its satellite. The supercilious, of course, will not admit this. They are those perpetual carbon-paper handlers, copiers, and enthusiastic imitators of foreign models who either cynically have abandoned their national or personal identity long ago, or are clinging with childish dilettantism even to the civilizers' empty slogans, behind which they fail to recognize the most obvious attempts to assert power interests. That is how cynism and dilettantism become inseparably linked, often inside one and the same individual. And from that linkage there stem phenomena that are well known also in our region: namely, the civilizers' arrogance toward the given natives, and the babbling humility toward the given uncles or godfathers.

It is high time for us to view the world finally as adults, to assess the opportunities as adult politicians of an adult

nation, to look at ourselves and our environment that way. We ought to know, for instance, that there is firm assertion of national and power interests also in the so-called civilized world, and that declarations of humane principle are often merely a charitable cover for such assertion of interests. We must realize that our role in the big plays on the stage of world politics is very minor; and also that the constant volunteer is merely a sucker whom the stronger power will discard as a tool that has ceased to be useful. We should be more aware also of the fact that the world—even in terms of values—does not consist merely of the United States and Europe, and that the Atlantic World Center will not remain the only world center for long; new poles of the world may develop, in a power and cultural sense as well. A monocentric world, with most of it relegated forever to the fringes, cannot be mankind's real prospect. A completely Americanized Japan cannot be modern Japan's real prospect. China, fully aware of its enormous power, will eventually produce a modern China that nevertheless will remain Chinese. The Arab world will build its modernized new world on the foundations of Islam. And the huge cocktail we call Latin America will probably offer mankind more excitement and particular solutions. Thus it would not be a wonder if Hungary sought a Hungarian or Central European way between West and East, its specific solutions, preserving its own values and characteristic. The wonder would be Hungary's failure to even attempt to do so, though some people these days are recommending that we abandon the centuries-old efforts, the ceaseless search for a way, and dissolve ourselves safely in the great Atlantic Ocean. Admittedly, it is far from us. But then there will be others who will help us.

Former Ambassador to U.S. Named Party Head
92CH0377B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 25 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Z.M.H.: "Campaign Overture at the Entrepreneurs? Peter Zwack, Party Chairman"]

[Text] The Entrepreneurs' Party of the Liberal Civic Association last weekend elected Peter Zwack as its chairman. Although not declared as such, from a practical standpoint, their Monday briefing amounted to the overture of their 1994 election campaign. The 10,000 member party finished among the top 10 in the course of the first free elections, but the 1.9-percent ratio of votes the party acquired was insufficient for being seated in parliament.

At this time they said that they were not striving to become a ruling party, but wanted to be seated in parliament after the next elections. They feel that entrepreneurs have no real representation at present, and one reason for this is that friendliness toward entrepreneurship has remained only an election slogan and a promise insofar as government policies were concerned. They are debating the party's program points, but they do not want to build their campaign on promises, according to

Peter Zwack. They are in fundamental disagreement with the way the official political sphere assesses the situation and believe that the 1990's have become the age of "entrepreneurship by constraint." Many people become entrepreneurs as a result of trying to escape unemployment and based on market and business considerations that lack adequate foundations. In the new chairman's view, the political apathy manifested by large strata of society amounts to national suicide. "Only deeds are able to control and stop the inflation of words," Peter Zwack concluded his political *ars poetica*.

Defense Minister Fur on National Consciousness
92CH0356B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 Feb 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Fur on Hungarian National Awareness"]

[Text] On Tuesday evening, at the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Headquarters on Bem Square and under the auspices of the MDF Academy, Lajos Fur held a one-hour lecture on distorted Hungarian national awareness. As he said in his introductory remarks, his involvement in politics during the past few years has limited the amount of time he is able to devote to pursuing the scientific investigation of this topic.

Fur emphasized in his lecture that from the late 1940's until 1990, the purposeful falsification of the 3,000 years of Hungarian history proceeded in the services of the state party's day-to-day political interests. It was also crammed into the heads of people, mainly of youths, that the 3,000 years of Hungarian history were merely the introductory stage for the history of the past century, and within it for the history of the labor movement. In the Middle Ages, he emphasized, we were one of the nations of Europe endowed with the most successful military virtues in defending the country and occasionally in the acquisition of territory as well. Bravery, as an outstanding national virtue, survived also later, until the end of World War I.

As the most flagrant examples of the falsification of history, Lajos Fur mentioned the conspiracy of silence about the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences, and the retroactive distortion of the Hungarian Government's policies on national minorities.

Orban on Interparty Relations, Prospects
92CH0390A Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian Feb 92
pp 3-6

[Interview with National Assembly Representative Viktor Orban, leader of the Federation of Young Democrats, FIDESZ, by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "Conversation With Viktor Orban"]

[Text] [Pogonyi] You have signed the Democratic Charter; as you know, it "consists of fundamental tenets of constitutional law." How could you have done something like that?

[Orban] At first I thought that I should not sign it, because I felt that this was not a political act of significance. I thought that it merely amounted to an action on part of the intelligentsia and that there was no commanding need for me to join. After the prime minister relieved Hungarian National Bank [MNB] President Gyorgy Suranyi on grounds that he had signed the Charter, the members of my faction and I felt that elementary principles of solidarity demanded that we sign this document. We did so, because we must have a sense of solidarity for those who have been disadvantaged for signing a document containing democratic principles. The prime minister has made the Charter part of larger politics and underscored it as a political issue; thus, as a politician, I could not avoid addressing this issue.

[Pogonyi] Don't you think that an increasing number of signs of authoritarianism manifest themselves in Hungarian politics and public life?

[Orban] Of course I do, and these manifestations come not only from the prime minister but from everyone around him. Both the prime minister and his colleagues manifest an arrogance of power and authoritarian attitudes. This is explained in Hungary in many ways. People claim, in part, that the head of government and his associates try to follow a pattern of conduct that has prevailed between the two world wars, and in part that they harbor antidemocratic sentiments. I have a different explanation for all this. I believe that frustration is the essence of this matter. Insofar as I am concerned, I understand the psychological situation. Supposedly, the prime minister and the members of his cabinet feel that they are working a lot, they are trying to live up to the positions they hold to the best of their ability, and at the same time, however, they sense that despite all these efforts the citizens' standard of living is on the decline. They are frustrated for this reason. What we are dealing with here is a situation in which the government is trying to manifest strength it lost a long time ago, while the country is in a crisis.

[Pogonyi] In such instances one usually creates enemy images, or, as you stated in our study, one resorts to "narcotics."

[Orban] They are trying to find an explanation for their lack of success. They feel that they are not the ones who made the mistake. As perceived by them, people are inherently good and incredibly well intended, the enemy gets in between the noble people and the incredibly well intended and noble government, and this enemy constantly causes nothing but problems. And well, this enemy consists of gentlemen dressed in liberal-bolshevik garb, like myself.

[Pogonyi] The tiny minority?

[Orban] Yes, the tiny minority, as they say. The government subconsciously acknowledges the fact that it has consumed its moral reserves. The government is in no position today to stand up and to announce to all the people in the country: Respected citizens, the situation is as follows.... In other words, it does not have the moral strength to provide a situation analysis and to state what steps must be taken, steps that are necessary from an economic standpoint, even though these steps would render the government unpopular. The government does not have adequate strength, or rather, it is in no position to have the electorate accept what it says, because during the past year and a half its actions have differed from what it has proclaimed so many times that the people have lost their faith.

[Pogonyi] Could it be that the government has morally discredited itself?

[Orban] We must be very careful in dealing with this issue, because the people in the government are not immoral in the everyday meaning of that term, what we have is that the psychological preconditions required to govern do not exist within the government. What follows from this is not that the people in the government are crooks, but the fact that the moral reserves required for the cultivation of politics have run out.

[Pogonyi] Some believe that the stability of the democratic system equals the stability of the government.

[Orban] I firmly deny this, even though this is indeed the way the government is thinking. I see this day after day, the gentlemen in the government put an equation mark between the stability of the system and their own stability, and this is not true, of course. It is yet another matter that the stability of the government is a truly important element of the system's stability, at the same time however, the possibility of changing the government is also an indispensable part of the system's stability. Well, the latter is missing as a result of our constitutional system.

[Pogonyi] It was possible to achieve all this as a result of the pact between the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]....

[Orban] Indeed, I attribute this to be the result of the Antall-Tolgyessy pact, and I have so stated in the course of parliamentary debate over constitutional amendments. One cannot simultaneously wipe out the institution of ministerial responsibility and bequeath everything to the prime minister, as well as introduce a constructive no confidence motion against the prime minister. A situation like this produces a government that is strong from the standpoint of public law, but is weak in a political sense.

[Pogonyi] Is there a responsible government in Hungary today?

[Orban] No, there is not, today's government cannot be held to account by parliament. It is responsible in a

constitutional sense, of course, because the legislature has the authority to relieve the prime minister as a result of a constructive no confidence motion. Parliament also has the authority to dissolve itself and to call for new elections. Accordingly, in this sense, the House of Representatives does have the formal authority to control the government. Nevertheless, two matters abridge this authority, and, in the final analysis, do away with the government's authority. First of all, the government tries to do everything to extricate itself from under legislative control. In this effort the MDF, the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] and the Smallholders Party representatives—the ruling coalition—are in partnership. For example, the budget debate late last year has presented a situation like this. The whole thing amounted to no more than an evasion of governmental responsibility. On the other hand, they feel that only a single pattern for coalition is conceivable, and they do not recognize any possible alternative to the present coalition. They do not regard the prime minister as just another citizen who has agreed to direct the government for four years, they regard him as the only possible person within their ranks who is able to perform that function. In their view, no one could replace Jozsef Antall.

[Pogonyi] Simply put, is he irreplaceable?

[Orban] Yes. Under such circumstances the ruling majority does not have the psychological preconditions to control the functioning of the government. Instead of rational debate, ruling party representatives have placed their relationship with the government on the foundations of faith. Since they are in the majority, the parliament's entire oversight authority has practically ceased, or more accurately, the possibility of overseeing the government has disappeared.

[Pogonyi] Could we go so far as to say that despite the semblances, governance is not based on the coalition?

[Orban] Coalition governance does not exist indeed, but for a reason other than what I have discussed so far. Today there is no coalition governance because the government is composed of one party only, and the name of that party is the MDF. The KDNP is represented in government only as a matter of formality, although I have some sympathetic feelings toward them. I believe that the KDNP has endeavored to stand behind the most unpopular decisions and has argued in favor of those in parliament. They were the ones who did not obscure matters. Since citizens have difficulty understanding their language and the way they express themselves, their voice has not penetrated the flood lights too well. The KDNP has manifested a respectable moral attitude with respect to the most unpopular decisions. The Independent Smallholders Party has virtually fallen apart. The prime minister is able to permit himself to do things vis-a-vis Smallholders Party Chairman Jozsef Torgyan that no prime minister in a western democracy could permit himself to do vis-a-vis a partner in government. From a practical standpoint, in these days the

prime minister designates which faction of the Smallholders Party represents that party. All this is stunning, because the Smallholders Party has a legitimate board of directors and a leadership, these bodies, however, do not have an opportunity to decide which faction to regard as their own. All this is determined by the prime minister, or, to be more accurate, he is the one who decides that the faction the party recognizes as its own is not the coalition partner faction, but instead, the other faction is. All this creates untenable anarchy.

[Pogonyi] The Antall government is well fortified in terms of public offices, while it is politically weak. Does not all this threaten political stability?

[Orban] I believe that my discussion thus far has provided ample evidence of the truth implicit in your question, but this is not so obvious to the public. They prepared the budget the way they did because the Antall government does not feel secure even vis-a-vis its own representatives in parliament, and this shows a weakening in political stability. The government has failed to present the privatization law to parliament for months because of fears that its own representatives would not accept it. This renders the country unstable from an economic standpoint, at least. One cannot understand privatization, it is taking place under chaotic conditions because clear-cut rules expressed in the form of law are missing. But from the standpoint of the Hungarian public political instability means only a situation in which a political party splits up or when personal disputes rage, whereas, in my view, instability clearly manifests itself in the things I have just mentioned. I hope that this situation is going to come to an end.

[Pogonyi] What do you think about the conduct, the political culture of the coalition parties?

[Orban] During the past year and a half we were able to see the grave damage the ruling coalition has inflicted upon political culture. A year and a half ago it would have been impossible for the ruling party to claim that the opposition was interested in destroying the country in order to realize its political goals. This phenomenon has become an everyday event by now.

[Pogonyi] We constantly hear that FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], the SZDSZ, or the Socialist Party [MSZP] are obstructionists, that they delay and sabotage the system change.

[Orban] So far so good, because it is not certain that FIDESZ's understanding of a system change is the same as that of the MDF; in this sense then FIDESZ could be manifesting a very honorable political conduct by not supporting the system change. The problem is more deep-rooted: We are dealing with treason.

[Pogonyi] What?

[Orban] As long as today's ruling majority claims that the opposition is interested in destroying the country, it

actually says that from a practical standpoint the opposition is a traitor. A political party could be interested in destroying the country for two reasons only. It could either be an agent of a hostile country, or it could be characterized by a certain political thought whose number one purpose was to take power at any price while the country's interests were of secondary importance. This too is treason, in my view. The ruling party claims that the country's interests mean nothing to people like this because they are willing to allow the country to collapse in its ruins just so that they control the government. This is none other than a charge of treason. All this amounts to a much graver charge than a claim that the opposition sabotages the system change. Istvan Csurka has introduced these kinds of statements to the political culture. The MDF as a whole is politically responsible for not distancing itself from such csurkoid [as published] way of thinking, and for trying to make such statements acceptable.

[Pogonyi] Do you like professional politicians?

[Orban] This might come as a shock, but I regard them as a very dangerous species. I am afraid of politicians who regard their positions as prime minister, minister or as representatives in parliament as some kind of political mission. Such politicians are devoid of a sense of pragmatism. The FIDESZ political culture is entirely different, and this applies not only to its leading stratum, but also to its local government leaders, factions and board. Notably, we regard our political activity as a civil contract. We proclaim our own political perceptions then ask the electorate to enter into an agreement with us. At the same time, this kind of mentality does not mean that we have not been blessed with a sense of responsibility, just as this meaning could not be applied to those who try to serve the cause of some inherent destiny in politics.

[Pogonyi] FIDESZ has yet another fault: You do not take yourselves seriously enough....

[Orban] I regard any politician who lacks a sense of humor as very dangerous, because the political role grows stiff on him like an armor, and the politician is unable to step out of it. All this deforms personalities. It is not possible to conduct political discourse without irony applied to oneself. One should never believe that a politician is irreplaceable. The country is in danger the moment a politician or a political party believes that tragedy ensues unless he or it leads the country, if his party is not in the majority. Political rotation has been invented to provide political leadership to the country that is capable of tolerating the fact that it need not, by all means contribute the prime minister and representatives in parliament. If the respected voters indicate that they like other programs and politicians better than they like my programs and my politicians, my only response can be to say okay, and to pick up my hat and leave. And at that point I will say that for the next four years I will either be in the opposition or that I will not be involved in politics. Everyone has his own trade, after all. One

minister returns to his law practice, another becomes a jurist, an economist, or a teacher. Unfortunately, Hungarian political culture has not yet reached a level where people could leave if politics assumed a certain direction. Throwing a politician out of public life is no tragedy at all, in my view.

[Poganyi] All this, however, cannot be accomplished with the consciousness of martyrdom, or, as we have often heard, by the "government going to the scaffold."

[Orban] I regard statements like this as truly tragic. I have heard statements according to which "we have sacrificed our lives for politics." As a voter I trust those people the least whose lives have been sacrificed for something. The kind of people I like to see heading the country are those interested in seeing to it that as a result of their lives the country accomplishes something. The grave heritage of the past 40—perhaps 70—years is that voters have accepted as their real prime minister, their genuine ministers and representatives only those who were "sacrificing" themselves. Politics is not self-sacrifice! God save us from pursuing politics as a matter of self-sacrifice! In a political culture like that a leader is needed only because he is able to make the most spectacular sacrifice. And those who stand behind the leader do the same, except that their sacrifice is not as visible. This kind of spiritual attitude is destructive in politics. This cannot have a happy ending.

Nevertheless, several good things have happened during the past year and a half, mainly if we compare our results with those of the neighboring countries. I have in mind not only that our economic situation is better than in neighboring countries, but also the fact that we are ahead in terms of the constitutional system. I believe that a presidential system threatens with the return of authoritarian rule in countries on their way out from communism. Hungary has managed to avoid this situation, and this is a result of the coincidence of several fortunate circumstances. With little exaggeration one could say that Poland today has a presidential system, or to say the least, that politics is moving in that direction. In Czechoslovakia they are appropriately justifying the broadening of presidential powers by saying, in part, that holding together an ethnically diverse state is not possible unless a presidential system evolves. The prime minister is correct from this standpoint, when he says that Hungary is an oasis, because Hungary is not being threatened by a presidential system. Our Constitution favors a situation in which this country continues as a parliamentary democracy, and this is very important.

[Poganyi] As long as we are discussing parliamentary democracy, I would think that you could also perceive some other alternative to the present configuration of the government....

[Orban] I envision several alternatives, and for this reason I am optimistic insofar as the 1994 elections are concerned. I believe that we need not settle down with an

MDF Hungary. It would be grandiose of me to predict the election results, but I would like to discuss the possible scenarios.

[Poganyi] Go ahead.

[Orban] We must prevent a situation in which the present conditions of the parties becomes permanently cast in concrete. We must not permit a situation in which the parties of the ruling coalition perceive the present alignment of parties as the sole possible alignment, and in which the opposition parties, too, think that they are able to function only in the framework of the present block of three. We must establish a spiritual condition for the 1994 elections in which it is not going to be impossible for the MDF to rule jointly let's say with the SZDSZ, FIDESZ, or God forbid, with the Socialist Party. The same way, we must have a situation in which cooperation with other parties becomes conceivable for the Independent Smallholders Party and the KDNP. We must also maintain a spirit within FIDESZ, so that under certain circumstances cooperation with the KDNP, or even with the MDF or the SZDSZ, but also with the Socialist Party becomes conceivable. It would be unfortunate to cast the parties in concrete and to eliminate possible contact between them at this point already. The opposite has to be done. For this reason I do not like the term "natural allies," this type of alliance should be wiped out from the Hungarian political vocabulary. It only solidifies the present interparty relations.

[Poganyi] Not too long ago you characterized the Socialist Party as having sexual problems, because it immediately offers itself to any party that has something good to say about it....

[Orban] The Socialist Party has placed us in an uncomfortable situation because it said that FIDESZ was prepared to cooperate with it. In contrast, I said that the socialists were beginning to emerge from the ghetto at last, and that in principle one could not rule out possible cooperation. But they should not be chanting hallelujah just because I said that. In my view, the Socialist Party has its chances if it acquires prestige as a result of long and tenuous work, even if not rapidly, it can achieve a status like this in society based on its professionalism and preparedness, by taking the place of the left wing's Social Democratic Party. Any hasty move, any sudden change would produce the opposite situation; they could, for instance, place me in a situation in which I would have to say the kinds of things you mentioned.

[Poganyi] Insofar as the ghetto is concerned, much of that has been caused by the former and the present opposition parties....

[Orban] Although I have been attacked frequently by the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party], I never intended to push the successor party into a ghetto. At the same time, I did not regard the Socialist Party as a party which I would ever want to cooperate with. I believe that the Socialist Party is functioning in the framework of the territory allotted to it in the democracy, but this must

not mean that we should, by all means, cooperate with it. There are a number of reasons for this; these are in part personal reasons, in part they exist because of the political background, and then, of course, the "Indian does not forget."

[Pogonyi] What do you have in mind?

[Orban] The Socialist Party still includes some people who demanded FIDESZ's liquidation at the time of its establishment and said that force should be used to break us down. The way I am unable to say that I do not regard Istvan Csurka as part of the MDF, the Socialist Party also includes some people of whom I am unable to say that they do not belong there. At the same time, however, I am aware of the great difference between, let's say, Istvan Csurka and Jozsef Antall, or Gyula Horn and certain socialists.

[Pogonyi] Let us change the subject and discuss the way you regard the two opposition parties—the SZDSZ and yourselves—that exists besides the Socialist Party you have already discussed. Has the change in SZDSZ leadership, and the present identity crisis of the Free Democrats benefitted your organization?

[Orban] For FIDESZ it is easiest to cooperate with the SZDSZ. I am very confident that this is going to be a lasting situation. There are a number of reasons for this, it is mainly the identity of SZDSZ's and FIDESZ's view regarding issues of principle. Insofar as the change at the helm of the SZDSZ is concerned, I do not know whether this was good or bad from the the standpoint of the SZDSZ. You should ask the SZDSZ about this matter. I am not interested in personalities, our long-term view of the SZDSZ is of importance. I do, of course, have my views as a private person. I am more interested in preventing a weakening of the SZDSZ in the long term. I do not want the SZDSZ to turn into a party which pursues unpredictable politics, thus preventing normal cooperation with them. Incidentally, FIDESZ's popularity is far ahead of that of all other parties; this represents an incredible power in my view, even though at present we are unable to turn this popularity into an everyday political advantage. This is so because there are only 22 of us in parliament and we badly need the SZDSZ's ninety plus mandates. FIDESZ's popularity is of no use if the SZDSZ begins to fall apart and its parliamentary faction is unable to follow a unified political line; at that point no one is going to be able to stand up against the MDF's undesirable endeavors to amend the Constitution. This is why another Antall-Tolgyessy pact would produce catastrophic consequences. For this reason we have no interest, whatsoever, in the weakening of the SZDSZ. Equally, however, it would not be in our interest if the SZDSZ produced better election results than we did.

[Pogonyi] It is, of course, your largest, liberal counterpart....

[Orban] The political problem may be seen in the fact that the SZDSZ's weakening means the weakening of the

liberal forces. If, however, the power structure turned around in the next elections, a weakening of the SZDSZ would not be catastrophic from the standpoint of the liberal forces.... There are a few problems, nevertheless. Just what the new SZDSZ leadership is doing is not quite clear. I believe that Peter Tolgyessy has acquired a tremendous opportunity when he became the head of the party, because he has the authority to do whatever he wants to do with that party.

[Pogonyi] What do you mean by that?

[Orban] I said this in the sense that in reality there is no significant political force opposed to him, because he enjoys the support of a sweeping majority of the membership. We are dealing here with a political leader who enjoys the confidence of virtually the entire membership and disposes over the party's staff and all of its financial resources.

[Pogonyi] While the people in the front lines retreat....

[Orban] They collectively committed suicide when they yielded every opportunity to a political line they did not like. Peter Tolgyessy now has an opportunity to unite the party. He could start an offensive to restore the SZDSZ's old prestige.

[Pogonyi] But this is only an opportunity, isn't it?

[Orban] By all means, because it is conceivable that Peter Tolgyessy is not going to be able to do so, and is going to continue the disintegration of the SZDSZ that went on for the past six months—a thing I do not want to witness at all. As I said, they could also gain strength.

I believe that in today's Hungary there are some psychological reasons behind the weaknesses and crises of political parties. This should not necessarily and primarily mean the psychology of the parties, but the psychological burden politics represents to individuals involved in politics. We recognize this phenomenon quite often, and this is particularly characteristic of the SZDSZ: Some outstanding, brilliant scientists, philosophers, historians, and economists whom I highly respect felt degraded for having to deal with politics. No politician who lacks the psychological conditions is able to follow an appropriate political line as long as he is unable to identify with the fact that he is a politician, but instead constantly thinks of having become involved in politics only temporarily, and of politics being a form of existence that is lower than his previous way of life.

[Pogonyi] In other words, has the psychological security of political leaders been missing?

[Orban] Exactly, even though there is a great need for them to identify with the role they are presently "playing." A politician must not have an inferiority complex concerning his present form of existence. I believe that most of FIDESZ's advantage stems from the fact that our politicians—previously scientists as for instance Jozsef Szajer, and I could mention others—were able to remain scientists, and yet, they were able to accept the

fact that at present they must be politicians for four or eight years as a natural outcome of life.

[Pogonyi] It is easy for FIDESZ to say this; incidentally, rumors are that FIDESZ feels that "there is no need to hurry," or, more bluntly: FIDESZ does not wish to commit itself. You may respond to this by saying that you do not wish to occupy velvet chairs right now, you have time to do so later.

[Orban] I am not certain whether this is a fortunate situation. I do not believe that our faction includes a single person who, in his childhood, had been chased around the table by his father for not wanting to become a minister. A respectable part of FIDESZ's political elite came from small cities and villages, from among the disadvantaged youth.

[Pogonyi] Within their families, are your members the first generations to enter the ranks of the intelligentsia?

[Orban] That is correct. Many members of our faction have experienced disadvantaged situations, so called. For this reason our personal ambitions and desires are much more restrained than those of others.

[Pogonyi] Could this be the reason why FIDESZ has somewhat of a plebeian flavor?

[Orban] Yes, but the essence of the matter is that while we claim that we have some time left, we do not want to exclude ourselves from politics, but instead are preparing ourselves. There is no haste, no impatience, whatsoever! We must think in the long term, not in terms of a single parliamentary cycle, but in two or three cycles. I believe that many voters in 1994 will regard FIDESZ as a political force capable of governing, and this is so because we are progressing fast in building our party, in selecting our cadres, if you will.

[Pogonyi] Well, you must have said that between some huge quotations marks, haven't you?

[Orban] Of course I have. I always smile when someone claims that FIDESZ does not have a second line.

[Pogonyi] But really, how far removed is the FIDESZ elite from its base?

[Orban] I am glad you've asked this question because they [the coalition] always suggest that they do not regard FIDESZ as a dangerous opponent.

[Pogonyi] And does this not bother you?

[Orban] No, because meanwhile we have time to deal with our own affairs. They do not regard us as a political force that should constantly be attacked, and if they do not attack us constantly we have more energy left to settle our affairs instead of dealing with the attacks. Accordingly, I am glad when they dismiss us and say that there you have in parliament 22 enthusiastic, smart boys and girls who have no second line.

[Pogonyi] In his days, Janos Kadar had alternated between scolding and praising Zoltan Kiraly for his youthful Bohemianism. As of lately, MDF faction leader Imre Konya expressed joy over Viktor Orban's refreshing, youthful remarks in parliament.

[Orban] Imre Konya, the poor thing, is a bit confused when he judges FIDESZ. In reality, FIDESZ's strength is not its parliamentary faction but a new political elite that is approaching adulthood at an incredible speed within local governmental bodies. All present members of the FIDESZ faction will have to fight hard four years from now to retain their positions, because some talented, agile, well-prepared and well-suited people are emerging from among those who serve as mayors, deputy mayors and in other positions today. Although I do not like this term, the "second line" consists of people who possess abilities which I am never going to be able to acquire, or, which I could acquire only as a result of much sweat and blood.... These people are in their twenties and serve as mayors, deputy mayors, and committee members in local governments.

[Pogonyi] In other words, they entered the front line at the battlefield of local politics.

[Orban] Never in my life have I acquired such experience. I entered the grand political arena without having previously experienced what it meant to pursue politics at the "lower" level. They are much better armed, they are more pragmatic and more practical than I am. This is where you find FIDESZ's real strength. And this will manifest itself at the FIDESZ Congress in February when these new people surface.

[Pogonyi] The two large parties, the MDF and the SZDSZ have already declared that they were preparing themselves for the next elections. Meanwhile FIDESZ enjoys a 36 percent popularity rating and is the most popular party. This may be an odd question: Isn't this depressing? Whom would you choose as your allies if the elections were held today?

[Orban] The SZDSZ is our eminent partner, we would negotiate with them first. From our standpoint, establishing a coalition is a pragmatic issue.

[Pogonyi] Would you survey the scene to find out who could be considered?

[Orban] Exactly, and negotiations could be held only thereafter. A coalition cannot be established the way the MDF did it, because that leads to shaking your own government apart. A ruling coalition can be established only if people sit down with others and figure out the three or four conflicting issues, then reach written agreements regarding those issues. Coalition is not a matter of inclinations. Starting from our present situation, we would negotiate primarily with the SZDSZ, but with others too, depending on their receptiveness to our perceptions. Insofar as FIDESZ is concerned, we have not proclaimed any kind of campaign, because we feel that we are better off by preparing ourselves quietly....

[Pogonyi] You can't accomplish things by making a lot of noise?

[Orban] I am suspicious about parties which try to substitute verbosity for actual election preparations.

[Pogonyi] Is it customary for parties to prepare themselves for elections quietly?

[Orban] We have begun preparing ourselves earlier. We took a look at, and selected people who excelled in local government, who could become National Assembly representatives; we are training them and try to make their names known in local politics.

[Pogonyi] How many people do you have now?

[Orban] I would much rather say that I have in mind about 95 people, we could run these in elections as early as tomorrow.

[Pogonyi] Are these the chosen ones, or have they emerged as a result of natural selection?

[Orban] I have these people in my mind only, I cannot fathom FIDESZ throughout the country. I believe that we have started our preparations for the elections appropriately; in reality we began our 1994 election campaign when the local elections took place.

[Pogonyi] The legislative proposal advanced by Zetenyi and Takacs that would have prevented criminal acts to lapse [and would have extended the statute of limitations] has been the "sensation" in 1991. Few people recall that FIDESZ has asked for a recorded vote in this regard.

[Orban] We did not want to cover up things, because we felt that this law involved constitutional principles and that one should face these issues up front. I have been asked at various gatherings why I voted against this proposal.

[Pogonyi] What was your response to these questions?

[Orban] I said that this issue had several aspects, including moral, political, and legal aspects. I felt that this proposal had reached fundamental principles related to the role to be played by representatives.

[Pogonyi] You expressed yourself in an overly complicated fashion....

[Orban] In more simple terms: I accept what Zetenyi and his associates have said, i.e., that some crimes of immeasurable gravity have remained unpunished. And yet, I ask myself: Could I, as a representative seated in parliament, infringe upon constitutional principles even to the least extent for morally justifiable reasons?

[Pogonyi] A tough question.

[Orban] My answer to this question is that this should never happen, regardless of the weight of moral considerations. From this point on, every other issue assumes a

secondary character. Even though in many respects I agreed with views expressed by the MDF, I voted against this law because I felt that if anyone, I should not be the one who was willing to transgress constitutional principles for morally justifiable reasons. I must vote for something else in a case like this, because there is not room for it within my political outlook.

SZDSZ: Social Security Law Unconstitutional

*92CH0377C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
22 Feb 92 p 5*

[Article by S.R.: "Social Security System Open at the Bottom; The SZDSZ has Constitutional Concerns"]

[Text] The SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] is contemplating whether to petition the Constitutional Court relative to the Social Security Law adopted the other day. Their thoughts are based on the fact that our basic law provides for health care to all citizens, while the presently amended law provides this only to the insured.

This was one of the pending issues we learned of at the SZDSZ's Friday press conference where representatives Ottilia Solt and Gabor Havas, accompanied by experts Chief Surgeon Dr. Janos Weltner and OKISZ [National Federation of Artisan Cooperatives] Executive Secretary Ivan Szabo commented on amendments to Law No. 2 of 1975 approved by parliament on Wednesday. This law will have grave consequences from the standpoint of the people, they said. The system is open at the bottom, and it is the poorest of people who may drop out of it. While we should applaud the fact that the system has been placed on insurance principles and that the various branches of insurance within the system had been separated, we must also recognize that the transformation of this large service provider system did not take place in conjunction with the transformation of the rest of the systems. Rules for home calls to be made by physicians remain unclear and so does the financing of physicians.

They stressed that the amendments adopted became useful as a result of action taken by the opposition and of the acceptance of opposition arguments by ruling party representatives. The proposal submitted by the Ministry of Public Welfare was unacceptable. For example, based on the original text, persons no longer eligible for unemployment support and their children would not have received any social security service provisions. The intent to provide assets worth 300 billion forints to social security by 1994 had been made part of the law at the last moment. Until that point the government recognized no opportunity to do so within the foreseeable future, and the projection is not realistic at this point either, because there are too many applicants for state property to be distributed.

In the end, they found the sick card system to be acceptable, although they felt that the use of bar codes on cards, prescriptions, and medical records would have made the sale of pharmaceuticals better manageable.

They took note of the fact that not even Mrs. Thatcher dared to propose comprehensive health care provisions.

Deputy Views Statute of Limitations Bill
*AU1703160792 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 13 Mar 92 p 4*

[Interview with Zsolt Zetenyi, Hungarian Democratic Forum parliamentary deputy, by Dezsö Palotas; place and date not given: "Zetenyi on the Constitutional Court's Decision—Crime Without Punishment"]

[Excerpts] Let us begin with a brief overview, for coherence's sake. Parliament passed the Zetenyi-Takacs bill and the president referred it to the Constitutional Court, which found it unconstitutional. After this, in a speech to parliament outside the regular agenda, [President] Árpád Goncz proposed the establishment of a historical fact-finding committee. We interviewed Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] Deputy Zsolt Zetenyi on the probable effectiveness of this measure, the party conflicts over it, and the basic goals of this now-famous bill. [passage omitted]

[Palotas] According to [MDF Deputy] Imre Kónya, the Constitutional Court's decision conflicts with the norms of international law as accepted by Hungary. Do you agree?

[Zetenyi] It is Hungary's constitutional obligation to coordinate its laws with official international agreements. There is a need for an international agreement that would positively declare that in addition to fascist crimes, communist war crimes and crimes against humanity have no statute of limitations either. The fact that this has not yet been done shows that the political development has not reached the appropriate level. [passage omitted]

[Palotas] Is Árpád Goncz's proposal not satisfying?

[Zetenyi] To put it mildly, it is not suitable for achieving the goal. Even if the committee found something, it could not punish—it could only be happy to have found something. This work would take decades, to say nothing of its inherent inefficiency. This concept is also unsuitable because it would not provide catharsis and appeasement. It would not be able to provide the catharsis of administering justice and of forgiving, as one of my fellow deputies put it. Forgiveness only provides catharsis when someone has the possibility to punish the offender but then forgoes it. The inability to act does not and cannot have the force of catharsis.

[Palotas] What about the social consequences of the veto? Will the Constitutional Court's decision increase the current feeling that nothing can be done?

[Zetenyi] The social danger is obvious. It is not desirable for a state to be unable to punish those who transgress against it. This reminds me of an AIDS sufferer, whose immune system is so weakened that it cannot kill the

viruses harmful to the body. As a matter of fact, through this bill I wanted to mobilize a defensive mechanism or immune system to make society aware that it must defend itself from those who betray it or commit murder. This is not a matter of forgiveness or altruism—this is healthy self-defense. Whoever cannot defend himself will be destroyed, and the same applies to society.

[Palotas] Do you nevertheless see a possibility of ever applying this law?

[Zetenyi] We are here to find the solutions.... I reject the contention that the statute of limitations is guaranteed in our Constitution—considering that it does not even mention it. The principle of legal security can be derived from the Constitution, but the statute of limitations is not a guaranteed institution in the Western democracies, either. Murder has not become obsolete in Germany since 1979, and acts punishable by life imprisonment never became obsolete in Austria. It is possible to quote several examples to show that a statute of limitations is not mandatory for constitutional state. As for the future, it could even be dispensed with because it is not a sine qua non of legal security.

To See and To Punish

[Palotas] Would this mean a much stricter penal code?

[Zetenyi] The accused has certain rights, and has to be given the right to defend himself and to answer to his own judges (this is one reason why the president's suggestion could not be used because it would mean the separation of the accused from his authorized judges). The victim also has rights, however. In my opinion, the two interests should have been weighed against each other. One issue is the interests of the offender, namely that he will not be punished after a certain amount of time has lapsed. Society, the murderers' victims, and their relatives also have rights, however. We should not kill one principle of law with another!

The obligation of the state to prosecute crimes has also been forgotten. This is where legal security begins. The Constitutional Court practically stated that a guilty person has absolutely guaranteed rights that cannot be limited for any reason. [passage omitted] I reject the notion that crimes not prosecuted by the communist regime should no longer be punishable.

[Palotas] Does this mean that the veto actually reduces our legal security?

[Zetenyi] In my view, legal security also means that the state protects me and my relatives from murderers, and locates offenders without first contemplating whether the murderer's rights will be violated. It should have been determined how many people may be affected and how serious the crimes are. This should have been weighed against the harm done by not punishing the crimes. The Hungarian people wanted to call their enemies to account. They did not want to annihilate the offenders, just see them caught and punished. This

produced near-hysterical opposition, although what we and the people wanted was an elemental change in the regime. I heard an opposition member say that this bill would increase the government's popularity. It is worrying that the opposition, because of its position in relation to the government, does not take the nation's and the people's interests into consideration....

Sides Getting Closer in Media Bill Negotiations

92CH0356C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
20 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by Gy.V.: "The Media Bill Is Submitted to the Government"]

[Text] Yesterday the Media Subcommittee of the National Assembly considered the latest—already the third—version of the bill on radio and television. In the debate, the differences between the standpoints of the individual parties narrowed, or their views converged. In its first reading, the bill will be presented to the government today.

The drafting of the media bill has shifted to higher speed, to which a contributing factor has been the Justice Ministry's ability to more or less combine in its new draft the views and standpoints that the individual parties and various experts presented in the course of the debate that has been going on within the subcommittee for months. According to this draft, Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television will continue to function as public endowments. Therefore, a corporation, formed by each public endowment, will provide the radio and television programming, respectively. Each public endowment will be headed by a board of trustees that will set the most important programming and business policies. The National Assembly will elect the trustees from among the nonpartisan candidates proposed by the parliamentary party caucuses. The Hungarian Radio Corporation and the Hungarian Television Corporation will be headed by their respective presidents. Each president will be aided by a board of directors. Each corporation will have a supervisory board to ensure that the public-service obligations, specified in separate regulations, are fulfilled. The two public endowments will function as nonprofit organizations; i.e., their possible profits will be used to expand their public-service obligations.

On behalf of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] parliamentary caucus, Ferenc Kulin agreed in principle with the outlined ideas, but he felt that it was up to the government to decide whether the corporation would be a suitable form of business organization for the two central media, or whether they should be financed from the state budget. Miklos Haraszti, the Free Democrats' expert on media policy, proposed that instead of having the individual parliamentary caucuses nominate one member each for the boards of trustees, the ruling parties and the opposition should set up these bodies on the principle of parity; and that the trustees be elected from

among experts, rather than politicians. Peter Molnar, the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] representative, supported a similar standpoint. The two liberal parties deemed it important that the boards of trustees should not interfere in the day-to-day operations of the media. The MDF concurred.

Ferenc Kosa, the Socialist representative who last year had proposed public endowments as the form of organization, felt that the profit-oriented corporation and the public endowment embodying public ownership were mutually incompatible. But the experts pointed out that the regulation of public endowments is still lacking in Hungarian law. Mihaly Galik, Hungarian Radio's managing director, proposed the separation of profit-oriented commercial activities from Hungarian Radio's and Hungarian Television's organization as separate businesses within the public endowments, on the model of BBC Enterprises. All the parties favored this solution.

Views of Former Hungarian Senator in Romania

AU2303100092 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 17 Mar 92 p 6

[Interview with Karoly Kiraly, former deputy president of the Romanian Senate, by Oszkar Fuzes in Budapest; date not given: "Nationalism Is the Means of Oppression"]

[Excerpts] Karoly Kiraly, obviously the most outstanding politician of the Hungarian minority in Romania, sticks to his conviction: Minority rights are not directed against the Romanians. On the contrary, the democratic implementation of these rights could promote a rapprochement. Karoly Kiraly was forced to resign his position as deputy president of the Romanian Senate a few months ago. Our correspondent interviewed him recently in Budapest, while he was receiving medical treatment here.

[Fuzes] The governing party lost in the recent local government elections and the opposition gained votes, but only enough to reach a stalemate. What is next?

[Kiraly] The greatest danger lies in the possibility that the opposition will allow the elections to be postponed. The current leadership alone would benefit from this, because there is hardly a deep-rooted democracy in Romania yet. Moreover, even the process of democratization has hardly started. Essentially, a dictatorship is preserved here, a dictatorship hidden in a multiparty system. Not the Ceausescu-type dictatorship, because this cannot be preserved, but the current regime has assumed many of the previous regime's intentions and methods. Therefore, this current regime can be called a neocommunist regime. It flirts with both the rightist and leftist extremes. We only have as much democracy as the actual situation and the opposition have literally forced out of the National Salvation Front [FSN] and the president of the Republic.

[Fuzes] In December 1989, the Hungarian public welcomed President Ion Iliescu as a politician committed to democracy. Ion Iliescu is an old acquaintance of yours. Has he changed?

[Kiraly] Indeed, I have known him for a very long time, and I have known him as a very humane and correct politician. I personally witnessed many cases in which Ion Iliescu was acting as a politician trying to break the framework of the old dictatorship. Of course, he could not do much against that dictatorship, but he did whatever he could and whenever he could. The national minorities had confidence in him when he was the leader in Temesvar [Timisoara]. He also behaved courageously against Ceausescu. Immediately after Ceausescu's fall, during the Provisional Council of National Unity, Iliescu himself declared that the national minorities had suffered brutal oppression and lacked rights.

When I reminded him of this later, and of the declaration of the aforementioned Provisional Council in January 1990 which promised to guarantee national minority rights, Iliescu said the following: "We had to be hasty in formulating that declaration." [passage omitted]

[Fuzes] Iliescu and [former prime minister Petre] Roman have turned against each other today. Why?

[Kiraly] As I have told you in previous interviews, I often warned Iliescu to keep an eye on Petre Roman, because he was turning against him. Iliescu said that he did not believe me then; perhaps he believes me now. However, it is possible that Iliescu will somehow come to an agreement with his rival today, because he is now only interested in preserving his position.

[Fuzes] Could their open debate be a political show?

[Kiraly] It is not a show but, in a certain situation, their common interests might come to the fore. They might forget about their principled, or rather unprincipled, differences of views, when both are threatened by the possibility of losing power. Therefore, the division of the opposition is dangerous.

One more thing. No one should be taken in by the appearance of a few iron guard people and of some extreme-right slogans. Actually, it is the former extreme-left that continues to operate with an extremist nationalist and socialist demagogic.

[Fuzes] And with anti-Hungarian propaganda, with the Hungarian "threat."

[Kiraly] One of their goals is to revive the Little Entente, and they have had some success in this area. They have discarded national minority rights and autonomy together with the nationalists in Serbia and Slovakia. They have denied all the national minority rights of the Hungarians, the very rights they demand for the Romanians in Ukraine. Of course, all this requires the myth of the Hungarian "threat."

[Fuzes] What is left then? Only a hope?

[Kiraly] It is tragic that there are serious forces in Eastern-Central Europe on a path of democratization

which treats the national minorities as a scapegoat. We must not agree with this! Nor should we become frightened, because this is precisely the goal of the aforementioned forces, to frighten us and to make the majority believe that minority rights are bad for them. We must not give up our natural and obvious rights. We cannot allow the majority to continue to disregard its obligation to defend the national minorities. The outside world and European integration could play a very important role in this. [passage omitted]

Poll Shows Low Level of Anti-Semitism

92P20175A Budapest HETI KIS UJSAG in Hungarian
24 Jan 92 p 8

[Article by D.M.G.: "MENORA's Statistics"]

[Text] An interesting article has been published by the Canadian weekly, MENORA, a newspaper of the North American Hungarian Jewish community. Jozsef Kovago, former mayor of Budapest, discusses the results of an opinion poll conducted by two respected American institutions, the American Jewish Committee and Freedom House. The article appeared in last year's July 12 issue, under the title "Measuring the Sentiments of the People in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland".

The poll was conducted simultaneously in Hungary (H), Poland (P), and Czechoslovakia (C) at the beginning of 1991 by well-respected polling institutions at the request of the above-mentioned two organizations. Approximately 1,200 persons were asked 199 questions in all three countries. The questions encompassed a wide range of topics that people are interested in, including democracy, economic reform, and Western aid, viewing them in the context of the present, as well as from the perspective of future hopes. In the the poll the researchers measured the sentiments of the Hungarian population toward the Jewish population; this is the topic that we want to discuss below.

A few of the questions:

How would you feel if members of one of the following ethnic groups were to be your neighbors?

Would you like such neighbors, would you not care, or would you be opposed to the idea. (The ethnic groups in question were: Russians, Blacks, Arabs, Orientals, Gypsies, and Jews.) Most of the Hungarians polled would object to Gypsies—76 percent—as they would to all other groups, except to Jews. With regard to this last group, the answers were, in percentages:

	Hungary	Poland	Czechoslovakia
Would like	16	3	5
Would not care	65	51	62
Would not want	17	40	23
Do not know	2	7	10

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Other questions dealt with the issue of the various groups' influence in society. With regard to Jews, the Hungarian answers were, in percentages:

	Hungary	Poland	Czechoslovakia
Too much influence	17	24	12
Too little	14	6	28
Just right	53	27	29
Do not know	16	43	31

With regard to the lifestyle of the various groups, 69 percent of the Hungarians polled considered the behavior of Gypsies objectionable and provocative; 41 percent thought the same about Romanians, and 21 percent about Russians. In clear contrast, 90 percent of those polled did not bring this charge against the Jews.

The polltakers also asked whether Jews should be allowed to freely practice their religion. Based on the answers it can be shown that it is in Hungary where the Jews have the best opportunity to freely exercise their religion. The answers in the three countries were, in percentages:

	Hungary	Poland	Czechoslovakia
Strongly agree	89	52	55
Agree	8	28	29
Do not agree	2	6	5
Strongly disagree	1	6	3

Finally the polltakers asked a question from which it becomes apparent that for Jewry the most desirable country, where they can live as an integral part of nationhood, is Hungary. "Is Jewry an organic part of our nation, or is it an alien body outside our society?" The answers are as follows [in percentages]:

	Hungary	Poland	Czechoslovakia
Integral part	75	44	52
Outsider	10	16	11
Neither	3	11	13
Both	4	8	5
Do not know	8	21	20

Editorial Views Leaders' Television Interview

AU1803133992 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 17 Mar 92 p 7

[Editorial by Balazs Stepan: "Tribal War With Machetes"]

[Text] Obviously, it would have been a mistake to expect statements that can be evaluated politically during the double interview broadcast on the Hungarian Television on the evening of 15 March. However, the program was

not without any lessons. In any case, it became clear that our president and our prime minister share the same opinion about some things. Prime Minister Jozsef Antall stressed that in addition to the necessary conflicts in the political life, some kind of a tribal war was going on in Hungarian intellectual and political life. President Arpad Goncz deplored our society's lack of patience, understanding, and attention. Jozsef Antall concluded his interview by saying that it was high time for everyone to be able to distinguish between political debates and hatred. One can absolutely agree with both statesmen's words; the question is what can change after these statements....

I am afraid that nothing would change. We should forget overnight a way of thinking, behavior, and reflexes ingrained over 40 years, and not everyone is capable of doing this. Of course, a new social consensus emerged at the elections, but we hardly succeeded in doing more than rejecting communism, as if this was still on the agenda today, although there is no sober-minded person here who would miss the power arrogance of the past 40 years.

It is characteristic of tribal wars that the fronts are along totally irrational fault lines. Power is responsible for decisions on where to open a front and where to seek agreement, while the mutual offenses of political enemies are pushing the possibility of an agreement even further away.

The government received a mandate to discard the monolithic power structure and refrain from creating a new one instead and consolidating its power, and to create an open society by respecting the citizens' activity. However, the government is trying to increasingly infiltrate the lower echelons of our society, to spread its power and to organize a clientele, and this government is increasingly impatient when listening to opinions that differ from its own. We can hardly find patience and calm moderation in everyday politics: This tribal war is fought with machetes. Politicians belonging to parties in power positions are conducting an open ideological struggle, instead of using political arguments and, thus, our political life lacks even the possibility of bargaining.

Naturally, a national day interview is not suitable for political debate. However, one could clearly see that the two highest Hungarian officials had at least a similar view about the essence of this conflict, and this is a lot.

Defense Official on Military Policy

AU1703142392 Budapest REFORM in Hungarian
12 Mar 92 pp 5, 35

[Interview with Erno Raffay, Defense Ministry state secretary, by Fuzesi-Vincze; place and date not given: "We Are Talking About an Evaluation of Forces and Not About a Display of Force"]

[Text] Erno Raffay speaks about this region's military situation and Hungary's defense situation, the borders

issue, discipline, the fears of the generals and the officers, and relations between politicians and soldiers.

National endeavors, national minority offenses, separatism or independence, retrograde nationalism and assertion of interests—an amalgam of concepts is hanging over Central and East Europe, and so is the smell of gunpowder. Even if there was a slight hope one and a half years ago that a world empire could disintegrate without dramatic crises, this hope has dissipated, and we can only hope now that sooner or later sober self-interest will make the nations and leaders in this region more considerate. Hungary has become the "natural target" of various propaganda attacks. One might dislike this, but one must acknowledge this fact. We are walking on a very narrow path in the spreading jungle of emotions, a path where one must not take a wrong step.

[Fuzesi-Vincze] Your last interview for REFORM was during the disarmament talks in Vienna. Times have changed since then, and so has the map. Big power attention is now focused on the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. Is there any energy left to verify whether the other countries in the region are fulfilling their obligations?

[Raffay] Yes. Verification is being carried out according to the "Paris Charter," and we do not have any information about any country violating the disarmament agreements. Fortunately, the conflicts and tensions prevailing in the everyday politics have had no effect whatsoever on this agreement.

[Fuzesi-Vincze] Are the direct military contacts, that curiously enough have developed more positively than the "civilian diplomacy" lately, still alive?

[Raffay] Of course. For example, take the current talks in Romania, the regular contacts between the two general staffs, and the confidence-building agreement known as the "open skies" agreement. We have good military-diplomatic relations with the CSFR and naturally with Poland too, and such contacts are developing with Russia, as well as with our huge new neighbor, Ukraine. We have every chance of being able to say the same thing about Slovenia and Croatia. We have one problem area, namely Serbian-Hungarian relations. I recently told the Yugoslav ambassador that we would like to have correct military relations. I am confident that his request to study our previous agreements with the neighboring countries was not an accidental gesture. Bad Serbian-Hungarian relations would threaten the security of the whole region, as well as the Hungarian minority. We are "predestined" to refrain from quarreling with Serbia. The fact that, naturally, the Hungarian Government and military leadership can only have contacts with legal political and military bodies, and not with free troops and militant organizations, only complicates the matters tremendously.

[Fuzesi-Vincze] In one of your statements made a few weeks ago, you said that Hungary has a sufficient defense

capability to withstand an attack from any side. In other words, this possibility is being considered....

[Raffay] This is natural. This is a fundamental task of every army headquarters after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and I mean here an evaluation of forces, rather than a show of force. A show of force would be stupid. The same applies to the opposite. We would also be stupid not to try to evaluate the dangers of the coming years and to think in advance for the benefit of Hungary's security as well as the security of the whole region. The social explosions deriving from neo-chauvinism and economic collapse could represent a source of danger, especially if these two factors blend together, and historical experience warns us of this possibility. If we are clearly aware of all this, our task is to first settle our economic situation and then build a stable and functional system of democratic institutions....

[Fuzesi-Vincze] It would be desirable then to have humanist historians in charge of other armed forces too....

[Raffay] This is an excellent idea! So be it!

[Fuzesi-Vincze] The background and creation of the Trianon Peace Agreement is your main area of scientific research. You published your third volume last year. Essentially, this "robbers' peace" was renewed on the basis of the Yalta Agreement after World War II. Western authors have been saying nowadays that Yalta exists no more, because one of the sides, the Soviet Union, has ceased to exist....

[Raffay] I must intervene here very quickly: This is a strictly scientific approach, like the way I treated the subject in my book *Trianon's Secrets*. As for how to approach the border issue in 1992, this is another matter altogether. The Hungarian Government has a clear position on this matter: We accept and respect the Helsinki Agreement of 1975, and Hungary does not try to change the borders by force in any way whatsoever. Naturally, bringing up the border issue could have unforeseeable consequences not only between Hungary and the neighboring countries, but also between a series of other countries. Bloody fighting is already going on today, although there are "only" attempts to change internal borders in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The domino-principle could work in this case, and this would lead to the collective suicide of the nations in Central and Eastern Europe. Previously, the Army was a "sacred cow"; today, it is neither a saint nor a cow....

[Fuzesi-Vincze] The reduction in personnel, the political changes, and the sharp deterioration in the standard of living have obviously made the officers insecure. Officers without respect?

[Raffay] There were still around 90 generals in the Hungarian Army three years ago. The Nemeth government pensioned off half of these people. We pensioned off some 10 generals. Therefore, those who are currently serving in the Army have nothing to worry about. I

remind you of the fact that neither the president nor the defense minister accepted Kalman Lorincz' resignation last year. Besides, there was an exemplary control over the Army during the change in the regime, and there was no possibility whatsoever for anyone to make use of the Army for political goals. There were conflicts after this, but simply because it was unclear what the Army's "dissideologization" really meant in practice. We succeeded in making this crystal clear with Lieutenant General Deak and Major General Lorincz.

[Fuzesi-Vincze] So it is a false rumor that the politicians and the soldiers are keeping a suspicious distance.

[Raffay] There must be people who imagine things in line with their desires, but the aforementioned relations are as good as possible.

[Fuzesi-Vincze] In conclusion, let me ask you a personal question: How does a civilian feel in the Defense Ministry?

[Raffay] Contrary to all the rumors, I feel well. I was surprised to hear rumors lately that I would like to go back to teaching at the university because "I do not feel secure here." I would like to say that it is not easy to upset my sense of security and I like to do my job. I do not interfere in military professional matters, although I am very much interested in such matters. As a historian, I have the opportunity to play a modest part in our history.

Army Commander Views State of Defense Forces

AU1703134492 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 14 Mar 92 p 6

[Interview with Colonel General Kalman Lorincz, commander of the Hungarian Army, by "F.G."; place and date not given: "Our Officers Deserve More Appreciation"]

[Text] Kalman Lorincz is 53 and has been in this position since 1989.

[F.G.] Mr. Lorincz! Has the prestige of the officers and the Army changed in recent years?

[Lorincz] The Army has changed quite a lot. Its attitude, its structure, and its relations to society as a whole have changed, but the prestige of its officers has not changed. However, its officers deserve more appreciation than they are getting today, because these soldiers did not leave the Army in these difficult times and accepted all the professional and personal consequences of the recent changes. Our Army maintained its ability to function thanks to these officers.

[F.G.] Has the Army discipline changed? Have there been more disciplinary problems lately, or have these cases simply received more publicity today?

[Lorincz] One can hear a lot about rebellious soldiers and soldiers with a criminal record both in the press and

in public, but nothing is said about the majority who are fulfilling their tasks honestly and are also accepting sacrifices. Of course, those disciplinary cases represent a real problem, but the same type of conflicts, extremism, and anomalies appear in the changing Army as in the changing society as a whole.

[F.G.] Several analyses published recently speak about our future army as an army made up of professional soldiers, or a "mercenary" army. In your opinion, what is the path of development?

[Lorincz] According to Hungary's historical heritage, the nation fights and defends itself. In my opinion, an army organized on a professional basis is not a positive thing; at the same time, a controversy has emerged between the reduced Army service and the need to efficiently operate the increasingly complex military technology. We need to create an adequate proportion to solve this problem. An army made up of 40-50 percent professionals and 50-55 percent conscripts would be able to excellently guarantee adequate defense. Of course, this system greatly demands real professional officers and staff. We have already extended the officers' training schedule, and we encourage studies abroad; we also started to train warrant officers according to the officers' training curriculum, and we are recruiting people from among young high-school graduates. We will only be able to further reduce the service time if we succeed in advancing in the use of soldiers on contract.

[F.G.] What kind of weapons do these soldiers receive? What is the level of our Army's arsenal?

[Lorincz] The level of our Army's arsenal does not differ essentially from that of the surrounding countries in this region. The problem is that there are differences in the age and quality of our technological equipment. Some of our installations have already become amortized, and they have not only become obsolete, but their use has also become questionable; some of our installations are still functional, but their operation is increasingly inefficient. However, a relevant amount of our arsenal can be used until the end of the century. The earlier international cooperation through which we purchased spare parts, ammunition, and missiles has ceased to exist with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and, therefore, we are now beginning to use up our reserves. We have not yet succeeded in finding new suppliers, and the output of our domestic background industry that guaranteed the needs of the Hungarian Army has also diminished.

[F.G.] In other words, we are still a long way from seeing the end of the tunnel.

[Lorincz] That is correct. Our Army's long-term technical development concept is currently being prepared, and we have to submit this concept to the government by

the middle of this year. If adopted, this concept could provide a good basis for budget decisions.

[F.G.] The Constitutional Court recently dealt with the command system in the Hungarian Army. Has this issue been clarified?

[Lorincz] Yes, it has. In line with the defense law, we worked out a division of labor between the Defense Ministry and the Army Headquarters. In solving various conflicts, together with the defense minister, we realized that it was no use turning the serious controversies prevailing in a changing army into personal conflicts.

Commentary Assesses Woerner Visit

AU1703175992 Warsaw *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* in Polish
13 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Kazimierz Woycicki: "Hurry Slowly"]

[Text] Rapprochement with NATO is a Polish foreign policy goal for obvious reasons. Even if the attitude that we assume toward our eastern neighbors is of the most receptive kind, we must seek security guarantees in the West. The CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries are also seeking security guarantees from NATO. They were recently admitted to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Woerner defended that very decision in Warsaw. His second visit was clearly intended to reassure his Polish partners on two points. First, NATO takes a favorable view of Poland's policy aims with respect to security; second, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary continue to be viewed in a special way.

At the same time, Woerner's statements served to check the excessive expectations of some Polish politicians. The talks clearly showed that NATO membership and formal security guarantees are issues for the distant future. No agreement was signed during the visit. Minister Parys was able to establish beyond doubt that his earlier statements calling for Poland's rapid admission to NATO are not viewed sympathetically by our Western partners. On the Polish side, Minister Skubiszewski performed a role of first-rank importance and his vision of a gradual rapprochement with NATO has been the most realistic one from the very outset. Skubiszewski clearly represents continuity in Polish foreign policy and that applies in equal measure to the negotiations with Brussels. Despite their earlier differences, both Polish politicians now spoke with one voice, and that merits recognition.

Germans View Polish Amphetamine Production

92WD0416A Warsaw *PRAWO I ZYCIE* in Polish
No 6, 8 Feb 92 p 12

[Article by Stanislaw Czynski: "Amphetamine Is Our Specialty," subtitled "The Germans Are Beginning To Suspect That Certain Polish Politicians and Policemen Are Profiting From Exports of Synthetic Narcotics Beyond the Odra"]

[Text] Wiesbaden, early February—A major new objective of the drug enforcement sections of the German Criminal Office (BKA) is checking the importation of synthetic narcotics from Poland. According to BKA estimates, in Poland there exist some 500 laboratories producing chiefly amphetamines, mostly for export to Germany. The Director of the German Criminal Office in Wiesbaden Michael Thomas estimated that the Polish output is meeting at least 20 percent of the demand in West Europe, and that the Polish amphetamine is of top quality.

Since the equipment and raw materials can be readily purchased both in Germany and in Poland, the decisive factor is the diligence, ingenuity, and accuracy of the chemists. In this respect Poland is one of the world's leading countries. The promptness of the shipments of Poland also amazes the German recipients and horrifies the German police.

Unlike heroin and cocaine, amphetamine is a narcotic manufactured exclusively from synthetic substances. Given the molecular structure of these substances, their possible derivatives number in the millions. In their search for new narcotic synthetics the Polish producers use computers for which they develop their own software.

The Germans firmly believe that the Poles have not only mastered the manufacture of such hallucinogens as "Ecstasy" and "Cadillac" but also synthesized new ones which need not be injected and can be intaken by swallowing, smoking, or inhaling. Polish laboratories focus on developing narcotics which are effective in microscopic doses and are practically undetectable in blood or urine by the methods known to the police. So far five groups of synthetic narcotics are known: phentanyls, amphetamines, phencyclidines, prodines, and tryptamines. By now, however, additional groups, unknown as yet to the police, may have been developed.

According to Karl-Artur Kovar, a professor of pharmaceutical chemistry in Tybing, it is not difficult to manufacture new narcotic compounds. It suffices to buy a classical narcotic like mescaline or such readily available chemicals as phenylacetone or piperonal in order to, through trial and error, develop a next-generation synthetic narcotic. But to this end the chemist has to be a criminal. That is because all such producers are perfectly aware that substances of this kind can cause myocardial infarction, paralysis of the respiratory tract, and disturbances of the nervous and psychic system prompting attempts at suicide. For example, carphentanyl, a derivative of phentanyl, is as many as 7,500 times as effective as morphine!

It is the profits, which are a thousandfold, that prompt some chemists to become criminals. That is why in 1989 drug-induced deaths in Germany totaled 1,000; in 1990, 1,500; and last year, as many as 2,000. To this total should be added the victims of heart attacks or road accidents caused by drug abuse but recorded in statistics as normal causes of deaths.

The tragic images of isolated drug addicts seen on television or in the periodicals pale before the impression of the Dantean scenes in the underground passages of the Main Train Terminal in Frankfurt. Here someone is frozen in a strange pose, there someone else is staring with a dark inward gaze, and over there a small group of people are avidly sniffing something; in another place still, a basket case, an armless and legless man, is sitting on a trash bin. In between them are ordinary people: pimps, whores, alcoholics, jobless Turks, Yugoslav

thieves. Hundreds and thousands of "normal" denizens of Frankfurt walk across these circles of hell without showing any special interest. Are they blind to that hell?

They are not blind. Frankfurt is also a city with 15 counseling, assistance, and self-help institutions for potential and actual drug addicts. Some of these institutions serve only children or youth, while others work with the entire family or with the school. Some provide aid to drug addicts, while others also help alcoholics, HIV-carriers, and AIDS patients. Quite a few such centers remain open late at night. In addition, in Frankfurt there operate dozens of counseling offices for children, teenagers, parents, families, women, men, the handicapped, the elderly, and foreigners, as well as psychological, social, and health clinics which also assist potential or actual drug addicts. The list of these centers, in small print, takes up an entire page of a newspaper. They are not too many, because as many as 17 percent of the inhabitants of Germany in the 12-25 age group have had contact with drugs.

There are many reasons why increasingly younger children are taking drugs: the [parental] lack of contact with children and the constant exposure to academic stress are the main reasons. The German educational system is increasingly ailing owing to its unrestrained emphasis on productivity and rationality, combined with cuts in teachers' salaries. The schools, television, the street, the home, they all increasingly often are detrimental to natural dreams and hopes. They are being replaced by "chemical dreams." And increasingly often the producers of these dreams are, the Germans contend, Polish chemists-criminals.

The persons I spoke with at the BKA and the German Ministry of the Interior unofficially voiced their bitterness at Poland's virtual failure to combat the production and exportation of drugs, especially synthetic ones. In Poland the possession of narcotics is not prohibited, and in practice no producer or trafficker is accountable. My impression is that the [German] drug enforcement agencies are but a step from suspecting that certain highly placed government and police officials in Poland are profiting from the production of amphetamine and its exportation to Germany.

The operational department of the Polish police for cooperation with the Interpol (to which the German Federal Criminal Office also belongs) which was established last November should be strengthened with more funds and personnel in order to cope with the needs. Otherwise Poland may become to Germany what Colombia is to the United States. The Germans want to provide material assistance to the Polish police, and at present a plan for such assistance is being worked out. At the same time, the Germans are disturbed by the lack of interest in cooperating with the German police displayed at the voivodship police level, which may cause the German material aid to be wasted.

Incidentally, I was authorized by Mr. Helmuth Schneider, first senior commissar at the Federal Criminal Office, to inform the national commanding officer of the Polish police that the BKA is willing to train at its expense, at its center in Wiesbaden, Polish police personnel who would be cooperating with German law enforcement agencies. Knowledge of the German language is a prerequisite.

[Box, p 12]

The Germans Do Not Understand That We Have No Money

Those fellows were simply raking in the money. In selling their merchandise to the FRG they were profiting ten-fold. One day in June the Security Service surrounded the house in which they were living. The door burst open noisily. None of the three "biznesmen" resisted or tried to defend the yellow bags containing merchandise worth a million dollars. That is how much the powder contained in these bags would cost "on the street." Laboratory tests left no doubt: In Warsaw 16 kilograms of amphetamine were confiscated.

That 1989feat of the quondam Security Service was widely applauded. The applause would have been still greater had not it been for one little hitch: The German courier escaped the trap. Soon afterward the detainees paid bail of 35 million zlotys [Z] each and were released. In October 1990 their lawyers accused Security Service personnel of entrapment. There was no way of proving that the three "biznesmen" were indeed manufacturing, trafficking in, or smuggling drugs. Last summer they were acquitted.

"The police need a change of law," said the Chief of the Department for Combatting Drug Abuse and Social Pathology at the National Police Headquarters, Sub-Inspector Zbigniew Dziemidowicz. "It should be adapted to international standards. In Poland possession itself of narcotics, and not just trafficking in them, should be made punishable. The present laws place us in a disadvantaged situation."

A lobby in favor of amending the 1985 Law on Drug Addiction is being formed in the Sejm, precisely with the object of instituting penalties for drug possession—a demand that has been made for years. The Germans, whose country is the biggest market for Polish amphetamine, cannot understand why Poles still have not settled such a fundamental issue.

As late as last June GAZETA WYBORCZA quoted employees of the Federal Criminal Office in Wiesbaden as saying that Polish drug producers have so much money that bribing law enforcement agents and public prosecutors is no problem to them.

This accusation was rebutted by Irena Popoff, the press-spokesperson for the UOP [Office for State Protection]. "As far as I know, our services are working quite hard on the amphetamine issue. To Germans, who are living

under a long-established and tried and tested legal system this may seem as taking a long time to resolve. But it should be borne in mind that in Germany legislative amendments are cosmetic measures compared with the work of our parliament. In Poland legislation is being revised from the ground up so as to adapt it to our new reality. I would consider the passage of a law providing for penalties for drug possession to be a turning point."

On 1 December 1991 the aforementioned drug enforcement department was established at the National Police Headquarters. Similar departments are to be formed at the voivodship police levels. At present in Poland as a whole this type of crime is handled by only 20 to 25 police personnel, assisted by 10 dogs. In addition, several specially trained quadrupeds are kept by the Border Guards and customs officers.

Yet, antidrug "Tiger Brigades," armed with protective clothing and drug testing equipment should join the combat. Unfortunately, that equipment is becoming scarce at some centers. The availability of skilled personnel for such purposes is uncertain, too. There is a continuing shortage of computers and fast cars.

"We won't catch the criminal by riding a trolley. At best, we can arrest a drug addict who is so much 'under the influence' that he cannot even walk," said an employee of the drug enforcement department at the National Police Headquarters.

In the case of amphetamine Poland is one of the world's top producers. But it is not among the leading countries so far as combatting the manufacture and trafficking in this terrible narcotic is concerned. This is due to extremely prosaic and banal problems, namely, imperfections of law and scarcity of funds—a tune that sounds quite familiar when many other issues are discussed as well. To put it bluntly, there is no money.

[Box, p 12]

Polish Amphetamine—Superior Quality, Low Price

At present six amphetamine-containing medicines are being manufactured in the world. Until 1976 one such medicine had also been produced in Poland, at the Warsaw Polfa Plant, under the appellation of Psychedrine ("Psychedryna").

The first illegal amphetamine producer was arrested in Poland in 1979. At present, according to police estimates, several secret laboratories are producing that narcotic from raw materials imported most often from the FRG. The starting material is benzino-methyl-ketone (BMK), used in the electronics and cosmetics industries. The technology of synthesizing amphetamine is not complicated; a normally equipped laboratory and a normally competent chemist will suffice.

Now and then the Office for State Protection comes across traces of clandestine plants manufacturing superior-quality amphetamine (99.99 percent pure). In 1990

a record amount, 17 kg of the white powder, was confiscated. In May 1991 the Office for State Protection shut down a secret laboratory near Piotrkow, without finding there even a gram of amphetamine, however. In late June 1991 the Lodz branch of the Office for State Protection confiscated a quantity of BMK sufficient to manufacture 60 kg of amphetamine.

Poland is, next to the Netherlands, the largest producer of amphetamine in Europe, with the Polish product beating any competition in quality and price. Nearly the entire Polish output of amphetamine enters the FRG and Scandinavia through illegal channels.

Smuggling is often by sea. Polish and Scandinavian customs officers now and then seize small (up to 1 kg) portions of amphetamine. Another smuggling center is Warsaw's Okecie Airport. In addition, smugglers transport amphetamine by car directly to the FRG. German police believe that persons involved in the operations of an international car mafia engage in drug trafficking. In the last five years several attempts to smuggle amphetamine to the West were uncovered.

In 1987 the Swedish customs service confiscated 20 kg of amphetamine originating from Poland.

In March 1988 Hamburg police confiscated from two LOT Polish Airlines pilots 4.97 kg of amphetamine worth a million Deutschmarks on the black market. Both spent two and a half years each in a West German prison. The organizer of the smuggling, a Pole with a West German passport, was sentenced to seven years in prison. Soon afterward a Pole attempting to sell nearly 8 kg of amphetamine was detained in the FRG. Also in 1988 the Swedish customs service detained a crew member on the Nieborow Ferry who tried to smuggle 300 grams of that drug.

In 1989 two Poles (one a Swedish citizen) were arrested in Finland for attempting to sell a kilogram of amphetamine in a Finnish park. Both were sentenced to three years in prison.

In June 1990 Polish law enforcement agents seized in Warsaw 16 kg of amphetamine originating from the same source as the amphetamine smuggled by the pilots into the FRG. Only the middlemen were arrested, as the German courier succeeded in escaping. In mid-1991 a court acquitted those middlemen by reason of lack of proof of drug trafficking.

In April 1991, at the border crossing in Kolbaskow Border Guard personnel detained a FRG citizen who tried to smuggle 40 grams of amphetamine out of Poland. In the course of the investigation an additional 2 kg of the drug was seized in Swinoujscie. In July 1991 Swedish police detained two Polish citizens for smuggling 1.2 kg of amphetamine.

Report on SdRP National Convention

Opposition Role Stated

92EP0235A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 17 Feb 91
p 1

[Article by Mateusz Jarski: "Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland National Convention: The Opposition Trap"]

[Text] "Every political movement, including social democracy, has a natural need for success, affirmation, participation in government. Political action, for the long term, cannot lead only to existing for the 'no.' What can be done so as not grow bitter in opposition? How should one operate so that the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] would not fall into the opposition trap? Because after all it does not look as though the reasons for our opposition will cease in the next few months," mused Aleksander Kwasniewski at the Second National Conference of the SdRP, which met on Saturday, 15 February.

The SdRP leader, responding to his own doubts, offered a catalog of positive actions. Thus, the party, through its deputies and senators, should be active in parliamentary work. It must submit its own legislative initiatives, effectively fulfill its deputies' and senators' mandates in its own electoral districts, and prepare for elections. "Even for elections to parish councils," Miller added to Kwasniewski's comment. The SdRP chairman pointed out that the party has also chosen between populism and pragmatism. "There is a way that suits the interests of working people and it is not populism, it is the social democratic way. The SdRP is the party of responsibility, realism, the Polish *raison d'etat*.

SdRP Secretary General Leszek Miller presented the issue differently. In his opinion, the party is choosing between radical opposition and selective opposition. In the meantime, "we should be a radicalized opposition, always having our own alternative idea, up to and including an alternative vision of society." Miller suggested that it is necessary to penetrate all the "overinterpretation of responsibility," and act more distinctly. However, the two views of opposition, presented by the chairman and general secretary of the SdRP, were not the basic topic of discussion. As was apparent from the majority of votes, the kind of opposition the SdRP is presenting now is good. Hence, rational and constructive. It was suggested that the SdRP should strive to attain the position of chief representative of working people, but on the other hand, the need to cooperate with all leftist forces fighting for these same interests was emphasized. Because the composition of forces on the left, as Miller said, is fairly clear, but not definitive. (A review of the SdRP's activity between conventions and a discussion of its platform and personnel are on page 3.)

POLAND

Program Described

92EP0235B Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 17 Feb 92
p 3

[Article by Artur Siedlarek: "Program for the 'Shadow Cabinet'"]

[Text] "Without a doubt, we have achieved electoral success, and the concept of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] has proved to be sound. By our election results we have shown that the left is necessary to Poland the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] can be its basic element. But it would be a mistake to stay in one place and be content to gloat over our success. It is necessary to 'move forward.'" This excerpt from A. Kwasniewski's statement showed what purpose the convention was to serve.

By coincidence, that same day important votes were taking place in the Sejm, and SdRP deputies spent most of the day there. This had a negative effect on the level of the platform debate. Many delegates noted that it is hard to build a sound program for party activity in a situation where the financial collapse of the SdRP has occurred. But there were also those who said that liquidation of assets does not yet mean liquidation of a party whose foundation is people, not furniture or cars. But opinions that a great deal can be done without a flow of money from headquarters were rare. Doubts on this question were dispelled by Secretary General L. Miller, who proposed decentralization as a prescription for revitalization in the party. Not only decentralization in the platform—to which the majority of regional members would agree—but above all financial decentralization, which would force voivodship organizations to secure operating funds in their own sphere.

Kwasniewski, pointing out the many threats the SdRP faces, also indicated ways to overcome them. In the leader's opinion, the SdRP is not a party of nostalgia of which many accuse it, but a party that wants to change Polish reality by parliamentary means, according to the ideals of the modern left. Kwasniewski is convinced that the SdRP can present a program that is an alternative to that of the right, taking into account the interests of working people, and at the same time a program that is not populist. The platform resolution of the second convention is naturally the result of compromises. During discussions, especially those of the committee on resolutions and motions, one could see the operation of at least two parallel currents of thought about the party's tasks. They differ mainly in their approach to matters of history. A large group, especially young members, would like to concentrate exclusively on building a future program, on solving the country's current problems, with particular attention to those groups from which the SLD electorate is drawn. These people want to build a new Poland and take from the PRL [Polish People's Republic] era only that which was obviously good. Their opponents, on the other hand, demand deeper involvement by the SdRP in the defense of postwar Poland. On

issues concerning the future, the SdRP has a more homogeneous face. The convention acknowledge as basic conditions for overcoming the crisis:

- Basing the government on genuine agreement among major political forces;
- Renouncing the premise of building a new economy on the ruins of economic substance thus far;
- Distributing equally over all levels of society the cost of systemic reconstruction;
- Rejecting the philosophy of hatred and retaliation that leads to squandering of the abilities and creative strengths of the people;
- A radical change in personnel policy from "one's own" to competent people;
- Openness to the world, but without selective treatment of the principles of national sovereignty;
- Elaborating a rational and socially acceptable doctrine of national defense.

The convention acknowledge as useful the party's appointment of its own "shadow cabinet," and also renewed its offer of dialogue and cooperation directed at all forces of the Polish left.

New Leadership

92EP0235C Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 17 Feb 92
p 3

[Article by (SIEDL.): "Personnel"]

[Text] Delegates to the convention generally assessed the work of the Main Council Presidium and Central Executive Committee [CKW] favorably. This assessment was confirmed in the results of a vote of confidence for the leadership. Only treasurer Wieslaw Huszcza did not win support. The convention elected a New CKW. In addition to Leszek Miller, it is composed of Edward Kuczera, Krzysztof Janik, Leszek Nikolski, Marek Ungier, and Dariusz Klimaszewski. The Main Council Presidium structure also changed. The convention's decision to eliminate the permanent committee of the Main Council brought with it the recall from the presidium of those joining it in their capacity as chairmen. After a vote to supplement the structure of the presidium, it is comprised of the following: Main Council Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski, Jacek Piechota, Marek Borowski, Marek Siwiec, Andrzej Szarawarski, Jerzy Wiatr, Piotr Mochnaczewski, Tadeusz Iwinski, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, Zbigniew Sobotka, Irena Nowacka, Ryszard Jarzebowski, Andrzej Urbanczyk, Waldemar Czajkowski, Jacek Uczkiewicz, Andrzej Jaeschke, and Antoni Szczucinski. Deputies Izabella Sierakowska and Jozef Oleksy were elected deputy chairmen of the Main Council.

SdRP's State of Affairs

92EP0235D Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 17 Feb 92
p 3

[Article by Aleksander Frydrychowicz: "Report on the State of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland"]

[Text] With much anxiety, participants in the Second National Convention of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] awaited the results of a vote of confidence for certain members of the party's leadership. Only party treasurer W. Huszcza did not receive a vote of confidence. This was no surprise to anyone, especially after the exceptionally critical report of the Audit Committee, which assessed unfavorably the course of work on preparation and adoption of the party budget last year. Among other things, the treasurer was accused of rejecting all comments by the Audit Committee on the reliability of party revenue figures. The Audit Committee also detected irregularities in the management of SdRP's assets. The reason for this lies—as was noted in the report—in the lack of continuity in financial accountability by people in leadership positions, due to several changes of personnel. The issue of management was also raised in the report of the SdRP National Party Court, which last year removed from party ranks the former secretary of the Voivodship Executive Committee in Gdansk for failure to observe financial discipline. But the settling of accounts affected not just financial matters. The party's methods of operation and the results it has achieved were also subjected to scrutiny.

Despite difficult political conditions and financial problems, the SdRP has undoubtedly left its mark on the Polish political landscape. Some gave it only a few months to live, yet its status and public support are growing.

The convention evaluated the party's successes very cautiously. In discussions, an attempt was made to boast less while drawing conclusions about party work with a critical approach to the problems analyzed. It was noted that difficult operating conditions do not encourage people to work. Among other things, that is why the requirements set for party members were decreased. The process of decline in their activities has been observed.

From the Party Court's report came the statement that in going along from the "only proper" party to the "only improper" party, people got lost and retreated, and want "blessed, social democratic peace." All the criticism in evaluating the party's activity does not mean the party has not had success in its corner. The most important—as was emphasized in the discussions—was elaboration of the SdRP election program, which is a sound alternative to government programs. The election results are the best evidence that the SdRP is not socially isolated.

The numerical state of the party has been stable for quite some time at about 60,000 members, but its permanent electorate exceeds a million people. The SdRP is one of the leftist forces. Its vitality will depend on the number of young people joining. Convention participants devoted many comments to this issue. The question of how to attract young people to the party accompanied the entire debate. Answers were sought in a form of program and operating methods that would be attractive to a young person surrounded by numerous social dangers. Among other things, the need to reach back to the

methods of prewar socialists—creating worker universities or worker housing cooperatives—was noted. It is apparent from the assessment formulated at the convention that the SdRP is aware of both its strengths and weaknesses. Without euphoria, but with a great sense of responsibility, it is approaching electoral success. Nor does it have a lineage complex. The caution in formulating positive assessments raises the hope that electoral success will not become the agent that obscures the real purpose of party activity.

Pessimism Seen in Household Budget Appraisal

92EP0241A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE
in Polish No 7, 16 Feb 92 p 15

[Article by Katarzyna and Jerzy Malyszow: "The Condition of Households"]

[Excerpts] The second year of studies conducted since the first quarter of 1990 concludes with the eighth survey in a row to examine the condition of households. 1,382 respondents reported their opinions about the situation in November 1991; in August 1991, there were 1,268 respondents. The survey continues to have a more urban character, as 78 percent of the answers were sent from cities of various types.

The distribution of the [sample] population according to source of income is relatively stable: Income from non-agricultural work dominates, while income from pensions is in second place; remaining sources have shares of just a few percent. The size of respondents' families is also characterized by relative stability: three- and four-person families dominate, amounting to close to 60 percent of the studied group.

Opinions About November 1991

Self-evaluation of the wealth of those surveyed, tested by a question about in which income group they would include their households, gave the following results in November 1991 (results from August 1991 are in parentheses): Only 0.6 percent (1.1 percent) thought that they received a high income; 48.4 percent (49.2 percent), a middle income; and 49.2 percent (46.3 percent), a low income. Thus the distribution of answers in two successive surveys is similar.

To a question about the income that the household had on hand in the given month, slightly more—5.6 percent—answered that it was "higher" (in August, 5.0 percent), just as slightly more—63.3 percent (as opposed to 62.3 percent)—considered it to be the same; thus 30.8 percent (before, 32.3 percent) judged that it was "lower."

The level of savings (in zlotys or foreign currency) in November 1991 was judged to be "high" by 0.1 percent of the respondents, "sufficient" by 23.5 percent, "disturbingly low" by 34.2 percent, "zero" by 22.9 percent, and finally, negative (indebtedness) by 18.3 percent. Consequently, of 1,000 households, only one has the

chance to redeem its situation with high savings, while as many as 412 have zero savings, or have simply gone into debt (in August 1991, 423).

The corresponding percentages representing savings in August 1991 were 0.6 percent, 22.9 percent, 33.8 percent, 24.5 percent, and 17.8 percent.

The distribution of answers to the question, "All things considered, are you satisfied with your life?" did not change in November 1991. The share of those dissatisfied continued to outweigh that of those who were satisfied; as in August, 57.3 percent were dissatisfied, and 41.6 percent (42 percent in August) were satisfied.

Prognoses for the First Quarter of 1992

Income prognoses are pessimistic in this survey as well. As much as 46.6 percent of the respondents predict that their income will be lower, and only 44.6 percent predict that it will not change. A rise in income is predicted by 8.6 percent.

Conclusions

Income: In the November survey, the number of respondents among whom a rise in income was observed grew insignificantly (only by 0.6 percentage points) in comparison to August 1991; at the same time, the number of respondents showing a decline in income in the same period decreased (by 1.5 percentage points). Similarly, a rise in income is seen more optimistically in prognosis (by 3 percentage points), but the depth of decline in income is seen more pessimistically (46.6 percent in the prognosis, as opposed to 30.8 percent in diagnosis).

Savings: The erosion of savings is taking place more quickly than is the consumption of food reserves. It is worth emphasizing that the diagnosis of the level of savings is more pessimistic than the prognosis, which means that the actual situation turned out to be worse than expected. As much as 85 percent of the households studied considered the level of their savings to be "disturbingly low," "zero," or "negative," but 80 percent of the respondents expect such a situation in the future (the prognosis).

The stabilization of the level of savings at a very low level, even in combination with a slowing of the erosion of those savings, constitutes an enormous threat to the condition of households in case of a return of hyperinflation.

The future of the household was appraised in this survey with minimally less "confidence" than in the August survey (only by 0.8 percentage points), but also with much less "fear" (by 2.6 percentage points). The future of households must appear to our respondents as closely dependent on the future of the Polish economy. Thus the evident deviation of the "fear" indicator from its growth trend.

Regardless of how the prognostic indicators of the future of the household come out, one can not lose sight of the

fact that 86.8 percent of the respondents feel apprehension or fear of what awaits their households in the first quarter of 1992. This means that the conviction is universal that our economy is far from stabilization, and from guaranteeing households a feeling of security (particularly in provisioning and social services).

Fishing Fleet Prospects Examined, Detailed
*92EP0203A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish
 No 15, 4 Feb 92 p 7*

[Article by Adam Gwiazda: "Unfavorable Prospects for Polish Fishing"]

[Text] Fishing was never a substantial part of the national economy in our country. At the beginning of 1991, its share in generating national income was approximately 0.25 percent, and employment in this branch (including processing and other associated industries) was approximately 0.36 percent of the total employed in the national economy.

Actually privatizing the existing five Baltic fishing enterprises and three deep-sea fishing enterprises has been

initiated, but this process is still not finished. Two of the Baltic enterprises, Szkuner and Koga, are in the final phase of privatization. Of the fishery enterprises that were state enterprises until recently, only the "remnants" of the Center for Fishing and Fish Plants remain. Also, the Foreign Trade Enterprise, Rybex, was privatized in 1991. Moreover, during the past year, many private wholesale firms appeared that took over most of the foreign market trade in fish and fish products (the share of Rybex in 1991 was estimated at approximately 40 percent).

The quite sluggishly implemented privatization was accompanied by serious regression in Polish fisheries in both Baltic and deep-sea fishing. It seems that following the present, very significant limitation of our catches in the Bering Sea and the literal expulsion of our fishing vessels from the Sea of Okhotsk, deep-sea fishing may be treated as a remnant of our fishing industry.

The most dynamic development of Polish deep-sea fishing began in the mid- 1960's when our catches rose from 195 thousand tons in 1965 to 304 thousand in 1970 and 603 thousand in 1975. In subsequent years there was a steady decline in these catches (see Table 1).

Table 1: Catches of the Polish Fishing Fleet (in thousands of tons)

Year	Baltic Catches	Ocean Catches	Total	Index 1975=100	Purchase at Sea from Foreign Fishermen
1950	58.5	7.7	66.2	8	
1955	65.4	41.7	107.1	13	
1960	82.5	85.8	168.3	21	
1965	84.6	195.5	280.1	34	
1970	146.6	304.7	451.3	55	
1975	213.7	603.0	816.7	100	
1980	221.7	560.0	781.7	96	
1985	178.7	472.8	651.5	80	83.6
1987	137.8	503.0	640.8	78	109.6
1988	126.5	492.6	619.1	76	112.5
1989	118.7	413.0	531.7	65	94.5
1990	110.6	319.1	429.7	53	86.1
1991*	100.0	295.0	395.0	48	70

* Estimated

Source: Statistical Bulletins of the Maritime Fisheries Institute

It must be noted that since 1975 there has been not only a decrease in catches with respect to the quantity of fish. This regression also involved the composition of the catches and profitability of fishing fleet operation.

One of the basic causes of this state of affairs was the introduction at the beginning of the 1970's by all "maritime" countries of so-called exclusive economic zones. This caused the Polish deep-sea fleet to lose the most profitable fishing catches in shore waters of the Atlantic and Pacific. According to certain estimates, due to this,

in 1975-78 we lost fishing potentials of approximately 550 thousand tons of fish annually.

At first we tried to move our deep-sea fleet to other, unclaimed international fishing grounds, which became very crowded in the 1980's, at least such as those in the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and in the vicinity of the Falklands where it was quite profitable to fish. Part of our deep-sea fleet also fished in exclusive economic zones after preliminarily purchasing fishing licenses (while in 1990 we had to pay Peru a license fee of \$120

for each ton of carrying capacity of the processing vessel, at present the fee is as much as \$200 for each ton, which in many cases makes the catch in these waters completely unprofitable).

Fishing enterprises, especially Dalmor, also attempted to enter into fishery joint ventures with foreign partners that have large fish resources in their zones, but have only a meager fishing fleet and lack suitable technology.

All of these efforts checked the decreasing trend in our deep-sea catches somewhat. But they did not completely reverse these disadvantageous trends which at present have brought Polish deep-sea fishing to utter collapse. Some experts believe that deep-sea fishing is already a closed stage and that we should now concentrate our efforts on ensuring optimal conditions for the development of Baltic fisheries.

The Baltic is one of the bodies of water to which we have guaranteed constant access within the framework of the

Polish exclusive economic zone. At the same time, it is a quite small body of water in which conditions in the last several years have been unfavorable for the development of certain fish varieties (specifically cod). As data in Table 2 indicate, the greatest catches in the Baltic Sea occurred at the beginning of the 1980's, and beginning with 1983, they declined steadily. This was true of all the countries bordering the Baltic Sea (see Table 3). While total catches of all the countries dropped in 1990 by about one-third in comparison with 1982, in the last 10 years, the catches of our Baltic fleet dropped by one-half. During this period, the greatest drop was in the catch of cod, one of the most valuable fish in these waters (in 1990, the cod catch decreased by 44 percent in comparison with 1981). In 1981 in our country's exclusive economic zone, cod made up 58 percent of the total Polish catches, but in 1990, this figure was only 26 percent.

Table 2

Year	Cod	Herring	Sprat	Other	Total	Index
1981	385	428	49	92	954	100
1982	364	468	49	79	960	100
1983	381	468	37	72	974	102
1984	441	446	52	68	1007	105
1985	355	447	69	71	942	98
1986	279	410	76	73	838	88
1987	236	384	88	17	725	69
1988	223	422	80	14	739	77
1989	191	417	86	21	715	75
1990	171	363	86	11	631	66

Source: Statistical Bulletins of the Maritime Fisheries Institute

Table 3: Polish Catches in the Baltic Zone (in thousands of tons)

Year	Cod	Herring	Sprat	Other	Total	Index
1981	120.9	64.5	8.9	14.6	208.9	100
1982	92.5	77.9	14.2	15.8	200.4	96
1983	76.5	83.9	7.0	7.1	174.5	83
1984	93.4	80.0	9.2	8.1	190.7	91
1985	63.3	89.5	18.5	2.4	173.7	83
1986	43.2	80.2	23.6	10.4	157.4	75
1987	32.7	63.5	32.0	9.6	137.8	66
1988	33.4	63.7	22.2	7.2	126.5	61
1989	31.8	60.3	18.6	8.0	118.7	57
1990	29.0	61.0	14.0	6.6	110.6	53
1991	23.0	45.0	22.0	10.0	100.0	48

Source: Statistical Bulletins of the Maritime Fisheries Institute

The decrease in cod catches was the result primarily of a deterioration in "ecological" conditions (due to pollu-

tion of the Baltic Sea) and biological conditions (decrease in biomass of these fish). Meanwhile we did

not exploit fully our quotas of herring and sprats despite the fact that the biomass situation of these fish had not changed at all over many years. This was due mainly to management mistakes in our Baltic Sea fishing and to unprofitable prices paid for these fish varieties during the last two years. For example, in 1991, the price offered by wholesalers or processing plants for a kilogram of herring fluctuated from 2.2 to 3.0 thousand zlotys [Z] while a kilogram of sprat was priced at Z1 to Z1.8 thousand.

These prices did not guarantee adequate profitability for the catches. For this reason, many fishermen did not fish and took other jobs temporarily. It is sufficient to note that of our entire Baltic fleet of fishing cutters, numbering 440 in 1991, about one-half remained inactive in ports.

In this situation, Poland has not been taking advantage for several years now of the catch limits (catch quotas) for herring and sprat assigned it by the International Commission for Maritime Fisheries or for cod found in our zone and in the international zone. In 1989, for example, we exploited 72 percent of our fishing limits for herring (81 thousand tons), 47 percent for sprat (43 thousand tons) and in 1990, 75 and 32 percent, respectively, while in 1991, only 55 percent for herring, 51 percent for sprat and approximately 60 percent for cod.

The persistent nonexploitation of catch quotas assigned us is a very strange phenomenon in a situation where there is a great demand for fish on the international market (and in our country, especially on the part of processing plants) and an existing, very large potential for fishing (a large fleet of fishing cutters). This potential is not only not properly exploited, but for many years there has been a marked decline in the efficiency of catches as converted to units of cost of fishing (per operating day of a cutter at sea) and per horsepower of engines installed in the cutters participating in the fishing. If we take the size of average catches per cutter in 1980 as 100 percent, then in 1990 it was only 20 percent for small cutters (17-19 meters long), 22 percent for medium cutters (21-24 meters), and for more efficient, large cutters (26-28 meters), approximately 68 percent.

It seems that under the present conditions of the new economic system, an adaptation of our fishing potential to existing possibilities would be a natural occurrence. However, in a situation of almost disappearing deep-sea fishing, a full exploitation of the catch quotas assigned to us in the Baltic is imperative, and imperative most of all is better management of these quotas. Otherwise, our Baltic fisheries may also lose their reason for being. It must be added that the proposed regulations on fisheries establish specifically the parity of owners of fishing cutters, which is related in turn to accessibility of bodies of water on commercial principles.

An urgent need also exists for a rapid implementation of an adequate fisheries policy adapted to the solutions contained in the EC "joint fisheries policy," particularly

with respect to management of fish stocks, price and tariff policies and quality control of production. Only this kind of considered and—as EC experience confirms—relatively inexpensive fisheries policy will enable us to check a continuing regression in our fishing industry and adapt this branch, important not only for purely economical reasons, to market economy conditions and requirements of the all-European market.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 9-15 Feb

92EP0221A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 7,
15 Feb 92 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted] During a meeting with parliamentarians of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Lech Walesa said: "We have achieved great things, but we have also made mistakes. I said that I would change governments like bumpers and I have. The first, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was only a politician, so he did not succeed. Bielecki, although an economist, also did not succeed. We now have our third bumper. His basic task is to outline the legal structure of the Republic. Let him succeed." The president admitted that the peasants are paying for the mistakes of the entire economy, but there is no alternative. If the factory in Mielec does not receive money for the helicopters that no one wants to buy, they will burn the Belweder.

The Committee for National Defense discussed the proposed new doctrine for state defense. Jerzy Milewski, head of the office of National Security, presented the proposed restructuring of the military that calls for a reduction of 50,000 in strength. Jan Parys, minister of defense, declared that he was surprised by the proposed reduction and thinks "it is unacceptable." In his opinion, "the threats are not symmetrical and there is no reason for us to be prepared for defense in all directions." President L. Walesa proposed that the Committee for National Defense be called the Council for National Security. Minister Parys said that there will be no purge in the military, but he proposed "that military personnel who do not identify with the new pro-Atlantic option leave the military on their own."

For whom would they vote? If elections were held now (a survey from 28-29 January 1992 done by Promedia for NOWA EUROPA): the Democratic Union (UD) 18.5 percent (an increase of 50 percent in comparison with the election results); the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 8.1 percent (an increase of 8 percent); and NSZZ Solidarity 6.2 percent (an increase of 19 percent). All the other groups showed losses: the Catholic Election Action 6.2 percent (a loss of 30 percent); the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) 5.8 percent (a loss of 50 percent); the Citizens' Center Accord (POC), 3.5 percent (a loss of 60 percent); the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D) 2.8 percent (a loss of more than 60 percent).

How much do officials earn? **GAZETA WYBORCZA** response to the question: Since January 1991, the salaries of government officials have not increased since they, along with the entire budget sphere, were not revalued. Currently, the prime minister earns 8.064 million zlotys (Z); a minister, Z6.566 million; a secretary of state, Z6.076 million; a voivod, Z5.824 million. Officials in the government administration from the general director up (the so-called hand) has a right to an official car with a driver. The president earns Z11.548 million. L. Walesa pays that sum each month into a fund that as of yet has no purpose.

Women '91. RZECZPOSPOLITA presented the results of a survey done by the Central Office of Statistics. The division of household chores: preparation of meals, in 72.7 percent of the households the wife, in 1.1 percent the husband; laundry, in 79.8 percent the wife, in 1.7 percent the husband; daily purchases, in 39.4 percent the wife, in 8 percent the husband; taking care of affairs in offices, in 25.1 percent the wife, in 43.1 percent the husband. Among the women surveyed, 77.7 percent are satisfied with their own family situation; 17.4 percent expressed dissatisfaction; 41.8 percent are satisfied with their material situation; 51.3 percent are not. Opinions about work are as follows: satisfied, 85.3 percent; dissatisfied, 9 percent. More than 60 percent of the women surveyed live in families in which the per capita monthly income was Z300,000 to Z700,000 in 1991. More than 80 percent of the families have their own housing. [passage omitted]

KURIER POLSKI has been sold to Zygmunt Solorz, the owner of the Solpol enterprise, which is a marketing firm and produces and sells clothing. Jacek Snopkiewicz has been removed from the position of president of the partnership and as editor in chief. The presidium of the National Council of the Democratic Party (SD) has called for the withdrawal of this decision.

TRYBUNA (5 February 1992) has published a sample court complaint for individuals who want go to court against Deputy Leszek Moczulski for violating their personal dignity by publicly announcing an opinion insulting the honor of former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] members and calling them "paid traitors, servants of Russia." [passage omitted]

Resignations of bishops in accord with the Codex of Cannon Law and accepted by John Paul II: Bishop Ignacy Jez (Diocese of Koszalin-Kolobrzeg); Wladyslaw Mizolek (Archdiocese of Warsaw); Waclaw Skomorucha (Diocese of Siedlce); Franciszek Musiel (Diocese of Czestochowa); Julian Grolicki (Archdiocese of Krakow); Stanislaw Smolenski (Archdiocese of Krakow). [passage omitted]

The most favorable investment of money during the last three months according to **NOWA EUROPA**: 1. the stock of Exbud, a profit of 33.7 percent, 2. an investment for three months in zlotys, 11.8 percent, 3. investment bonds, 9.7 percent, 4. the German Mark, 5.5 percent, 6.

dollars in the bank, 0.0 percent, 7. stock of Zywiec, -0.7 percent, 8. stock of Prochnik, -1.3 percent, 9. dollars at home, -3 percent, 10. other stock, it will be difficult to earn more on them than by investing in the zloty in the bank. [passage omitted]

The chief political figure of the last two months in the rankings of **ZYCIE WARSZAWY** is Prime Minister Jan Olszewski (94 points); second is Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski (84 points), who advanced from sixth; third is Jacek Kuron (74 points), who was first in the previous ranking. [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Marian Jurczyk, chairman of NSZZ Solidarity '80:

(From a comment during a meeting with the employees of Petrochemia in Plock, TYGODNIK PLOCKI 26 January 1992)

"Our victory will depend on how we defend people. On the other hand, it is true that until now we have been attacked from all sides. The guilt lies with a small group of people lead by Mr. Walesa, Mr. Geremek, Father Jankowski, and many, many others.... Paris KULTURA reports \$7-8 million have reached the opposition in Poland. And people, including myself and my closest associates, have been brutally attacked using that money. The president, when I asked for help once, when I came out of prison after three years told me: 'Marian, there was a man, who demanded money, who wanted to test us, he is already smelling flowers, he is no longer alive. I advise you as a friend not to seek money, for the same thing might happen to you.' I am fully aware that I am speaking publicly in front of journalists."

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 16-22 Feb

*92EP0231A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 8,
22 Feb 92 p 2*

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted] Lech Kaczynski, the candidate of the Center Accord, was elected president of the Supreme Chamber of Control by the Sejm. In this way, the vacancy which had continued since October 1991, ended. The deputies made their choice on the fourth round of voting with 213 votes of the 356 cast for the candidate. Among others, the deputies of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) voted against him because of his membership in the government coalition. During the first round, Zbigniew Romaszewski received the fewest votes, 78, and he did not go through to the next round. In the next round, Andrzej Ostoja-Owsiany of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), 77 votes, fell by the wayside, and in the next, Piotr Kownacki, currently directing the Supreme Chamber of Control, 139 votes, fell. In the fourth round, L. Kaczynski (age 43,

lawyer, unaffiliated) was the only candidate and an absolute majority was 179 votes.

L. Kaczynski with the authorization of the prime minister presented proposals to the Democratic Union (UD). They involved the position of deputy prime minister and minister of finance; other offers were not ruled out. T. Mazowiecki reported the proposals, but M. Gugulski, the government spokesman, denied that talks on broadening the government coalition were taking place and declared that no one had been authorized to hold such talks. In a commentary on the report, GAZETA WYBORCZA writes: "Someone here is avoiding the truth: Either spokesman Gugulski presented his own version of events that would be unprecedented, or Prime Minister Olszewski does not want to admit that he gave the authorization, or the Kaczynski brothers are conducting a political play without the permission of the prime minister and are attempting to manipulate him into it."

The Constitutional Tribunal, under Deputy President Leonard Lukaszuk, has declared a pair of articles of the law on the revaluation of retirements and pensions unconstitutional. The emergency condition provoked by economic need to which the law's defenders, representatives of the Sejm and the prosecutor appealed in their arguments before the Tribunal, were declared an unacceptable suggestion. That is not a category of constitutional law. The Tribunal questioned, among other things, the limit of 250 percent of the basic level as the upper limit for benefits, because there is no limit on the insurance contributions collected. The decision of the Tribunal returns to the Sejm, which can accept it or reject; the Sejm has six months.

Marian Miskiewicz, minister of health, acquainted the deputies with the initial plans for the socioeconomic policy in the health services. The basic health services are to continue for free; fees for other services will be introduced. The minister announced the liquidation of 25,000 (about 10 percent) of the hospital beds. More than 25,000 doctors and nurses will lose their jobs. About 15-20 percent of the specialist offices in regional and hospital-associated clinics and in industrial health services will be liquidated. The number of places for medical studies will be reduced by 10-20 percent. Emergency services will intervene only in life-threatening situations. There will be a charge for an unjustified call. There will be fewer inexpensive medicines.

Minister Antoni Macierewicz at a meeting with foreign journalists: "The Christian National Union (ZChN) has the greatest social support among the political parties. The elections, the number of seats in parliament, and the program, which the party represents, are the measure of this support. I believe that among those who did not vote, a majority are our supporters. Poland in general, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in particular, needs Christian values. The Christian National Union stands upon the teachings of the church, and in the near future the shape of the Polish state should be based upon those

teachings. It would be good if the people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs were inspired by Christian values." [passage omitted]

Whom do Poles fear? A survey done by the Workshop for Sociological Studies in Sopot for GAZETA WYBORCZA. The greatest danger lies in Ukraine (38 percent); Germany (28 percent); Russia (15 percent); and Lithuania (not quite 10 percent). Only 17 percent thinks no one threatens Poland. The younger and the poorer a person is, the more she feels threatened.

Minister Jan Parys in an interview with journalists after deliberations of the Sejm Commission for National Defense: "The military is an apolitical institution and party activists, like Onyszkiewicz and Komorowski, cannot hold responsible posts in it. Romuald Szeremietiew, the new deputy minister, is resigning from his party functions and activities, although he was already outside the main political current. I think that Mr. Szeremietiew represents an independent current, which was not previously present in the ministry, will find recognition in the army. I think he has the qualifications needed." Minister Parys dismissed two civilian deputy ministers, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, associated with the Democratic Union (UD); he replaced the first with Romuald Szeremietiew (since 1976 a PAX activist, then cofounder of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], imprisoned during martial law, after the amnesty he was a founder of the Polish Party for Independence, an adviser to Solidarity, an activist of the Citizens' Committees). The following were removed: Gen. Jerzy Jarosz from the position of main commander of the Military Police (the last active member of the Military Council for National Salvation, WRON); Gen. Miroslaw Hermaszewski, deputy commander of the Air Force and Air Defense (the first Polish cosmonaut); Gen. Ryszard Michalik, head of the personnel department of the Ministry of National Defense (Janusz Wojsz, a civilian, replaced him); Jerzy Slaski, editor in chief of the daily POLSKA ZBROJNA. There is talk of a nomination for Jacek Szymanderski, either to replace Onyszkiewicz or Slaski. Szymanderski was chairman of the Sejm Commission for National Defense during the last Sejm. He called the Polish Army prior to 1989 a "Polish-language armed unit." [passage omitted]

According to the Central Office of Statistics, the monthly wage in the six basic sectors of material production in January 1992 was 2,483,991 zlotys [Z] and was 7.9 percent higher than in December 1991. The prices of goods and services rose 7.5 percent during the same period. [passage omitted]

The Przemysl enterprise Trek is planning an expedition of Polish businessmen to the Crimea for 10-19 March 1992. They are to present their goods and services on the ship Lev Tolstoy on the route from Odessa to Sochi and back and to establish contacts with their colleagues from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldavia and to

learn about the new financial and customs regulations currently in force in those states. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, president of the Center Accord:

(Interview by Elzbieta Isakiewicz and Piotr Gerczuk, NOWY SWIAT 3 February 1992)

[NOWY SWIAT] There is talk about the possibility of overthrowing the president. Do you support these suggestions?

[Kaczynski] No. It is not in the interest of the state to provoke another crisis. After the adoption of the Constitution, I would not have the courage to offer to society a head of state who has the entire executive power concentrated in his hands.

Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, former president:

(Interview by Krzysztof T. Toeplitz, NOWA EUROPA 4 February 1992)

[Jaruzelski] Many things that contributed to the decision for martial law will not bring honor, frankly speaking, to individuals and political forces of that period. Thus, instead of hiding the card, which for one and the other side is the cause of bitter reflection, one reveals the card. Recalling this subject also forces me to a different point of view about the book which I am writing and in which I have attempted to rise above the discussions and battles of that period. At present, by the force of fact, I

am forced into a defensive position. Obviously, I will not defend myself in a partial manner, but I am afraid that a battle over past things is beginning.

Pawel Spiewak, sociologist and columnist:

(MOWIA WIEKI No. 12, 1991)

"Politics for many people, for very many, appears to be a reality dominated by coercion and particular interests, by corruption and demagogery. It is presented as inimical to people, inimical because it is unknown and not understood. No one knows what concerns the leaders of the country, what game and for what stakes they are playing. Politics is finally a sphere which is capable of consuming and depraving every person. Successive groups of the best people have entered parliament and government cabinets, and after a while, it turned out that they began speaking a different language, that they represented interests and opinions different from those they voiced before they became politicians. Politics changes peoples and changes them for the worse. It corrupts their souls. It has turned out, one might think, that the world seen through the perspective of power and from the perspective of the average citizen looks completely different. So different that between the two perspectives there are no bridges. Thus, the we-they opposition known for decades is returning. But before 'they' were clearly situated. They were communists, party operatives, and few expected good things from them. They were an ill fortune. But why, people ask today, is the same thing happening with Solidarity activists? Everything indicates that politics has some secret, destroying force. Thus, it is a realm of evil."

Justice Minister on Planned 'Trial of Communism'

92BA0621B Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 21 Feb 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Justice Minister Mircea Ionescu-Quintus by Ioan Lascu; place and date not given: "Restoring the Truth Is the Most Important Thing"—first two paragraphs are *TINERETUL LIBER* introduction]

[Text] The questions we asked of Justice Minister Mircea Ionescu-Quintus were designed to elicit answers apt to offer a general "projection" of the juridical foundation of the much debated "trial of communism." We view the answers we got as a bridgehead in our (probably) long journalistic attempt to sort out its true meaning, opportuneness, and the historic need for a "trial (trials) of communism." From the very beginning we are determined to point out that it is not our purpose to unleash any vindictive action or witch hunt. The most important objective of the "trial of communism" is to reconstruct the truth.

We want to express our hope that the other national bodies and institutions—the General Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of National Defense, the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], the National Archives, the Nicolae Iorga History Institute, AFDPR [Association of Former Political Prisoners in Romania], etc.—will be as responsive to our questions as was the Ministry of Justice through the person of the minister himself. Both we and our colleagues will undoubtedly be governed by the best intentions, tact, and probity in the actions we will together take with a view to furnishing and publishing correct information.

[Lascu] A possible "trial of communism" should, in our opinion, feature several directions and implicitly, dimensions: political, legal, moral, and historical. The reconstruction of the truth is undoubtedly the essential goal. Do you, Mr. Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, believe the opening of such a "trial of communism" to be opportune? When? What do you think will be its most important dimension?

[Ionescu-Quintus] In my opinion, only the reconstruction of the truth can justify the opportuneness of opening such "trials of communism," whose present direction can be only legal. The others—political, moral, and historical—will have to be left for the, we hope, not too distant future.

[Lascu] In the minds of some people, unfortunately rather many, a trial of communism is confused with a wide scale vendetta. What should be the legal foundation of such a trial in order to avoid such a development?

[Ionescu-Quintus] The obsessively repeated journalistic expression of a "trial of communism" has produced both

confusion and anxiety, precisely what none of the initiators wanted. It came so far as to have it said that new jails, new labor camps, and new "canals" were going to be built, and all sorts of such absurd and malevolent rumors. I stated several times that no one was thinking of any vendettas or witch hunts, and consequently that none of the former party members or Securitate members needed to be afraid if they did not commit serious violations of the law. Criminal action can be brought only against a small number of people, only after investigations, and only in compliance with all the court guarantees. Who is afraid of a just judgment?

[Lascu] How should the "trial of communism" be approached: chronologically or diachronically?

[Ionescu-Quintus] Not chronologically, but in relation to the collection of evidence material.... The "canal trial" may be the first in the series.

[Lascu] Who should bring action?

[Ionescu-Quintus] Evidently, the only institution that has the prerogative to bring action is the Prosecutor's Office, or under its constitutional name, the Public Ministry.

[Lascu] What would be the counts of indictment?

[Ionescu-Quintus] Genocide, manslaughter, serious abuses, and complicity in them.

[Lascu] Who will be the defendants? Can you name the most guilty among them?

[Ionescu-Quintus] Those who will be found guilty of having committed them. Citing names seems to me an unpermissible anticipation of the findings of the investigation.

[Lascu] How should the trial (trials) be organized? Do you have in mind some Nuerenberg-type tribunal but at national scale, or trials similar to those brought against the former members of the defunct Political Executive Committee?

[Ionescu-Quintus] I think that it will be judiciary trials in accordance with the code of penal procedure. The establishment of a (national or international) Nuerenberg-type tribunal will soon be discussed in Salzburg (Austria) in the first part of March at an international conference with the topic "The Judiciary During the Transition Period," which I have also been invited to attend.

[Lascu] If the trial should end with imprisonment verdicts, do you think that from a humanitarian point of view, all the defendants should serve such sentences? We mean to say that some of the potential defendants are of an advanced age, may be sick, etc.

[Ionescu-Quintus] Deciding on the individual punishments is the exclusive prerogative of the courts, which take into account both the seriousness of the crime committed and the degree of guilt, and the person of the

offender. Age, health condition, sincerity, and other similar personal circumstances cannot be left out of the assessment.

[Lascu] Assuming that the trial will proceed to the end, the procedure will undoubtedly be complex. Can you estimate how long it will last? Do you think that its effect in terms of justice will be even remotely adequate to compensate for so many victims and so much damage?

[Ionescu-Quintus] It would seem that the last question is usually the most difficult. Who could estimate the duration of trials that have not even begun? What I think is important is that at least one trial should begin; that we should endeavor to retry those political trials in which thousands upon thousands of innocent people were sentenced; that, after dozens of years of lies, the truth should be revealed about the crimes committed under the totalitarian communist regime, regardless by whom. Only in that way can the moral and material harm done to so many victims be repaired.

Democratic Convention Electoral Gains Downplayed

92BA0622D Bucharest AZI in Romanian 27 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Radu N. Alexandrescu: "Deceit in Meanings"]

[Text] Just as the general election had a novel character, so the recent local elections marked a political first in that, as will be the case in the future, both took place after the replacement of the political mechanism of a single party that had discredited any election to the point of voiding it, by a multiparty system and generally by political pluralism. However, beyond their common element, the two electoral processes differ from each other in specific details. Thus, the local elections carry local significance and results and their effects have only an indirect general (national) connotation. In contrast to the general elections, which establish the hierarchy of the political parties as a function of the electorate's preferences regarding national objectives, decide the political composition of the legislative branch and thus of the executive, and consequently describe the overall framework, the local elections are defined by being partial, upholding the elements of regional politics, and accordingly establishing the hierarchy of the political options of the local electorate. From this viewpoint, investing the local elections with significances specific of a parliamentary election is inappropriate. That is even truer since such significances originate with political leaders and parties which merged into a coalition that calls itself democratic. The undissimulated satisfaction with which they are presenting the results of local elections as a general defeat of the FSN [National Salvation Front] by exploiting a significance that cannot be extrapolated, stems from the same source as Mr. Campeanu giving the victory sign last September when the Roman government fell in the wake of the latest miners' raid.

By displaying a behavior typical of parliamentary elections, the Democratic Convention is trying to extend the local significance of the election results in Bucharest to the national level, thereby concluding that it has caused the front an obvious loss and that it has practically reversed the relationship between the majority and the minority produced by the previous general election. They are, however, making a double mistake. One is that, if their aim is to establish the national significance of the local elections, that can be obtained only by totaling the results achieved in each district separately (thus forfeiting partial significances as was the case of Bucharest), which would confirm the same hierarchy (at least in its upper layers) of the political parties as after the 20 May election (with FSN as the country's major political force, and the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] and the Democratic Convention sharing the second place). Secondly, the case of Bucharest, where the Democratic Convention had a clear win, cannot alter the majority-minority relationship for the simple fact that that is not the objective of local elections. At the most, local results may suggest a series of tendencies and of probable or predictable developments, something that may entitle them to be viewed as a test for the general election, but that is something entirely different.

The specific significance of local elections is of regionally distributing the electoral preferences of the electorate in parallel with creating zones of preference—electoral fiefs which a given current political party may control for a longer or shorter period of time. This does not say anything directly about the distribution of the political votes at the national level, with the exception of the electoral systems, in which certain districts are decisive for the election of the president or prime minister. But in our case neither the one nor the other is decided in Bucharest, but throughout the country.

However, far from such considerations, disloyal toward its opponents and inconsistent with the logic of a democratic electoral process, the Democratic Convention obstinately claims to have defeated the Front in the elections, an idea in keeping with the nihilistic policy so far conducted by its member parties of constantly contesting the relationship between the political majority and minority and even the decisionmaking capability of the electorate, whose votes it is now trying to use. If the Democratic Convention is showing any consistency, it is only in reasserting the only specific program element of its member parties and their ideological point of convergence, which is political negativism.

Electoral 'Fraud,' 'Intimidation' Alleged

92BA0622C Bucharest AZI in Romanian 28 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Marin Badea: "Erosion-Resistant"]

[Text] We do not yet have the final official results of the second round of elections, but the essential is already known. Thus, for example, one of the most important

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things that the electorate has confirmed is undoubtedly the resistance to political erosion shown by the National Salvation Front [FSN], particularly its resistance to the thorny ideological struggle and to the enormous pressures exercised on it by parties and groups located both at the left and the right of our political spectrum. Having by itself won the largest percentage of votes (31.18 percent for mayoral positions and over 33 percent for councilor seats) already in the first round of elections and approximately 41 percent in the end, while the "cartel of the 14," demagogically self-dubbed the Democratic Convention, came in second with 21 percent, was undoubtedly a particularly important electoral success. It was not a success in comparison to the results of 1990, but the socioeconomic and political-ideological circumstances in which the two elections were held were completely different. In the meantime the FSN was alone in the government; it shouldered the enormous responsibility of the reform and of orchestrating the historic process of reshaping the structures of the Romanian society; it placed the country's foreign relations on new foundations at a time of radical restructuring of the balance of forces in central and east Europe or the Middle East; it fought the enormous difficulties generated by the reform and it fought to stop the production decline, to ensure energy sources, to align the Romanian economy to the dynamics of the international market, and much else. But most importantly, it was compelled to handle the harsh consequences of the transition and their effects on the living conditions of the masses. That undoubtedly had a negative mental effect on the electorate that should have been more studiously avoided, not necessarily with an eye to the elections, but to what should be a real policy of social protection, a policy rather difficult to implement in all the particulars envisaged in the FSN program as long as the material resources required to support them could not be secured.

On the other hand, the political and... apolitical forces grouped in the Democratic Convention, having finally decided to comply even minimally with the democratic means of struggle for power—after having so many times failed in their attempts at destabilization, with the exception of the end of September 1991—obtained the results we cited above, which did not represent any notable increase in their popularity, but were largely the effect of pressures, fraud, intimidation, and of buying labile characters, something that in the future they will probably no longer be able to do.

On the one hand, we should also note the light decline recorded by the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] with its single accent on what was and what is the building at any cost of a privileged minority status; the lack of response of the centrist parties without a coherent program or a specific policy in the area of national social structures, such as they are two years after the revolution of December 1989. On the other hand, we must emphasize the lamentable failure of the left wing. It remains to be seen how the general elections will be prepared. We would like to believe that the FSN will

overcome the decline recorded at the local elections. The rose is still the symbol of our hopes.

Election Lessons for FSN, Democratic Convention

92BA0621C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 29 Feb-1 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Raluca Stroe Brumariu: "Possible Strategies for the Front"]

[Text] The results of the local elections have highlighted an evident change in the Romanian political landscape. At the same time, they foreshadowed the political forces that will confront each other in this year's general elections. Currently there are practically two dominant political forces: the Democratic Convention, which came out the winner in the large and not so large cities, and the National Salvation Front [FSN], which won in the rural areas and in Moldavia, with the exception of the cities of Bacau and Roman. Unfortunately, Moldavia and Wallachia once again revealed themselves as the areas least open to the idea of change. The victory of the PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party] in three important cities—Cluj, Baia Mare, and Buzau—must not be overlooked either. The explanation for the PUNR victory is the nationalist campaign, which may catch on in areas where ethnic conflict existed or could arise. In Buzau the victory of a nationalist party probably has other explanations. In those cities and in other localities in Cluj County, where Ceontea's party won many mayoral positions, the party was supported in the second round by an alliance that may announce the coalition that will be formed for the general elections: PUNR, FSN, the Romania Mare Party, PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], and USD [Socialist-Democratic Union]. The leadership of the Front, aware that the party is no longer strong enough to go to the election by itself, whatever forms of propaganda it may use, probably intends to form a mirror alliance to that formed by the Convention parties. Evidently, Mr. Roman can no longer dream of another FSN government alone or together with two or three satellite parties. In fact, these elections have sanctioned the end of the period of political domination by a single party. However, the loss that the FSN has suffered may deepen the internal conflicts in the government party. More than certainly, the poor results obtained by the Front candidates in the major cities will be used by the Front conservatives (we have already seen Vasile Vacaru on television expressing displeasure and proffering veiled threats to the present Front leadership), who criticized Roman on various occasions even before the elections, as a pretext to demand not only a change of strategy, but also a change of leadership at the March convention. Or, hinting that they were not allowed to get sufficiently involved in the local elections, they will demand that the organization for the general election be left mostly in their hands (they probably view themselves as the heavy artillery of Front propaganda, in view of their long experience with propaganda). Thus, putative alliances with left-wing or even extreme-left parties are becoming

a strong possibility, and it should be interesting to see the platform that such an alliance would present for the election. The current Front leadership is faced not only with the evidence of lost ground, but also with a rather close contest inside the party. The next period will not be too peaceful for the FSN national leader; he will have to choose between a new compromise with the conservative camp led by President Iliescu, or a definitive break with that camp, something that would weaken the party, at least for a time, especially in areas like Moldavia or the south of the country.

The results of the local elections provided an additional lesson for all those who thought they could govern a nation by lies, demagoguery, and disinformation. At the same time, they have shown the Convention parties that they can win only united.

Severin Offers Analysis of FSN Electoral Losses

92BA0621A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 18 Feb 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Adrian Severin, chairman of the National Agency for Privatization, by Aurel Perva; place and date not given: "This Commission Is Tantamount to a Parliamentary Miners' Raid"]

[Text] [Perva] Any government is obligated to account for its actions. Still, the manner in which Parliament raised the issue of X-raying Petre Roman and his team, by establishing that commission, struck me as odd, to say the least....

[Severin] Under the Stalinist system of thinking and its practice, the departure from a political position was always followed by being deleted from history. People who lost their post were immediately declared enemies of the people, traitors, agents of foreign powers, deviationists, violators of the constitution and of criminal laws, and so forth. That was the technique of the famous trials held in the USSR in 1936-38, and not only there, but of all the trials imposed and staged in all of Moscow's satellite countries. Hence, what is occurring today may become a very dangerous precedent for our democracy. First of all because totalitarian practices are being introduced into a budding democracy, and second because it paves the way for permanent account settling between those formerly in power and those who followed them to the power.

[Perva] Getting off the tiger is always dangerous....

[Severin] I know one story which, even if it is not true, is a good illustration. The Roman dictator Sila at one point left his seat and on his own accord decided to resign. On his way home he was followed by a plebeian who kept piling invectives on him; after suffering this treatment all the way home, when he got to the gate of his house Sila turned around to the plebeian and said: "You wretch, do you realize what you have done? From now on no dictator will voluntarily relinquish the power." In such conditions I'm afraid that a democratic government will

from now on have every reason to hesitate before leaving the power more or less voluntarily, knowing that it exposes itself to great risks. This is the reason that I think this entire procedure represents an enormous threat to democracy. Besides, as I said in another interview, it is at the same time illegal, absurd, and immoral.

I think that this measure marks a unique point in our history. It is unique not because a government is subjected to a parliamentary inquiry. Such cases occurred three times before in our history and each time the procedure and the initiative were equally damnable; the people involved in all three cases were leading personalities of the Romanian political scene, who today are viewed with respect by each Romanian and known for their moral sense and incorruptibility. People like Ionel Bratianu, Lascăr Catargiu, and Titu Maiorescu fell victims to such procedures. The unique or novel element lies in the fact that for the first time the party in power calls for an inquiry of its own government! This commission is tantamount to a "parliamentary miners' raid" and I think that in a Europe that has enormously developed from the viewpoint of democracy and whose most representative countries have a high level of political maturity, our gesture, the gesture of those who initiated this farce will, I think, fully contribute to disqualifying us not from belonging to Europe, but to the planet Earth.

[Perva] Do you not think that, aside from what occurred, precisely the presence of people closely linked to the old regime in key posts contributed to marring the country's image in the eyes of the world?

[Severin] I think we should get rid of the mentality of cadre files, as well as of the obsession that a person's past is necessarily a disadvantage for the country. This is even more valid now, two years after the revolution, in which time everyone had an opportunity to prove by his actions whether his past was in anyway relevant for the present. An image often deteriorates independently of the reality represented by the person in question, and in politics image is extremely important, because it eventually becomes substituted for the reality and itself becomes the reality on which one's political and economic partners and everyone with whom one has relations model their behavior. Of course, we would like to believe and to hope that everything we do is measured by what we really are. In reality, only the image we project is weighed, and from that viewpoint it would be an untruth for me to now assert that Romania's image abroad is being improved by some of the persons who currently hold important positions in our state. That is regrettable, it is a disadvantage and an onus for us, and I think that what is important now is to approach these things with great maturity and discrimination. From this viewpoint, the service and thoughts of each one of those involved is almost irrelevant; what is relevant is whether his image and the image the world forms of Romania by identifying it with him allow us to enter into a constructive dialogue with the world in which we live. This is the tragedy of the politician at a time when politics has

become more of a spectacle than ever before. But that is one of the risks of politics, and all those who think of themselves as statesmen must endure and brave these risks and take the decisions required in such circumstances. Thus, taking into account what can best serve the country's interests in such a situation, the politician, prisoner of his own image, must accept his own sacrifice in addition to the sacrifices required of his conationals.

[Perva] How do you view your own political future at this time, when attempts are being made to lay all the responsibility for the country's difficult situation on a few members of the former government?

[Severin] I have to begin by making one point clear: The politics game is a team game. This is all the more true in a modern society. When you play on a team, you have to assume all the responsibilities arising from the team's mistakes, regardless of the fact that you personally did not make them and did not contribute to them. The reverse is of course also true, because the merits of the team must also be divided equally or proportionally, but certainly divided among all the team members. In this respect by "team" I mean a system of concentric circles: The government is one team, but this team acts within a larger team, which is the parliamentary group of the government party, which in turn belongs to an even larger team, which is the parliament, which represents the public and is of course the largest circle, but which itself must feel responsible for certain situations prevailing in the country and for certain shortfalls. What is now being done is to assign the merits—when they are not completely ignored—to some of the members of those teams, and the blame only to other members, especially to those who are probably viewed as being political candidates or dangerous competitors who stand a chance in Romania's political arena. This is particularly the situation in which I find myself; on the other hand, I have to confess my disappointment and dissatisfaction with some of my former colleagues in the government and Parliament who in these circumstances should have publicly stated that some of the things of which I am being accused, if they must absolutely individualize the accountability, have nothing to do with the work I did and the responsibilities I carried.

[Perva] How big were the Front's losses in this first round of local elections?

[Severin] I think that a first analysis of the results obtained in the election highlights several very clear observations. First of all, the National Salvation Front [FSN] suffered a drop in electoral support that was logical in general terms. This is not the place to examine the complex circumstances that allowed it to win 65 percent of the votes cast on 20 May 1990, but it was obvious that, except for the conjunctural elements that are no longer valid at this time, the Front had to in any event pay for the fact of having governed at a time of great crisis. That is why I think that the drop was logical and was thus not in itself a failure.

On the other hand, the results show that at the level of the entire country the Front remains the strongest party, since it won the most votes, but its appeal is more weakly received in the urban areas, where its center position seems less convincing than the positions of the parties to its right or left.

Through these results the Front has also demonstrated that it has two vulnerable points: its organizational capabilities in the major cities, and a shortage of individually recognized political personalities. While the Front has the largest number of valuable technocrats, it did not do enough to project some individual political personalities capable of eliciting popular enthusiasm. The Front does have such personalities, but it did not do enough to appropriately introduce them to the public.

Another observation concerns what I think is proof of the fact that the role of the historical parties in Romanian politics has ended. The most elementary calculations will show that, had they not entered the Democratic Convention coalition, these parties would have achieved nothing.

Consequently, the elections demonstrate that this Convention must become a coherent party that could have an important say in Romanian politics. If that should come to pass, it will be very good news for the progress of Romanian democracy.

And finally, the really bad news we got from the election results was that if these results were to be projected to the parliamentary elections and if a 4- to 5-percent electoral threshold were to be introduced in Parliament, the country's third political force would not be made up of the group of minor democratic parties, but of the group of extremist parties. Even though in absolute figures the performance of those parties was encouragingly low, the fact that they are gaining in popularity and can attain the quota necessary to enter Parliament should ring a warning and prompt all the democratic parties to cooperate regardless of whether they are in the government or in the opposition.

Along this line, the circumstance that in Bucharest, for example, the Democratic Convention parties each obtained approximately the same number of votes as Romania Mare by itself, should determine the more or less historical parties to more realistically assess their much discussed victory.

Division Within 'Undermined' FSN Led to Losses

92BA0622B Bucharest AZI in Romanian 28 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Rodica Dan: "Post Local Election Clarifications"]

[Text] Much has been written and will undoubtedly still be written about the importance and significance of the local elections, and many lessons still remain to be learned. Therefore, the purpose of the present article is to merely call attention to two particularly important

aspects. First is the matter of recognizing an incontestable truth highlighted by the results of the local elections, namely the fact that despite all the difficulties, the Front is still the country's most important political force, something that was demonstrated not only by the number of FSN [National Salvation Front] councilors and mayors elected, but especially by the reality that those percentage points were recorded by a single party, not by a coalition of 14 parties and apolitical organizations.

Secondly, there is the fact that the Front placed second in Bucharest and in many of the major cities. The reasons can be grouped into three categories: the great difficulties of the transition period, which will erode the popularity of any party in charge of such a painful social crisis (felt even more acutely in the large urban centers); the vehement denigration campaign staged by the opposition, which anchored its program exclusively on exploiting the reform hardships and putting the blame on the Front government; and the actions that undermined the Front from the inside at the height of the electoral campaign. It is no secret to anyone that some of the Front members, especially Parliament members [MP's], deliberately contributed to discrediting the FSN before the electorate, because the establishment of the Parliamentary commission to investigate its own government and the frequent attacks in the press, on television, and in Parliament practiced with incredible unconsciousness (?) by many MP's and other prominent personalities in positions of power against the current democratically elected leadership of the Front, as well as the shortage of funds for electoral propaganda due to the fact that the law on government campaign subsidies was not passed in the certain knowledge that the opposition parties had foreign means of financing, all those things were nothing but attacks on the party whose members they still consider themselves, actions organized in order to reduce the credibility of the Front and alienate the electorate on the eve of elections. These are all facts that admit no commentary and I think that those involved should give an account of themselves at the upcoming Front convention.

There is another equally evident fact that cannot be ignored, namely, that in spite of all these difficulties, the good results obtained by the Front in the first round of elections can no longer be attributed to anyone but those who achieved them: the current leadership of the Front.

P.S. I wonder if, under attack as it is from every side, AZI will nevertheless carry this article, which is bound to displease some people (because the truth is annoying...).

P.P.S. I also wonder, with regret and anger, what the results of the Front would have been if some so-called Front members had not turned into its demolishers, much to the joy and amusement of the opposition....

Campaign Charges Against Halaicu in FSN Daily

92BA0622A *Bucharest AZI in Romanian* 22 Feb 92 p 8

[Article signed "A group of observers of the first round of elections": "What Mr. Crin Halaicu Owes the Convention (and Other Allies)"]

[Text]—Several millions a month to make the publication LIBERALUL profitable and another few millions a month to transform it into the PNL [National Liberal Party] daily.

—Give back the building (and if possible the funds) of the National Bank which, until its takeover by the state, was a PNL "fief."

—A preferential tax system for entrepreneurs who are PNL supporters and sympathizers so that they can best carry out their traditional policy: "by ourselves."

—Give back all the Bucharest properties that belonged to PNL members.

—Urgently turn several residential districts into geriatric treatment and rehabilitation facilities for the central, municipal, and district leaders of the PNT-CD [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], a founding member of the propelling Convention.

—Several millions a month to ensure the continued appearance of the daily DREPTATEA, the organ of the above founding member.

—Another several millions—a month—to ensure the reappearance of the PNT-CD weekly VIATA CAPI TALEI.

—Pull down the National Theater and the Intercontinental Hotel and build on that land next to the square a Ioan Alexandru reservation (consisting of a PNT-CD cathedral, a memorial museum, and other Christian-Democratic facilities, including its own arsenal, to be used as needed as a logistics base for a perpetual siege of the government).

—Build a canal between the Dimbovita and the Black Sea using all the political opponents, primarily the FSN [National Salvation Front] members, as the exclusive labor force.

—Award half of the funds and buildings of the former PCR [Romanian Communist Party] to the PSDR [Romanian Socialist Democratic Party] (Cunescu) in compliance with its right to the property generated by the 1948 merger between the PCR and PSD [Socialist Democratic Party].

—Several millions—a month—to ensure the appearance of a Cunescu daily newspaper.

—Another several millions—also a month—to permit the appearance of a PSDR weekly.

- Offices for the PSDR in each district and neighborhood and in the vicinity of major plants.
- Immediately create a definitive ghetto for the Romanian residents of Bucharest who are not sympathizers of the Key [electoral symbol of the Convention], so as to provide sufficient vital space for the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] community, another founding member of the propelling Convention.
- Use of the Hungarian language as compulsory second language in the Bucharest local administration and garrison.
- Urgently replace the municipal police by several regiments of Honveds [Hungarian infantry in Austro-Hungarian Empire], billeted for free in the homes of FSN Wallachians.
- A preuniversity and university education system in the Hungarian language (at the least 12 high schools, two universities, and one military academy of their own).
- Several hundreds of millions—a month—for each of the free-party-affiliated television stations of the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], another important member of the propelling Convention.
- A 25 percent tax on the revenues of all those who were not dissidents and are not now members of the PAC (or Key sympathizers), the funds thus obtained to be used to print and ensure international distribution of the political works of Mr. Nicolae Manolescu.
- An additional 5-10 percent tax on the revenues of those who did not vote for the Key, in order to finance Mr. Nicolae Manolescu's future electoral campaign for the presidency; should Mr. Campeanu be a candidate for the same position, the tax envisaged under para. 1 will be duly raised.
- A preferential system of scholarships for all members of PAC dues-paying families, so that they can spend all their vacations abroad.
- A memorial complex for Constantin Ticiu Dumitrescu, chairman of the AFDP [Association of Former Political Prisoners], and an even more marking member of the same propelling Convention. The complex is to feature a museum, an automatic Molotov cocktail-filling station (with a capacity of 25,000 bottles a day), and a modern jail complex for all those who did not vote for the Key.
- Several millions—a month—to bring out a central AFDP press organ. One collector copy to be printed each day on skin (preferably FSN skin).
- Urgently redistribute the combat gear of the Antiterrorist Team of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] and of the Special Guard and Protocol Service to the Revenge and Extermination Subunits (SRE) of the AFDP, whose members will be paid under a collective labor contract.
- Give the outright (and tax-exempt) property right over the former People's House to the UMRL [World Union of Free Romanians], for the purpose of holding a perpetual denial congress of the Saint-Maur Congress.
- Several millions—a month—for the UMRL press organ, ROMANUL LIBER, whereby the salaries of anyone who did not vote for the Key will be paid—upon a City Hall ordinance—mainly in unsold copies of that newspaper.
- Compulsory distribution of Ion Ratiu's book "Moscow Defies the World" as manual of Romanian language and literature and European history, economics, and geography.
- Under a City Hall ordinance, all the funds of the former UGSR [General Union of Romanian Trade Unions] to be urgently transferred to the political trade union Fraternitatea—an apolitical member of the propelling Convention—which will be declared the only legal form of trade union organization in Bucharest.
- Under a City Hall ordinance, anyone who is not a member of the University Solidarity to be immediately fired and deprived of the right to practice, that being another apolitical member of the propelling Convention.
- Each member of the University Solidarity to be declared a life rector and immediately entrusted with the budget of the university—over which he may preside—for the next 10 years.
- All the other organizations and parties belonging to the Convention (i.e., the Civic Alliance, the Future Romania Movement, UDC [Christian Democratic Union], and PUD [Democratic Unity Party]) will upon request enjoy any financial or other advantage, while the City Hall will be obligated to handle their requests on a priority—and possibly exclusive—basis.
- As of the date on which Mr. Crin Halaicu could be elected mayor, all legal provisions contrary to the wishes of the Convention and which do not ensure a prosperous life only for those who voted for the Key, will be suspended throughout the Bucharest municipal jurisdiction.
- Each time a party (or organization) leaves the Convention, 7.1428571 percent of Mr. Crin Halaicu must also leave the Bucharest City Hall; this drop is to be somehow indexed.

P.S. Let us assume that this was all a game. But what if it was not? What if at least one of Mr. Halaicu's above listed obligations is real? Are you willing to take that risk? If yes, vote for the Key...

Paunescu: FSN Needs New Leadership, Program
92BA0620B Bucharest *DIMINEATA* in Romanian
25 Feb 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Adrian Paunescu: "Toward a Left-Wing Synthesis"]

[Text] The comedy is over, that was it, the authentic left-wing forces are dutybound to urgently weigh the situation and take urgent measures for the general elections. The National Salvation Front [FSN], as the major leftist party with centrist tendencies cannot rest content with losing several important, representative cities, even if the general percentage point does not indicate an actual bankruptcy. The national FSN leader, Mr. Petre Roman, thought that there was room on the right for him and his party. What the flighty leader failed to calculate was that on the right there are countless of people with right-wing skills and experience. Mr. Roman would like to pull the FSN to the right, but without having to stand in line for an admission ticket straight to the top. Mr. Roman wants right-wing priority! But for a policy without social protection, for a jump without a parachute, Mr. Roman did not need to declare himself both a socialist and a social democrat. The truth is that the leader tends to change colors according to the environment, not the most felicitous sign of a minimal strength of character. In his pitiful anticommunism, Mr. Petre Roman has forgotten that his position also requires some service record. You cannot come from the Bucharest PCR [Romanian Communist Party] desk straight to the right-wing staff and even claim to teach Messrs. Ratiu and Campeanu about anticommunism. They know enough, they do not need a lecturer in anticommunist political education. They are managing without. The FSN's electorate of May 1990 felt betrayed precisely because a reasonable, social democratic policy was unexpectedly dropped in favor of a shock therapy from which we have still not recovered, nor are we likely to recover any time soon. And the voters were not and are not anticommunist. Their procommunism was formal, but their anticommunism, too, was merely verbal, conjectural. The only movement capable of pooling people's energies and enthusiasms—disappointed as they have been—and their hopes and ideals—humbled as they have been—is a rational left-wing movement with centrist tendencies, capable of polarizing especially the producers of material and cultural assets and of preserving an acceptable living standard in Romania precisely for these people, who today are scorned and persecuted. Those are what until recently was known generically as the working people: the workers, intellectuals, peasants, and office clerks, known as such, but also the new employees of private enterprises who need a political party to ingather and defend them, to voice their problems, and to decisively influence the country's policy in the direction of their interests. A new left-wing synthesis is needed like a purification, like a rebirth. The FSN must examine its successes and failures and attempt its own salvation. Anyway, now we see how necessary a radicalization of the relations was needed from inside

the Front, even before the beginning of the electoral campaign. Mr. Roman put it off and he knew what he was about, judging from the angle of his ambition to continue as leader. But it made the Front lose. The electorate was misled and the FSN candidates did not enjoy real support from the center. Never mind that they were not always chosen in accordance with quality criteria! Now every one is waiting for the waters to clear, which cannot happen at the mouth of the river, only at the source. What path will the major left-wing party take? Will it allow itself to be dragged after Mr. Roman's publicity interests and wounded pride? Will it find another leader, capable of shedding light on such a tangled and tiresome affair? And will such a leader have the strength to acknowledge the mistakes in the program of the second convention and the shortest path to the first, social democratic convention? How will President Iliescu be able to work by day at the Cotroceni Palace, sleep by night in the Primaveri District, and in between satisfactorily teleguide the needle of the FSN compass in the Modrogam Avenue? The name of the person who passed the law that the president had to withdraw from the political party was Petre, and he knew what he was doing. President Iliescu now finds himself in the paradoxical situation of being hit by all the opposition forces, while his former political party not only does not support him, but because of the usurping zeal of Mr. Roman, it even attacks him, trying to portray him as a man of the past. An initiative toward a new regrouping of the center-left forces can invigorate the Romanian political arena and shift it away from the rotten foundation of personal attacks onto the sound footers of a discussion of programs. After all, what is it that the left should not forget? Woe onto the social democratic or socialist party that tramples underfoot the social aspect of its program. And the left-wing parties could do worse than try to rediscover the strength of the trade unions, to find out the views of the downtrodden, and to take the pulse of the masses of unemployed.

Their future programs must impose economic objectives apt to provide work and food for those who have neither. No left-wing party can rest content with the dramatic situation of the Romanian professionals who are leaving the country without hopes and without regrets. The loss of our scientific researchers is an outright crime. With their disappearance, the future of this country has been definitively put in hock. But the left cannot evade its main mission, which is the concern for the everyday life. The new generation is living in confusion and promiscuity; neither the churches nor the cultural institutions are filled, and the access of poor children to higher education is becoming increasingly limited. Neither sports nor amateur culture, the culture of genuine amateurs, are practicable any longer. The pursuit of profit is taking outlandish forms and culture is becoming unaffordable for the professional class, because it is expensive and is not sponsored by the major companies, themselves always on the brink of bankruptcy. The country's best athletes have only rights and no duties toward this people, among whom they live while

becoming something, because the people are not too smart by nature, and afterward they leave with contracts, helped by the club managers who may not have contracts, but who get commissions. What's the big deal if our man should cash a few hundred thousands dollars for a contract worth several millions? Why should our money sit in their pockets? Except that slowly, slowly the stadiums are emptying and the motivation of the parents to send their children to junior clubs is beginning to make as little sense as the motivation of the clubs to cultivate sportsmen whom the big boys will one day take away and sell abroad any way they please. Does the left wing have anything to struggle for? Do people have any reason to believe in the center-left movement? Yes, but on condition that it produce a clear program without any hypocrisy. People must be told the truth about everything that was, but the essential must not be forgotten. People cannot be held responsible for having lived, worked, and built in the times in which they did. The main moral action that the democratic left must start up is to clear the Romanian nation of guilt. What the country needs is not political trials, but transitive authorities. It needs people who will get down to work and consciences that will make sense of everyone's daily hardships. A very large number of people are working at 20-30 percent of their inherent potential precisely because of the permanent guilt of having been communists. At the historical level, that is not guilt. The attempt—successful up to a point—of the national FSN leader to purge the party of the former communists is an expensive piece of demagoguery. We don't need purges, but purification. We do not need schisms, but a new synthesis. One does not need to run away from the left-wing parties in order to demonstrate how anticomunist one is, but one does need to remain loyal to the program with which one entered the political arena. A new left-wing synthesis will undoubtedly eliminate any totalitarian practices and the vices of a single party and single holder of the truth. But did the abusive ouster from the Front of those who did not agree with the national leader, as was the case of Mr. Alexandru Birladeanu, not exhibit precisely the mechanism of a single party and a nostalgia for the comfortable humanity that no heresy was allowed to trouble?

If a shock therapy is needed, then it should be applied to the FSN, to whatever areas the majority of its members believe that it should be applied. As far as I am concerned, I am convinced that after the troubles it suffered, the FSN needs a new leadership, a new social democratic program, and a new ambition for the general elections.

Bucharest Gypsies Urged To Back FSN Candidate

92BA0622E Bucharest AZI in Romanian 22 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Eng. Puiu Kalistrat Pipoicescu: "The Rose of the Bucharest Gypsies"]

[Text] Brother Gypsies of our capital city, we have the God-given gift of saying what we do and doing what we

say. I would say that until a few days ago I had never heard the name of Mr. Cazimir Ionescu's opponent in the race for mayor of the capital, and for the life of me I cannot remember it; I keep confusing it either with Halitu [to wolf down]—which means he does not need to eat—or with Nehalitu—which means "Attention! danger to food supplies."

Mr. Cazimir Ionescu's opponent holds the keys to the prison doors beyond which our brothers or parents may be locked.

The "Nehalitu" with mayoral ambitions never gave us a thought, whereas Mr. Cazimir stated in TINERETUL LIBER of 20 February 1992 that he will focus primarily on the interests of the community that will show confidence in him, meaning ours, too.

The "Nehalitu" is not even an engineer, while Mr. Cazimir, aside from engineering, studied social psychology and especially philosophy, sciences which study the human soul, which means ours, too. That is the reason that Mr. Cazimir Ionescu holds the secret of building us a cultural institution for music and dance, something that will bring us and our families important revenues in the country and abroad.

The PNL [National Liberal Party], of which the "Nehalitu" is a member, did not agree with our country's Constitution and implicitly with article 30, which bans racial hatred. Imagine therefore what this man may be capable of doing as mayor!

On 20 February 1992 he openly admitted on television his disagreement with the Constitution, but said that willy-nilly, he will respect it. How nice.

I do not know how anyone can wolf down something they do not like; perhaps only if they have a name like his.

Even though we have won, through the Gypsies' Alliance, councilor seats in the fifth and second districts, it will not do us much good unless we win and cement the link between them and the general mayor of the capital, who can be no one but Mr. Cazimir Ionescu. Only then will our interests be defended on the basis of legal considerations. We must not allow ourselves to be influenced by the University Square camp, which turned out to have been corrupted by foreign dollars, or by so-called "FSN whores" who overnight exchanged the rose—the most delicate of flowers—for rusty keys, or but people who, since they do not know what they want, are holding off—out of excessive laziness—waiting to see on what side the balance will tip, people whose fate is sealed by happenstance. We know what we want!

Numerically speaking, alone in the second and fifth districts we are 150,000 Romanian citizens who are ethnic Gypsies. When to that figure we add our people in other districts, we can indubitably demonstrate that in case of a tie a single Gypsy can tip the balance in favor of the interests of the entire community. It is now or never,

we have an opportunity to show to the entire capital city that the Gypsies can be like the prince of the Romanian soul, whereas so-called Romanians or fake Romanians, devotees of racial discrimination, can be nothing but enemies to genuine Gypsies.

We must make sure that the vote we will give Mr. Cazimir Ionescu will reflect the purity of our soul, tormented by so many passions, concentrated in the perfume of the rose petals for which we will tomorrow vote together with our spouses, children, parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents.

Trusting in you, "I end my poem and forgive my dwarf/ Because three incorruptible angels have whispered to me/ This one was whelped of nothing under the skies/ And there is no point in fighting against him," as said the second Morning Star of Romanian poetry across the Prut River.

Ethnic German Candidates in Local Elections

92BA0627A Bucharest NEUER WEG in German
20 Feb p 1

[Article by hb.: "There Were Forum Lists in 35 Localities: Nearly 400 Ethnic German Candidates Were on the Ballots in Roughly 130 Localities; The Most Varied Electoral Alliances Were Formed"]

[Text] Sibiu—The circular regarding the participation of the DFDR [Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania] in the local elections on 9 February published in the NEUER WEG and sent by the National Forum to the regional associations (but unfortunately not received by all of the local Forums) included the general recommendation that Forum lists should be prepared in places where it was likely that candidates of the DFDR might receive sufficient votes to get onto the local council. Where this is not the case, the local Forum organizations have the option of entering into electoral alliances (except with parties which advocate nationalistic or otherwise extremist viewpoints); care should be taken that the Forum's candidates have an advantageous position on the list and therefore have a chance to enter into local or municipal councils.

According to—unfortunately incomplete—information available from the National Forum (the statistical shortcomings are attributable both to a lack of overview and of interest on the part of the individual local Forums and the delayed publication of the election results), 365 ethnic Germans decided to become candidates for election. In 35 villages and towns in the Banat and in Transylvania there were Forum lists, yet Forum members and individuals of German origin were on another almost 100 lists or were reported to the election commissions as independent candidates. While an electoral alliance with the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (UDVR) was formed in the area of the regional Forum of North Transylvania (Satu Mare, Baia Mare, and Oradea), the representatives of the regional Forum of the Bukowina Germans had themselves placed on the

lists of the Democratic Convention. No candidacy is known from the regional Forum "Altreich" (which includes the Forums from Craiova to Constanta and Iasi).

According to the results on hand, after the first ballot in kreis Brasov, two Saxons received the absolute majority vote for mayor—Georg Stefani-Figuli in Tekes and Johann Schindler in Saros. Mayoral candidates nominated by the Forum and UDVR also won in Satu Mare County, in Bildegg, Foeni, Petrifeld, and Turulung. With some of them having good chances for a majority vote, candidates for the Forum are facing a runoff on Sunday in Kerz, Stolzenburg, Rod, Petrosani, Periam, Teremia Mare, Buzias, and Liebling.

The highest number of votes in a county commune went to the slate of the Forum in Resita (12 percent), which gave three representatives, the graduate engineers, Andreas Zahner, Oskar Seewald, Norbert Protocsil, seats on municipal council. In Sibiu, three candidates from the Forum list, Hans Wolfgang Auner, Hans Klein, and Sara Reisenauer, as well as Hermann Fabini, who headed the list of the Democratic Convention, succeeded in getting on the municipal council. Forum Heltau also has three representatives on the municipal council there, while the first two candidates each on the Forum list in Anina, Dognecea, Lugoj, Buzias, and Hatzfeld were voted onto the municipal council. The votes cast in Medias, Reps. Sighisoara, were sufficient for only one candidate on the Forum list—there are still two Forum members on the municipal council who got there via other parties. One seat each was won in Arad and Timisoara. Via the electoral alliance with the Democratic Convention, Georg Boer gained a municipal council seat in Muehlbach, Hermann Fazekas in Suceava, Bruno Stuner in Caransebes, while the Forum is represented in Satu Mare by Johann Leitner and Martin Zinner, No. 2 and No. 8 on the UDVR's list, and in Baia Mare by Ladislau Schneider and Stefan Ludescher, who occupied the first two slots.

The grand winner—according to results to date—is Mergeln, the small community in the upper Harbach valley, which also includes Schoenberg in its administration, where four Saxons (Daniel Frank, Johann Herberth, Katharina Lautner, and Erwin Stirner) moved into the local council via the Forum slate, plus two others (Alfred Lautner and Johann Hartel) via the National Salvation Front slate. (Just about 200 Saxons are still living in both villages.) All four candidates from the Forum list also gained council seats in Kerz as well as in Periam and Biled. Furthermore, candidates on Forum lists received a sufficient number of votes to be elected in Stolzenburg, Dirlos, Grossprobstdorf, Halvelagen, Nussbach, Tekes, Scholten, Nadrag, Sag, Lovrin, and Bacova. Of course, because of the very diverse electoral alliances (from agrarians to ecologists and Republicans, the National Salvation Front, and even the Party of Romanian Unity) and the participation of independent candidates, there are also Romanian Germans in municipal and local councils in Ferdinandsberg, Bocsa, Lupeni,

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Gura Humorului, Siret, Putna, Chiesd, Rod, Risnov, Taratalau, Brenndorf, Marpod, Hamruden, Nussbach, Petersberg, Talmaciu, Altin, Agnita, Hetzeldorf, Grosslasseln, Birthaelm, and Coplea. According to present information, 104 of the 365 (known) candidates can consider themselves among the election winners. It is hoped that an extensive

overview of the Forum members on the newly elected municipal and local councils will be made available on 14 March when the National Forum meets. The excellent election results may be attributed, however, to the esteem that the ethnic German population in general enjoys and not so much to the efforts of the Forum.

**Request for Bosnian MUP Transformation
Discussed**

92BA0629B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Momcilo Mandic, assistant minister of internal affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, by S. Hodzic; place and date not given: "They Want the Personnel Officer To Be Replaced"]

[Text] One of the demands of the Crisis Command Center of the Serbian people in the time of the barricades in Sarajevo, which has been honored in a dramatic meeting of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], was transformation of the B-H MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. However, nothing more has been said about this transformation, and it is still a secret what the MUP is supposed to look like after the agreed changes.

We must say that many of the responsible people in the MUP did not know of anything to say as to what kind of transformation is envisaged. They sent us to Momcilo Mandic, assistant minister of internal affairs, who should know.

"In the B-H MUP, there have been major illegalities detrimental to personnel of Serbian nationality," Mandic said, by way of explaining this transformation to us. "The commission formed by the minister has established that 1,400 people were employed in this ministry outside the job analysis, and they were mostly of Muslim nationality. At the same time, there are cases when job vacancies envisaged for personnel of Serbian nationality are not filled for as long as six months. For example, in Bratunac the chief of the SJB [Public Security Station] and the commander of the police station were removed after a young man of Muslim nationality was murdered; the former was a Muslim and the latter a Serb. Another Muslim was immediately appointed to the chief's post, but no Serb has yet been put in the position of commander of the police station. The situation is similar in Visegrad.

"Nor has a public security chief been elected yet in the Mostar center of the security service, and that post is also classified for a Serb," Mandic continued. "Another important disgrace for the MUP is the fact that Miroslav Duka has been working in the Bileca SJB since in September without official confirmation of his appointment."

Mandic says that criminals are being hired in the department and applicants have been accepted for enrollment in the course for policemen when they did not have specialized secondary training.

Mandic puts most of the blame for this situation in personnel policy on Mirsad Srebrenovic, assistant minister for personnel, who was appointed two or three months ago to replace Hilmo Selimovic.

"Srebrenovic was brought in from another state—Croatia," Mandic says. "And we do not need to have a foreign national shaping our personnel policy. A Muslim from Bosnia-Hercegovina should take that position, that is, a man who lives with us, not one who has a Croatian passport. In addition, as a member of the Main Committee of the SDA [Democratic Action Party], he has been conducting the policy of the extreme wing of that party, which did everything to get rid of Hilmo Selimovic. It seems that even Minister Delimustafic, who made immense efforts for unity in the MUP, is giving in to that extreme segment of the SDA, so that if this ministry splinters, he will also bear responsibility."

So, Mandic continued, the demands for transformation of the MUP are as follows: invalidation of all decisions on employment in the MUP which do not conform to the criteria of the job analysis, institution of criminal charges against those who did those things, the hiring of Serbian personnel for those positions to which they are entitled and which have been envisaged by the job analysis, replacement of Mirsad Srebrenovic and his replacement by a Muslim from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

**Dragonja River Seen as Slovene-Croatian
Boundary**

92BA0600A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 25 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by Boris Suligoj: "The Border Should Run Along the Dry Bed of the Dragonja"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] This is what the Commission on International Relations and the Commission on Maritime Affairs thought; the issue of the Piran Bay will be very complicated; the border as a center line?

Ljubljana, 24 Feb—Slovene negotiators should promote the possibility of Slovenia's access to the open sea to the greatest possible extent, and in this regard should exploit all the advantages offered in international maritime law by conventions with respect to the handling of sea straits. Otherwise, nothing has yet been decided on the maritime border between Croatia and Slovenia. Today, two Assembly commissions—on international relations and maritime affairs—met on the issue of the demarcation between the new European states. The first commission has already supported the Slovene government's initiative for concluding an agreement on the border with Croatia, but this agreement still does not define the maritime border.

Among other things, the Commission on International Relations adopted several resolutions, which first of all advocated settling the issue of the border between both states in the interest of good-neighborly relations. They likewise proposed demilitarization of the border areas between Slovenia and Croatia. A complication arose when Danijel Starman, the chairman of the Commission on Maritime Affairs, proposed that the second article of the agreement with Croatia that was being discussed be

somewhat revised. That article now says that the neighboring states should study the issue of the demarcation at sea in accordance with the principles and rules of international law. Danijel Starman, however, proposed that this article say that the starting point on land for defining the maritime border be proposed by a separate agreement between the states. That proposal seemed superfluous to the members of the commission, since the text of the agreement that has already been proposed provides for appointing an intergovernmental commission, also including experts who will be able to talk precisely about the maritime border. Most of the attending members of the Commission on Maritime Affairs thought that the starting point on land, and how the border ran on land before it reached the sea, were of crucial importance for defining the maritime border (three members of the Commission on Maritime Affairs, the brothers Franco and Aurelio Juri and Marino Domio, did not agree with that opinion).

The proposal offered by Danijel Starman seemed to most of the members of the Commission on International Relations to be sensitive, since to a certain extent it affected the already defined land border. Jozef Smole, for example, thought that regarding the issue of the border on land, Slovenia had to proceed from the principle of the inviolability of Slovene borders, since otherwise, questions could also arise concerning the fairness of borders with the other states bordering on Slovenia.

The text of the proposed agreement, which describes the land border between Slovenia and Croatia fairly precisely, thus remained. The border's final kilometers before the sea are described as follows: "In the vicinity of the Abitanzi settlement, the border turns to the northeast up to the Dragonja River. It follows the Dragonja River for approximately one kilometer to the west, where it turns to the southwest and again reaches the Dragonja River above the Mornjan settlement. From there, it follows the Dragonja further to the Mlini hamlets, and then goes south from the Mlini, Skoldelin, and Skrile hamlets along the former southern and now dry bed of the Dragonja to its former outlet into the Piran Bay, south of its present redirected course."

With respect to a possible sea corridor that Slovenia should obtain, the majority thought that this was actually not that important to Slovenia, since international maritime law automatically, so to speak, "allows" a coastal state with a closed sea to apply so-called innocent passage, which means that in any case Slovenia has a right to innocent passage to the open sea, even if the neighboring state were at war. Consequently, it also would not be sensible to offer that sea corridor in any way in exchange for any kind of highway corridor.

There will be a much more complicated issue with respect to the demarcation of the Piran Bay. In the opinion of master of maritime law Gregor Velkhaver, silence on Slovenia's part could mean tacit acceptance of the border's being drawn through the middle of that Bay in accordance with the principle of the center line. This,

of course, would have a substantial impact upon the Piran Bay and the opportunities in this bay of Slovenia's. If an intergovernmental agreement is not reached soon, "the border will be instituted as a center line." Slovenia should not allow this, since there are historical and other circumstances that argue in favor of the fact that the Piran Bay represents a specific integral unit. It is not yet possible to predict today how the states will resolve this issue, however.

Slovene-Croatian Maritime Boundary To Be Defined

92BA0600B *Ljubljana DELO* in Slovenia 29 Feb 92 p 22

[Article by Boris Suligog: "Gunboats or Surfers"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Demarcation of the sea with Croatia will be difficult; Slovene diplomacy will have to prove itself, and will obviously have to bargain with Zagreb.

What sort of times await the sea in the Piran Bay? Will two gunboats (Slovene and Croatian) really protect the maritime border in the middle of the Bay, or will reason prevail, so that there will be an agreement and such a maritime system that a surfer at Bernardino will not have to think about whether to take his passport with him, but only about whether he will catch a favorable wind, and that a fisherman will be able to wet a fishhook without concern, and tourists from one side of the coast will still want to visit the other side?

While awaiting agreement, Croatia has been in a slightly unusual hurry: At the end of the Savudrija peninsula, it has decided to set up a military (naval) radar observation base. It is an obvious gesture—you never know when your neighbor (Italian or Slovene) can surprise you and attack... the Slovene bunkers are negligible in comparison with that base. Franco Juri explained the planned establishment of the military base on the cape, just a shot away from Piran (he has the information from competent sources, he clarified at a meeting of the commission on maritime affairs) as a Croatian response to the Slovene "appetites" that have appeared among the public, primarily in the Piran opstina and in some Slovene media. The Croatian move would thus represent a warning about the inviolability of Croatian Savudrija.

The demarcation of the Piran Bay by a so-called center line, on the other hand, would mean that Slovenia, in the process of becoming independent, has lost a part of the sea that it has used from World War II onward, and has still been concerned with in one way or another. There are several possibilities for the location of the maritime border between the new states. The states can agree on any sort of variant. Dr. Davorin Rudolf, Croatia's great expert on maritime law and at the same time the neighboring state's Minister of Maritime Affairs, wrote among other things in his 1985 book *International Maritime Law* (when he probably did not yet guess everything that would start happening in 1991): "The demarcation of the territorial waters of two or more

states is defined by an agreement. If there is no agreement, no state can expand its territorial waters across the center line, i.e., a line that is equally distant from the closest points of the base lines from which the territorial waters begin to be measured...." (We should explain that the territorial waters begin to be measured from the base lines and not from the coast in all cases. The base line attempts in some way to "straighten out" the coast and connects the capes of a curved coast, according to precisely specified regulations, of course.)

Consequently, if Slovenia and Croatia do not agree, the principle of the center line will automatically go into effect. At a time when there is no agreement, the center line in the middle of the Piran Bay is gradually becoming an increasingly firmer fact. In other words, this means that Slovenia is gradually losing control over part of the Bay that it has been supervising this whole time. In it, it has taken care of the cultivation of fish and shellfish (and is still doing it), developed aquaculture, transported tourists from one coast to the other, tried to run the cleanest possible sewage into it, etc. The opinion of some people at the joint session of the Assembly commissions on maritime affairs and international relations that negotiating on the maritime border can wait may be controversial precisely because of the principle of applying the center line. In fact, waiting can gradually lead to application of the center border line.

In lateral demarcation between states (that is, demarcation at sea between states that are adjacent to each other), several different principles can be applied, Dr. Davorin Rudolf states, and in listing examples, he mentions first of all the possibility of continuing the maritime border in the same direction as on land. Specifically, if the border reaches the coast at a right angle, this principle can be applied, but if it is at an acute angle, for instance, this principle cannot be applied.

He also cites the possibility of drawing a right-angled line from the starting point on land (from the point reached by the land border) to the coast. This is out of the question, however, if the coast is a winding one. The border line can also be drawn at sea along geographic parallels or meridians that pass through the starting point, or perpendicular to the coast, etc. This means that in defining the maritime border, it is naturally important where the starting point on land is actually located, or how (in which direction) the land border reaches the coast—sideways or directly, which coast it comes to, etc.

This detail probably did not seem important to the members of the commission on international relations. In fact, when the members of the commission on maritime affairs insisted that the approach of the land border to the sea should be studied a little and related to the formation of the maritime border (we have yet to negotiate with the Croats on the maritime border), they considered such comments insignificant, and drew the land border with Croatia rather precisely right to the sea. Perhaps this will not have a substantial effect upon the

maritime demarcation. Nevertheless, at least theoretically there is a possibility that a land border defined up to the last meter before the sea would prevent one version or another of the maritime border with Croatia. To be sure, it is still questionable whether the proposed land border (before the sea) is even acceptable at all to the Croats, who keep talking about the border on the Dragonja (in the Slovene proposal, it goes several dozen meters further south). Slovene surveyors, in fact, recognize three river beds of the Dragonja. The first one is the regulated bed, along which the Dragonja flows now, and which the Croats recognize as the border (at least in view of where they are building their border crossings). The second is the former bed of the Dragonja, which reaches the Piran Bay in the middle of the Secovlje salt works, and into which the Drnica stream is now diverted. The third one is the oldest, the dried bed of the Dragonja, which is perhaps known only by experts (the local residents with whom we spoke do not know about it), and runs somewhat (on the average, several dozen meters) south of the present Dragonja. If it were a desert, this probably would not matter. Things are different, however. It is quite possible that there may also be disagreements with the Croats over how the border should go on land for those few kilometers before the sea. Several "boundary posts" have already been enclosed; even though the border has not yet been defined, both sides are persistently completing and strengthening the border crossings.

With respect to the issue of a passage to the open sea, Slovenia can already reconcile itself to the statements that were rather convincingly made some time ago by Dr. Davorin Rudolf. Slovenia will not have a passage to the open sea. Certainly, it could ask Croatia for a corridor, and offer some other privilege in exchange, but something like this would be absurd. What Slovenia would use such a corridor for, in fact, automatically belongs to it according to the provisions of international maritime law—that is, the principle of innocent passage, which applies in a system of straits. That may seem unusual to the lay reader, since he imagines straits only as a narrow passage between two larger areas of the sea (for example, the straits of Gibraltar), but it should be explained that the principle of straits also applies to other cases. According to the 1985 Convention on Territorial Waters and the External Zone, one can also consider as straits a narrow passage between part of the open sea and part of the territorial waters of a state that does not have coasts on the straits themselves. Experts also arrived at this definition and solution after the complication in the Gulf of Aqaba, around which there are four states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel).

In that narrow Bay, Israel and Jordan would not be able to establish connections with the open sea, but since the straits principle applies in this case, it means that all vessels of a state that does not have coasts on the straits have the right of innocent passage, such that the states on the straits cannot stop vessels (merchant, military, fishing, research, etc.) under any circumstances. In this

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regard, one rule applies above all—that the straits must not be broader than twice the width of the territorial waters; in the case of the Adriatic Sea, this means twice 12 miles, i.e., 24 miles. The distance between Savudrija (Croatia) and Gradez (Italy) is shorter. This means that in this part of the straits, the principle of innocent passage automatically applies to all Slovene vessels (and others sailing to Slovenia). Consequently, Slovenia does not need corridors for access to the open sea at all.

Of course, the issue of fishermen is completely separate. This innocent passage will also be unimportant to Slovene fishermen if Croatia declares an economic zone at sea (this can be 200 miles wide from the territorial waters). Croatia has this possibility, and it will do it as soon as the situation permits. It has decided on this possibility, and already committed itself to it in its constitution. Consequently, Slovene fishermen can only fish freely somewhere in the Mediterranean. For fishing in the Adriatic Sea, however, they will have to obtain a permit of one kind or another from Croatia (or from Italy).

The issue of the Piran Bay is much more complicated. How can one divide this Bay in such a way that the wolf will be full and the goat will be whole (in this case, the goat is the small Slovene sea)? There are several procedures. The most elegant (for Slovenia, of course) would be if Croatia ceded the uninhabited part of the Savudrija peninsula to Slovenia in exchange for some other part of the territory. This would involve some sort of trade, which Marjan Starc proposed in the commission on maritime affairs. A trade, however, was decisively rejected by Aurelio Juri of the same commission, who claims that such a trade, in principle, would make possible a trade of another kind, and in this regard he mentioned the Italian neo-Fascists who were talking about buying back Istria in some way. Of course, the position on shifting the land border does not seem satisfactory to the commission on international relations, since it thinks that the agreed-upon principle of the unalterability of the land borders should be consistently observed.

And what possibilities remain? For some time they considered whether Slovenia could declare part of the Piran Bay to be internal maritime waters. This, however, can only be declared if the area of these waters is larger than the area of a semicircle with a diameter equal to the line that can be drawn to the Bay in the east. The theoreticians have already abandoned this theory, however, since it supposedly does not benefit Slovenia much. Another possibility would be using the principle of the direction of the land border. From the Dragonja, the maritime border could pass along the Savudrija peninsula; Croatia would thus keep a narrow zone of the sea along the peninsula, and most of the Bay would belong to Slovenia. Of course, this would have to be agreed upon and justified. The next possibility would be if the Piran Bay were to be declared a historic gulf (a "historic bay" or "historic waters"). It should be said at once that experts have not yet been able to agree on regulating this

issue in maritime law. (Elsewhere in the world, the case of the Fonseco Bay, on the Pacific coast of Central America, is known in regard to the disputes among Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador). Dr. Davorin Rudolf is convinced that such a "historic bay" could only exist within the bay of one state. This also means that the Piran Bay could not be treated as an integral historic and economic unit, even if we could prove historically that for all these years it has primarily been Slovenia that has used this part of the bay and taken care of it.

The Slovene experts see the only solution in an appropriate agreement with Croatia, and propose even preparing a special agreement (a sort of "Osimo" agreement with Croatia) that would describe very precisely all the issues related to demarcation.

Of course, what concessions should be offered to Croatia is a matter for political, economic, etc., judgment. It is understandable that Slovenia would have to think over whether it would be worth while to make concessions so that Slovene fishermen would be able to cast their nets in Croatian waters. It would also be possible to calculate whether fishing was of more interest, or whether highway tolls would bring more.... It appears more and more that Slovenia's geostrategic position is just not that negligible, even though it seems sacrilegious to certain people to talk about any sort of trade. A proposal has even appeared that borders should not even be established in the Piran Bay, which would mean that the sea in this bay would belong equally to both states. It is already clear to many that a center border line would have an economic impact on the Piran Bay and the possibilities of using and developing it. It is precisely for this reason that such a border is unacceptable to most experts. Why wouldn't the system in the Piran Bay remain as it has been until now, when (this still applies now, when we are writing this) the Slovene maritime police are overseeing the entire bay up to the Savudrija coast, and the border of their control is a straight line that goes from Savudrija to the open sea?

Now Slovene diplomacy and legal and other experts will have to prove themselves, and above all their capability of sober judgment. A great deal is also said about willingness to settle the complications in connection with the Piran Bay in a statement by Zoran Thaler, the Slovene deputy foreign minister, who said that they would be grateful if they received any sort of initiative for rescuing the bay from the territorial area. It is hard to imagine what sort of system we would have in the bay if no borders were drawn. Of course, drawing a border is one thing; the system in it is a completely separate issue....

JNA Knin Corps Commander on Situation in Front

92BA0660A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
11 Mar 92 p 10

[Interview with Brig. Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of the Knin Corps of the Yugoslav People's Army, by

Borislav Solesa; place and date not given: "If Not for the Army, Blood Would Flow"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Brig. Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of the Knin Corps of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], on the situation at the front, the arrival of UN forces, the transformation of the JNA, the arrangement for weapons. The ultimate aim of the actions of Croatian units is to delay or put in question the involvement of UN forces. Tudjman's statement about demobilization—a show for the world public. What has remained in the JNA—is also valid. The military leadership initiated everything even while Kadijevic was in charge.

"The situation at the front is unstable, and much more unstable after the attack by Croatian forces on the village of Nos Kalik (a Serbian village in which three people were killed and 49 taken prisoner—editor's note). The aim of Croatian armed units has been to create this instability, which in their judgement is supposed to grow into widespread clashes in this area. They are constantly violating the cease-fire, at specific intervals of time, operating primarily with firearms equipped with silencers, while mortar and artillery actions are also not rare. There have been a number of provocations on their part in the region of Drnis and the Skradinski hinterland. Yesterday they began provocative attacks and actions in the Gospic-Gracac direction. The ultimate aim of these actions by Croatian paramilitary units is to delay or put in question the involvement of the UN peacekeeping forces. It is being shown that they are afraid of the truth because, with the arrival of the peacekeeping forces and neutral observations of the crisis in Yugoslavia, the real perpetrators of the crisis will be recognized. As is known, the leadership of the Republic of Croatia is the instigator of the crisis in Yugoslavia and has ignited the flames of war in our country. We have been restrained to the maximum extent in all cases of cease-fire violations, but from this moment on, where they violate the cease-fire, we will react in an appropriate manner, with the aim of protecting peoples' lives and property."

The commander of the Knin Corps of the JNA, Brig. Gen. Ratko Mladic, describes the current situation on the Knin battlefield in this way. We spoke with him about the arrival of the peacekeeping forces, the transformation of the JNA, the arrangement of weapons after the arrival of the "blue helmets."

What Is Not a Secret

[Solesa] Can the defensive actions about which you're speaking endanger the peace plan?

[Mladic] International war law allows us to react to their attacks. I made it clear to them that we are for peace and the peaceful resolution of the conflict in our country, that we will not undertake first, as we have not done up to now, any aggressive actions or attacking operations,

for which, by all means, we have the forces and capabilities. We are for a peaceful solution and the complete respect of the cease-fire agreed on in Sarajevo on 3 January of this year.

[Solesa] Contradictory information is coming from the opposing side in this war. President of the Republic of Croatia Tudjman has announced the demobilization of 20,000 troops but, on the other hand, information is also coming about the strengthening of the Croatian army with arms. Tanks (German "Leopards") have allegedly been unloaded in Rijeka harbor and aircraft are also often mentioned. Do you have information in this context about reinforcements on the front lines.

[Mladic] Well, it's no secret at all that they have continually been arming themselves and that this is still going on. They are not obtaining these weapons openly from those forces that have supported them up to now. What Tudjman has announced as demobilization are only his games at presenting himself to the world public as a peacebuilder and to justify the actions that he took in coming to power, bringing war to Yugoslavia. This is also a certain justification for him before his own public, since he is resolving the accumulated dissatisfaction and problems that face him with various empty promises. It is illusory to discuss how much he is for peace. If he were for peace, he would not have done what he has done.

[Solesa] The Army and its Yugoslav character are often spoken about, with speculation that it has broken up into several armies. How do you view this situation?

[Mladic] The JNA is experiencing changes and transformations, as is all of Yugoslav society. The Army has passed through many difficult times. I appreciate the fact that, passing through specific situations and attacks from all sides, it has become still firmer. In my opinion, what has now remained in the Army—is worthwhile. What has fallen out of it should not even have been in it. The trouble is that there were numerous traitors in it who thought that, by leaving the ranks of the JNA, they were putting themselves in the service of some national interests and for the good of their people. However, they pulled the people into the conflict and brought war to their people. If not for the Army, blood would flow in streams, and casualties would number in the thousands and tens of thousands.

Everything Will Go According To Vance's Plan

[Solesa] The role of the former federal secretary, Veljko Kadijevic, in the JNA is still being speculated about. Controversial information about this is available.

[Mladic] I wouldn't comment on those stories. It's not up to me to discuss and think about this. I think that the military leadership undertook everything even while Kadijevic was in charge, as well as now that the crisis is being resolved by peaceful means, without bloodshed for the preservation of Yugoslavia. All these are unfounded

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interpretations and assessments, probably circulated by those who do not think well of either Yugoslavia or the JNA.

[Solesa] How are preparations proceeding in the Knin corps for the arrival and reception of the peace forces? What have you carried out?

[Mladic] Up to now we have realized a number of contacts with the UN mission in Knin. With a group of high UN leaders, which will be deployed in a zone of responsibility for the Knin corps, a survey of locations will be carried out in the coming days, we will concern ourselves with their lodging and assist them with their involvement in all situations. We will await the arrival of the peacekeeping forces in readiness.

[Solesa] What, specifically, will the Knin corps offer the peacekeeping forces?

[Mladic] When I go with them we will reach specific agreements. We will provide lodging facilities and everything that they will need to carry out their mission as successfully as possible. We have already taken some steps in establishing a communications system.

[Solesa] A dilemma still prevails about how JNA units will be deployed and where weapons will be laid down. Has that finally been resolved?

[Mladic] There is no dilemma, and it is not necessary to speak about details to the general public, because part of the information from that domain has been designated secret. In any case, it will be the way it was drafted in Cyrus Vance's plan, or in the plan of our assumed command.

[Box, p 10]

The Militia of Knin

[Solesa] What are the relations like among the JNA, TO [Territorial Defense], and the "Knindza," the militia of Knin?

[Mladic] That is a unified organism and no type of separation should be sought. We are working responsibly and in a complex manner. Everyone is performing his function and I think it will be that way until the end. Therefore, we have preserved the area of Krajina, which we secured together.

[Box, p 10]

Krajina Divisions

[Solesa] What effect are the Krajina political difficulties and polarizations, up to the duality of authority, having on the fighters at the front?

[Mladic] In the beginning phase those misunderstandings perhaps had a certain effect. However, the morale of the fighters and people is high here. The people cannot be deceived so easily. I personally think that there will be no negative effect in that the individuals are attempting

with all their resources to adhere to the positions where they once were, and they are unaware that they have gambled away the trust of the people. The question is how they will adjust to these new circumstances. I have always emphasized and I am emphasizing now too that unity is our strongest weapon. Therefore, every individual must act in accordance with the interests of the whole and to give everything of himself in order to achieve maximum unity, in order to be as firm as possible, and in order to surmount this painful period as successfully as possible with the fewest possible casualties.

Economic Woes of Bozovic's Government

92BA0626A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
2 Mar 92 pp 13-14

[Article by Stojan Stamenkovic: "The Politics of Bozovic's Government: 'St. Anthony's Chain'"—first paragraph is VREME headline]

[Text] Serbian economic powers, after an agreed-on economy, are establishing an underground economy: rule by underground acts.

We are confronted with a total reduction in production and the absence of a minimal material base for preserving a standard, already lowered to the edge of poverty.

Estimates are that this year only about half of the volume of production in 1989 should be counted on. For the sake of illustration, one can begin with the fact that, for example, Portugal and Yugoslavia (this can also be representative for Serbia, which does not deviate significantly from its average), at the expiration of the 1970's, had approximately the same per capita social product; this permits the assumption that their average standard was about the same then. According to estimates, we will achieve about 35 percent of the product per capita of that same Portugal in 1992, although it has not distinguished itself with extremely rapid growth either; based on this, we are no longer in Europe, but somewhere in northern Africa.

A Fourth of the Standard

When excessive distribution to the detriment of the average standard because of the war and increased costs caused by the emergence of new states, as well as because of the net outflow of resources conditioned by the payments balance blockade, is figured in—it can be taken reliably that the average standard has fallen behind still more (it has probably remained under one-quarter), with a massive increase in the number of people on maintenance: retirees, unemployed, hidden unemployed, military....

Since it cannot be concluded that a dried-up dogwood can be squeezed still more with an increase in tax appropriations, an increase in production *conditio sine qua non* of whatever stabilizing and whatever social

policy, as well as a pre-condition for the formation and functioning of a modern economic system.

In fact, the main question that now arises is: will the conditions be created, and how fast, for a revitalization of economic growth—first short-term, and then for development too. If development, based on conditions of a market system, is a process that requires time and structural adaptation is necessary for conquering new markets—that means years and capital. And one sole way remains for the rapid revitalization of production: the rapid renewal of commercial flows in the Yugoslav economic area, where existing production has a market and sources of supply.

Deeper to the South

Whole production complexes have been stopped, whether because they are cut off from sources of supply, or from the market, and workers live under the illusion that they are employed, although the wages that they receive are nothing else than social assistance. The creation of all conditions for the renewal of commerce, including the normalization of transportation, the elimination of commercial barriers and the establishment of payments exchanges (this does not have to depend on a uniform monetary system), is necessary and possible despite the fact that several nations have emerged in that area and despite the political antagonisms among them, as well as the emotional charges that divide them.

Because, the alternative is a longer road to the south, to a society of the undeveloped, in which people can no longer nourish themselves even with a policy of equal stomachs. And at some future time, when passions have cooled, and the political map of Europe is consolidated, neighbors in this area, as always and everywhere, will be important economic partners: expansion of the economy to new markets does not mean abandoning old and established ones.

If one begins with the assumption that peace will be consolidated with the arrival of the UN forces, this means that the main assumption for abandoning the principle of a war economy in carrying out economic policy will be assured. However, an environment is being created at the present time for the economy of Serbia that is not suitable either for the rapid recovery of the production that was suddenly interrupted because of the disintegration of the Yugoslav market and war activities or for the development through which it would establish a connection with its economic surroundings in Europe and the world.

When the issue is the rapid development of commerce in the Yugoslav economic area, it is clear in and of itself that the commerce's satisfactory volume and structure, and with this a volume of production, cannot be achieved if this commerce is renewed by a natural exchange and if each job must be blessed in advance by the appropriate government organ.

Unfortunately, all this fits into a systemic environment whose long-term development prospects appear uncertain. The market concept in which competition prevails and the motive of maximizing profits are replaced by the concept of exporting surpluses and by imports of that which cannot be produced.

Serbia Rescinds Private Owners

It seems that material balances are again becoming the main lever of "macroeconomic" policy; this is, by the way, the main systemic characteristic of administrative socialism. Although limited short-term effects of the substitution of imports (from abroad or from the Yugoslav area) on production can be achieved through waging economic policy in this manner, a handicapped economy, inadequate for market competition, is thereby created over the long term.

Among arguments for this claim, one should particularly point out the widespread demand for support and integration of good and bad enterprises in the expectation that share capital will flow toward those firms (from where?). The system and economic policy have a discriminatory relation to private enterprises. The tax system limits the growth of private firms: together with the regulation on the obligatory sale of foreign exchange with imports of consumer goods (what is the right relationship for that?), a large number of private firms will close.

And, in general, a situation in which the government, through regulations under which economic conditions can change daily (which do not even have to have a base in law, but in a judgement of "justification" like the recent regulation on salaries), in which ownership relations established earlier (according to laws in effect that were indisputable then) are revised under new laws with retroactive effect, represents an environment in which domestic private capital is directed only into speculative investments with a very quick turnover and even with improbable conditions for doing business.

Ten percent of monthly interest on foreign exchange funds that is given by newly formed private banks means 200 percent on a yearly basis! If this is a pure transaction, it remains unclear why the National Bank of Yugoslavia does not make fixed-term deposits with a part of its foreign exchange reserves in those banks and settle the obligations for which it becomes liable from this interest. The question is, really, when this "St. Anthony's chain" will break. As far as foreign capital is concerned, it also will not come where its position can change overnight with one regulation.

Promises Without Cover

In this way development is squeezed among the tax system, the concept of a closed economy, and legal uncertainty, or uncertainty in regard to economic conditions.

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There is no capital for development, and it won't come under these conditions either, especially since the ever increasing inflation (or its substitute: the impossibility of obtaining goods for money) is something that is completely uncertain. At this time the control of issuance and excluding it from being absorbed by the budget cannot be achieved, because this would lead directly to a social explosion, since a broad fan of consumption is financed in this way—from the army and the administration, to pensions and wages for nonexisting work.

But, this way the question is also until when can it be postponed. It is interesting that the opposition is also without a real program in this regard, and statements from various sides that the economic mechanism and prosperity will be started through public works are naive, because it is precisely for public works that huge investment outlays are necessary. We must free ourselves of the illusion that more democratization in and of itself will bring faster development. It depends on the effective administration of capital; democracy is desirable here, but it is not a necessary condition (several cases of very effective economies in totalitarian regimes of older and more recent times can be cited).

But, on the other hand, an ineffective economy and lagging in economic development inevitably lead in the end to the extinguishing of democratic processes.

One piece of "good news" at the end. It seems that the problem of financing stocks of wheat, which has been very pronounced in recent years and which has even strengthened some political tensions, will be resolved. After the next harvest, there will not be any of these stocks, by their nature.

Study on Slovene, Croatian Economic Problems

92BA0626B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
2 Mar 92 p 16

[Article by Dusan Reljic: "Look Into the Future: Embrace of East and West"—first paragraph is VREME headline]

[Text] The birth pains of the Slovene and Croatian economic independence, judging from the findings of a Vienna study, will be severe. Cutting the umbilical cord with Yugoslavia is risky and visibly damages the interests of the "newborns."

Vienna, Feb—The economic recovery of Slovenia and Croatia substantially depends on reviving their connections with the Yugoslav market. The "prophet" that pronounced these perhaps sobering forecasts is not some confirmed unitarist, but an objective observer of Yugoslav economic (non)conditions, an analyst at the Vienna Institute for Comparative International Economic Research, the instructor Hermine Vidovic. Her conclusions are based on a vast study that she compiled on the economic situation in Croatia and Slovenia. The Austrian economy is among the parties most interested in an

objective assessment of the economic "health" of its old neighbors in new national attire.

"It has been said that the mutual economic ties of the Yugoslav republics are not particularly close, but it has been shown that there are strong, historically developed bonds. It has been claimed that the disintegration of the Yugoslav market would harm only Serbia, but that is an erroneous conclusion: The loss of the Yugoslav market is causing a great drop in production for everyone," Hermine Vidovic indicated in a conversation with a VREME correspondent.

Lack of Foreign Exchange

The Vienna institute has just published the findings of the study. These two new Balkan nations, judging from its results, are faced with a long journey until they see the light at the end of the tunnel. "Considering the lack of foreign exchange, Slovenia and Croatia are faced with a severe problem in paying off debts to foreign countries and stabilizing their currencies. Moreover, the economic future will depend significantly on the future organization of commercial relations with the former Yugoslav republics," the study says in conclusion.

A drastic drop in production, foreign trade, and personal incomes, galloping inflation, and growing unemployment are basic characteristics of the economic conditions in Slovenia and Croatia, Hermine Vidovic indicated. She especially warned of growing social dissatisfaction in both republics. Unemployment has "in no way reached its peak," she said, recalling the fact that enterprises under social ownership were forced to release work force because of necessary restructuring and the "pruning" of state subsidies. Private enterprises are still too weak to be able to "absorb" work force "freed up" in this way. Only one-third of the unemployed in Slovenia and Croatia, according to figures cited in the study, are receiving financial assistance. Many employed have not received wages for months.

The two new nations in the northwest of the Balkans need, the study states, financial and technical assistance from the West. It was emphasized that, because of an "acute shortage of capital," membership in the International Monetary Fund would be of "essential importance" for surmounting "financial impasses." Membership in the IMF is a condition for gaining access to credits from the World Bank and commercial banks and for initiating negotiations with the Paris Club on postponing the payment of existing debts and granting new credits.

A Clash of Ideologies

"Strong financial injections from abroad cannot be expected until Slovenia and Croatia are accepted into the IMF. It is known that Washington is not ready to recognize them, as it is also known how great the influence of the US is in the IMF," Hermine Vidovic stated. According to her assessment, Germany and Austria can reduce, to some extent, the barriers on their

markets for goods from Slovenia and Croatia, but truly free access to the European market is "a thing of the distant future." "Slovenia and Croatia will continue to be able to sell a great number of their products only on the Yugoslav market," she emphasized.

In the struggle for a better life, Slovenia's position is much more favorable than Croatia's since, as the study concluded, Slovenia possesses the necessary conditions for this: a higher degree of general economic development and significant experience on the western market. It was stated that, with the financial help of the West, Slovenia would be able over the long term to overcome the burden of paying off foreign demands.

However, Croatia is faced with a worse situation. The study concludes: "In the coming years Croatia will have to reckon with a significant loss of economic power—with all the difficulties of the transition to a market economy and a reduction in trade with the former socialist countries of central and eastern Europe, as well as with partners in the former Yugoslavia, and it must overcome severe damage from the war, as well as the possible loss of territory. The revival of tourism, Croatia's most important economic sector (2.2 billion dollars in revenues in 1990), will be slow because of political uncertainties." The same is true for joint investments and direct investments from abroad.

The birth pains of Slovene and Croatian economic independence, judging from the findings of the Vienna study, will be severe. Cutting the umbilical cord with Yugoslavia is risky and obviously damages the interests of the "newborn." The Economic Institute in Belgrade has confirmed that a complete economic break by Serbia with Slovenia and Croatia would cause a drop in production of 20 percent and the loss of jobs of at least 120,000 people in the Serbian economy. The question is whether the instinct for life of the economy will overcome the morbid passions of national ideology.

Slovene Textile Industry Hurting

92BA0664C *Ljubljana DELO* in *Slovene* 11 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by Lojze Javornik: "Strong New Competitors Have Appeared in the European Market"—first paragraph is *DELO* introduction]

[Text] The loss of the southern markets has been a serious blow to the Slovene textile industry because previously garment manufacturers sold up to 40 percent of their total production there. It will be necessary to find new markets, and we spoke about this with the general director of Jugotekstil, Dr. Tone Hrastelj, since Jugotekstil, as a large commercial firm, has an insight into the situation in world markets.

"The EC is by far the most important export market, not only for Jugotekstil, but also for the Slovene textile industry as a whole. Of the Slovene textile industry's total exports, \$750 million, \$500 million is in exports to

the EC. Jugotekstil alone exported \$280 million worth to the EC last year. It is also the most important market for us," Dr. Hrastelj stated.

The agreement between Yugoslavia and the EC was favorable to the textile producers because it allowed them to export without tariffs, which average 12-15 percent. This was a rather considerable advantage over competitors who did not have this privilege. To be sure, the EC prescribed quantitative limits, which with a few exceptions (i.e., knitted goods) were high enough that in practice they did not present any obstacle. The EC sanctions were a double blow to Slovene textile producers, since at the same time that tariffs started to be levied on their export goods, the EC approved the same privileges as our exporters had previously had for the Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, and Poles, on the basis of associate membership agreements. With the events in the Balkans, some businessmen began to think that they should reorient themselves toward countries where the transition from socialism was more peaceful.

Tariffs are still being levied on Slovene goods in the EC states, in spite of the decision already made a long time ago on eliminating the sanctions for cooperative republics. The exception is Germany, which has actually eliminated the tariffs on Slovene exports and even refunded the amounts already paid.

European tariffs are a heavy burden for the textile producers, since their customers shift the tariffs almost completely to them. With the total value of Slovene textile exports at \$500 million, 12-percent tariffs means \$60 million less income, and that is money with which, for example, one could build four or five new factories. The burden is being borne almost exclusively by the textile producers, since the former East European socialist states have also appeared in the European market as strong new competitors. With that competition, the seller cannot shift the costs to the customer, but has to lower prices instead in order to adjust to the competitors.

World Trade (Growth in Percent
Compared to Previous Year)

1988	14
1989	8
1990	15
1991	2
1992	8 (projection)

Source: HWWA

Let us also look at the rest of the most important markets! The American market is not as important to the Slovene textile industry, but of course it has to be taken into account. It is really interesting only to certain sectors—the wool producers, who were encountering quantitative limits in the EC, were more oriented across the ocean even earlier. Certain types of garments were

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also successfully sold in the United States. Exporting to the United States is difficult, since there are no customs privileges, transportation costs are high because of the distance, and fashion changes in America are also more rapid than in Europe. Thus, in past years Slovene textile producers earned \$35-40 million per year in America, and in the best case \$50 million. "In spite of everything, we have to keep the American market, and we will try to fight with their administration to free us of quantitative limits for some period. Perhaps we will succeed in this. I spoke in Davos with their chief GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiator, and he said that we had some possibilities for such a privilege," Dr. Tone Hrastelj said.

At this time cooperation is reviving again with Iran, where Jugotekstil has already been operating for more than 20 years. It has ongoing relations with Libya, where, judging by the most recent information, state import firms were recently abolished and imports were again left to private businessmen; more equal conclusion of contracts is expected from this.

Jugotekstil also has a foothold in Egypt, where it does buy more, but to which it also exports nontextile goods. In general, Dr. Hrastelj thinks that we should also develop relations with Egypt because of the closeness of the market. He says to those who interpret this as nostalgia for nonalignment that they should look a little further into the past, and they will see that even during the times of the defunct Austria-Hungary, Slovene merchants went to Egypt very frequently.

Jugotekstil has been cooperating with China for more than 30 years. At one time exports and imports were completely equal, but now it is importing more from China, especially raw silk and silk products. Periodically it also imported cotton, but China scarcely has enough of it for its own manufacturing. The Chinese also buy blankets, heavy wool cloth, and certain raw materials.

Of the former republics of the former Soviet Union, Jugotekstil is oriented primarily toward Russia, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, which is particularly interesting to it because of its cotton. Jugotekstil has a representation in Moscow, and is also preparing to establish representations in the other two capitals. Of course, there are great difficulties at this time in relations with these states, but Dr. Hrastelj thinks that one should take a more long-term view: "I recently spoke with representatives of an international bank who were assessing the situation in Russia fairly optimistically, and saying that the situation would already have stabilized considerably in two or three years. According to their assessment, the debts could be repaid, since they have enough interesting goods—especially raw materials, oil, and gas. During the transitional period, we obviously have to use the barter method of trading goods for goods as much as possible.

We must say that we do not have any faith at all in intergovernmental barter. For example, an agreement in the amount of \$150 million was signed with Russia, but it does not work, or perhaps it only works in the case of Russian deliveries of oil and gas. It is consequently necessary to find reliable partners and agree on specific transactions."

[Box, p 4]

Margins for Waiting for Better Times

Dr. Hrastelj is quite familiar with the industry, and he says that the situation in the Slovene textile industry is truly difficult. The physical volume of sales by Slovene textile businesses was cut in half last year. Those who achieved 55 percent are considered successful. Many private businessmen with whom Jugotekstil is cooperating say that they are only persisting out of stubbornness. Some of them have lowered their margins to 15-20 percent. "They cannot survive with this; it is substantially too little for retail sales. In good times, the retail sales margin was 80 percent, and that is also the usual margin in the world. Specifically, you have to take into account the fact that you will sell certain things at a discount, even below the purchase price. That is why a retail sales margin of 35-40 percent would be barely enough to survive, but 15 or 20 means that you are only living on waiting for better times—which may or may not come," Dr. Tone Hrastelj said.

[Box, p 4]

What Kind of Agreement With the EC?

In connection with the discussion about how to regulate relations with the EC after May, when the agreement with the EC will expire, Dr. Hrastelj thinks that we should weigh the different possibilities very carefully. Certainly, an agreement on associate membership is something attractive, but it raises the question of reciprocity: if Slovenia reduced or eliminated tariffs, the situation in the textile sector and certainly others as well would deteriorate seriously. "It therefore seems more appropriate to me to have, for a certain transitional period—as the EC may also offer us one—the same kind of agreement that the previous state had; this period would last for a year or two, and then, on that basis, we would develop an agreement on associate membership. In that way, it would be easier for us to get through this critical period of exports without tariffs," the director of Jugotekstil thinks.

[Box, p 4]

Textiles have become too expensive for Slovene customers, even though the prices of textile products increased somewhat less than the jump in average industrial prices. Last year the prices of individual commodity groups in the textile sector increased considerably less.

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